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Declaration
I declare that this thesis is, in total, an original piece of work of which none has appeared
in print before. I have published different material derivative of this thesis in various
publications (for more details see the bibliography), but it is work that is journalistic in
form. The only academic article I have written that comes out of my work on this thesis is
my article 'The Elephant Man: An Analysis From A Disabled Perspective', published in
Disability and Society (Vol. 9, No. 3, 1994). It is an article from which I have quoted but
which is completely different from the thesis. The papers, presentations, and journalistic
pieces that I have presented have all been on images of disability on film commissioned on
the basis of my carrying out this research.
In this thesis I have used many words that have for disabled people a suspect nature or
lineage without elaboration of their ambiguity, though their context and use in the thesis
will imply that I am aware and deeply suspicious of such ambiguity in their use. In order
not to waste too much time in repeating suspicions, or explanations for finding them
ambiguous, I do not continually put them in distancing 'quotation' marks; for example,
words and labels such as 'normal' or 'abnormal', 'Otherness', 'natural' and 'unnatural' and
'spastic' or 'cripple', 'positive' or 'negative', 'good' or 'bad', et cetera.
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Suininan,
In writing this thesis I have tried to get beneath the clichés of disability imagery to reveal
the social constructions, through cinematic processes, of images of physical impairment as
disability. The thesis must be seen in the context of other writers who have done similar
work on other marginalised groups within our society that are regularly portrayed on the
cinema screen: gays, blacks, women and, to a lesser extent, the working-class. The
construction of school of writers, using representation theory, who have over the last two
decades revealed that which had previously been taken for granted - the ideological and
cultural influences on and of imagery that have an impact upon the lived lives of those
represented - have been my guiding influence. The Social Model of disability theory has
been used as my primary methodological framework and analytical approach.
In the introduction I provide an outline of Disability Theory — i.e., the Medical Model and
the Social Model of disability - and define the theoretical framework within which the
thesis has been written to make the thesis comprehensible in the wider context of the social
construction of 'disability'. In the literature review of disability imagery writing (Chapter
One), I include writing that is journalistic rather than academic to redress the general
scarcity of writing on disabling images.
In this thesis, the cinematic techniques that construct impairment as disability, i.e.,
pathologise impairment as Other(ness), are identified. I explore three specific areas of
cinema and culture in Chapters Two, Three and Four of the thesis: the use, or non-use, of
stereotypes; the representation of the family in relation to disability, and finally, the use of
the abnormal body to pathologise impairment.
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Introduction
'Nature, Mr Al/nut, is what we are put in this world to rise above.'
Rose Sayer (Katharine Hepburn) in The African Queen (John Huston, GB, 1951)
'I feel that life is divided up into the horrible and the miserable; those are the two categories, you know: the
horrible would be like - um - I don't know, terminal cases, blind people, cripples. I don't know how they get
through life, it's amazing to me. The miserable is everybody else. So when you go through life you should be
grateful that you're miserable; you're very lucky to be miserable.'
Alvy Singer (Woody Allen) in Annie Hall (Woody Allen, US, 1977)
In this introduction it is essential that I clarify certain things: the meaning of 'disability' as I
have used the term in the thesis; what films are at the core of the study, and why I have
chosen those films in particular. Most importantly, though, is that I outline the
methodological approach to be used and the way it is to be applied. I start by giving a brief
introduction into what constitutes 'disability'.
What is Disability?
In any discussion of disability, let alone disability imagery, terminology and definitions are
key factors in determining how it is seen and then 'interpreted'. Most Western states
employ a definition advanced by the World Health Organisation (WHO), in order to carry
out their social policy (Barnes, 1992). It has three distinctions: impairment, disability and
handicap, encapsulated by Barnes (1992) as follows:
'[i]mpairment' refer[s] to a defective limb, organ or mechanism of the body,
'disability' as the resulting lack of function, and 'handicap' denotes the limitations
on daily life which ensue from disability. (p.6)
Consequently, from this definition a 'handicapped' person has an 'impairment' which
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produces the 'disability' and, as such, is 'handicapped' by that 'disability' and 'impairment';
the whole definition rests upon the body of the individual who has the impairment. Thus,
disability, according to this defmition, is based on a pathological and individualised model
commonly known as the Medical Model. The Medical Model has a philosophy and
interpretation that has their foundation in the Enlightenment (Davis, 1995), the rise of the
medical profession (Foucault, 1977[a]), and industrial capitalism - workers had to be
classified as those who could work, who could not and who would not (Oliver, 1990).
Also, around the time of the Industrial Revolution, organised charity and philanthropy
started to employ the Medical Model of impairment as the main definition of disability
(Stone, 1984); the medical definition helped to define those who should receive charity, or
state aid, and those who should not. People with impairments started to be named 'disabled
people'; i.e., their up-until-then irrelevant impairments were made significant in the social
construction of abnormality and normality (cf. Foucault, 1977[a]; Oliver, 1990; Oliver,
1996; Davis, 1995).
Disability is, thus, in the Medical Model, a 'personal tragedy' rather than anything to do
with society or its social processes. It is pathological. Many disabled people, and the
organisations that they have founded, are highly critical of such a definition as it de-
socialises a condition that they perceived as being socially constructed. For the disability
movement (cf. Campbell and Oliver, 1996) people with physical impairments are disabled
not by their physical impairments (pathological realities) but by socially constructed
barriers (their social disablement) placed upon and around them by society. It is a society
that is built to exclude them physically from such entities as buses, buildings, education,
employment and leisure facilities, thus bearing out a theory that is, in essence, the Social
Model of disability (Oliver, 1990; and Oliver, 1991). The Social Model I am using has
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been developed, defined and refined predominantly by Michael Oliver (1990; 1996; Oliver
and Barnes, 1998). It is a materialistic model and one that adheres to basic Marxian
concepts of ideology and hegemony (coming from a Gramscian development of Marxist
philosophy). The definition of disability that organisations of (rather than for) disabled
people's use takes into account the social exclusion of people with impairments by a world
(socio-politically, economically and culturally) created and maintained by able-bodied
norms rooted in a capitalist means of production, one which has various ideologies that are
either in the superstructure and / or support the capitalist structures that exist in Western
capitalist countries (Gleeson, 1999; Shakespeare, 1998). For Hevey (1992) disability is
entirely a political issue:
[D]isability: the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary
social organisation which takes no or little account of people who have physical (or
mental) impairments and thus excludes them from the mainstream of social
activities. (Hevey, 1992. p.9)
The Social Model's definition of disability is based on the fact of discrimination and the
social exclusion of people with impairments, grounded in the assumption that the disabled
are socially constructed as abject and not the natural results of a physical limitation or
difference within any given individual. The Social Model challenges the WHO model by
having 'disability' as being that which they label 'handicap'; the Social Model of disability
amalgamates WHO's definitions of 'disability' and 'impairment' whilst also making them
irrelevant to issues of 'disability'. The Social Model definition is often broken down into
three main categories of discrimination (cf. Barnes 1991). It offers categories emphasising
three types of barriers that are used to exclude and discriminate against people with
impairments: the attitudinal, the institutional and the environmental. Disabled critics are
beginning to reveal the processes of disablement — from a Social Model perspective - in all
aspects of society. This trend has been demonstrated, for example, by many writers in
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relation to disability and the State (Oliver, all references; Stone, 1984), the law (Gooding,
1994; 1996) and the media (Barnes, 1992; Norden, 1994; Kimpton-Nye, 1994; Kimpton-
Nye, 1997). Such writing is also now appearing in the fields of medicine (Armstrong,
1983; Bogdan, 1988; Turner, 1992), charities (Hevey, 1992), and housing and education
(Barnes, 1991; Barton, 1989).
The Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS), in 1975, defined
disability, using an early form of the Social Model, as:
the loss or limitation of opportunities to take part in the normal life of the
community on an equal level with others due to physical and social barriers.
(Barnes, 1992. p.'7)
The UPIAS definition emphasises the exclusions placed upon people with impairments in
relation to normal activities, but such definitions call for equality with normal others,
assuming that this is all that disabled people (as a socially constructed group) want.
Significantly, its weakness for academics such as Oliver and Barnes (1998) is that the
UPIAS definition assumes, at least in theory, a normal capability for all disabled people
along with the notion that normal is an actual and comparable reality.
The above criticism is based upon the assumption that by aligning issues of disability with
normality, one both degrades impairment as a lived experience and participates in the
further segregation of those with extreme or multiple impairments that cannot be brought
under any definition of normality, no matter how wide. Some disabled people (Barnes,
1990; Liggett, 1988) acknowledge the Social Model as a step forward from the Medical
Model but fear its appropriation by those who wish to put the emphasis on something that
the disabled (or anybody else) are not, i.e., normal people.
Goffman (1990; 1991), for example, falls into this category as he posits a theory that
places the management of impairment on the disabled individual. Goffman argues that the
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impaired individual must cope with his / her own spoilt identity as it is his / her own
problem. Although Goffman acknowledges a degree of social construction in deviancy
and abnormality, he nevertheless suggests that it is the individual 'deviant's' responsibility
either to change or to ameliorate its effects. Perhaps the problem with Goffman's approach
is that while it acknowledges a Social Model perspective, in the abstract, it is trapped into
seeing society as having no role in the subsequent 'management' of impairment or
abnormality; that is left to the individual. Goffnian thereby validates an individualised
definition of disability because, although the individual is subject to social construction
and / or internalisation of what is placed by society at large upon that individual's identity,
the responsibility for the amelioration of that 'crisis' is still primarily the task of the
individual.
Other writers, primarily Liggett (1988), Abberley (1987) and, in relation to the Deaf
community (a capital `D' specifically denotes those who use sign language and identify
themselves as part of a Deaf culture), Davis (1995), view disability through what they call
an interpretative methodology based on Foucauldian ideas. This approach discusses
disability genealogically, placing it in its historical perspective and trying to draw
conclusions regarding who benefits from the creation of the disabled and what power
relations exist as a consequence. Such writers conclude that capitalism is the principal
beneficiary of an established status quo (Oliver and Barnes, 1998), however biased.
Liggett argues that as capitalism has evolved within a shifting base of employment
conditions and practices, the definition and scope of disability have shifted in order to deal
with its own crises (of capitalism). This indicates, for Liggett, disability's arbitrariness
and implicit link to social processes, rather than its being some scientific or immutable
definition.
Equally, Stone, in The Disabled State (1984), identifies the medical profession as the
gatekeepers to non-medical state and charity benefits, thereby making the medical
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profession, intrinsically linked to capitalist modes of production, one of the key groups in
the modern construction of disability. This view is based upon the assumption of the
profession's ability to cure (normalise) the abnormal or care for (discipline) the impaired.
Significantly, though, Stone argues that as the number of disabled people has increased,
other professions have been brought in to interpret and construct disability in their own
way: social workers; welfare professionals; charity workers; the 'disability industries'
(Hevey, 1992) making prostheses and normalising aids; and professionals to train the
'disability industry' professionals. Concomitantly, as ever-increasing numbers of the
disabled have needed to be managed, corresponding new class(es) of managers has been
created to manage that increase. For a critique of the historical perspective utilised by
Stone see Gleeson (1999).
Interestingly, the political Right are beginning to accept disabled people's demands for
equality, arguing that they are 'normal people really', in order to subvert a benefit system
which renders disabled people dependent. The benefit system forces many disabled people
to stay on those benefits because if they obtained work or participated in other activities
the benefits would be withdrawn. Thus, it is fmancially beneficial to be as impaired /
disabled as possible in order to maintain a standard of living that would otherwise become
impossible, especially in the face of attitudinal and environmental barriers and generalised
discrimination and exclusion (Oliver and Barnes, 1998). Consequently, the post-war
welfare system makes the disabled dependent by taking away benefits if they show any
sign of independence (Berthoud et al, 1993; Drake, 1999). Significantly, the political
Right have appropriated an element of political disability theory / politics in order merely
to reduce benefits rather than to increase independence, claiming that benefits make the
disabled dependent (Berthoud et al, 1993; and Russell, 1998). Disability political theory
does not overtly criticise such actions if these exist within a framework that challenges
other forms of the oppression or exclusion of the impaired at the same time. Either way, it
must still be stated that impairment does cost more to live with, and disabled people will
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often need more money to maintain the same standard of living as do others who have no
impairment. The Social Model does not deny the pathological elements of living with
impairments (Barnes, 1998) as some critics would suggest (Crow, 1996; and Morris,
1996). Consequently, from either a Medical Model (pathological) or Social Model (socio-
cultural) perspective, disability is a social issue both financially (Medical Model) and
politically (Social Model).
This brings us back to the Social Model's articulation for a form of equality that accepts
difference; for this nexus impairment is different, but not inferior, and it is only when this
factor is accepted that equalising action will be given as of right and not as charity. Having
aid, of any kind, given paternalistically, which is how the benefit system or current
disability equality legislation is framed (Berthoud et al, 1993; Oliver and Barnes, 1998),
merely reinforces the disabled as child-like, dependent and reliant on the 'goodwill' of
others. Ultimately, such paternalistic social policies reinforce the construction of disability
within the personal tragedy theory (Oliver, 1996). In a recent work on social policy the
two leading theorists on the Social Model of disability, Michael Oliver and Colin Barnes
(1998), have distilled the model down to its purest basics - the inclusion and / or exclusion
of disabled people in all forms of social processes. This thesis, in using the Social Model
and following in the theoretical footsteps of Oliver and Barnes (all their work), identifies
how cinematic representations of the disabled show; reinforce, and validate the social
exclusion or inclusion of the impaired and the disabled.
A key element in the use of the Social Model in this thesis is that its roots lie in the
'Construction Of' school of thought, just as does representation theory. Consequently,
they are ideal partners when used in conjunction in this thesis. The Social Model uses and,
to a large extent, identifies what constitutes the Medical Model. The Social Model defmes
the Medical Model - identifying the nature of its pathological exclusivity — as part of its
own theoretical basis and methodology. The Social Model offers a perspective from which
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it builds an inclusive model that is non-pathologically orientated. As such, this thesis, in
utilising the Social Model and representation theory as exemplified by the representation
of school of writers, is largely concerned with identifying Medical Model (pathologising)
practices and ideologies to reveal the hegemony of Medical Model practices that dominate,
in contrast to inclusive Social Model ones. Consequently, herein, I am applying the Social
Model theory of disability as a methodological approach to identify Medical Model
ideologies. By adopting two constructionist theories I am using the two most appropriate
methodological approaches that complement each other with no inherent inconsistencies.
There has been a move to create a third way of disability theory and politics, a perspective
premised upon the integration of impairment into the Social Model of Disability — a non-
binary paradigm rather than the Social I Medical Model dichotomy. This is largely
motivated by feminist writers such as Morris (1992; 1996) and Crow (1992; 1996) who
suggest that the experience of impairment should be segmented into or subsumed under the
Social Model of disability. This move is needed, they argue, because women's experiences
have been ignored and because impairment is a vital part of their disabled identity that has
hitherto been ignored. In addition, and as a result of the displacement of the experience of
impairment, they argue that Social Model theory is a man's theory designed for the benefit
of men. Combined with this, Morris and Crow (ibid) maintain that the Social Model
implies that the problems of impairment will cease to exist once the social processes of
disablement are challenged and eradicated. In response Barnes (1996) argues that
impairment is at the heart of the Medical Model's appropriation of disabled people's
identity because it focuses on impairments and, therefore, the Social Model is an
alternative which is more balanced and less liable to corruption from the medical
profession. In relation to the role and significance of women Barnes (ibid) is categorical
in stating that disability theory and politics have fully included women to the extent that
women have indeed been mole influential than have men in this context.
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Barnes argues that the role of medical sociologists in exploring (often negatively)
impairment issues is well documented and that it has, indeed, offered valuable information
and data about the psychological nature of impairment and its effect on the individual. On
the issue of impairment Barnes makes two further clear points about the Social Model.
Barnes (1996) argues that since impairment is an individual experience it cannot be a part
of a social model, but that the Social Model recognises its importance for the individual; it
also notes the Medical Model's appropriation of individual impairments for the latter's
own hegemony. Secondly, and more significantly, Barnes (1998) has recently written that
the Social Model:
is not a denial of the importance of long-term illness or impairment(s), appropriate
medical or psychological intervention or, indeed, discussions of these experiences.
Nor is it an assertion that once the various barriers have been removed the problems
associated with chronic illness or certain types of impairment will disappear — they
will not. And, contrary to recent assertions of some disabled people and non-
disabled writers (Crow 1996; Morris 1996), I have never met anyone or read
anything that suggested otherwise. (p.101)
The third way of Morris or Crow will not be addressed in this thesis as it is neither
sufficiently developed, nor does it yet have any foundation on a theoretical basis
significant enough to withstand strong criticism of the type made by Barnes (1996; 1998).
This thesis would not argue that Morris and Crow's perspective is neither invalid nor that it
is of no use for film studies on disability imagery in the future. On the contrary, a third
way that incorporates impairment and an awareness of the individual's experience of
impairment would probably be most useful in audience research and in assessing why a
variety of images of disability may be enjoyed by certain disabled people yet experienced
as offensive by others. Equally, the audience's perspective is not explored here because
this thesis is a purely textual analysis of the ideological intent and content of specific films.
The analysis will thus not incorporate the third way of Morris and Crow, but the
application of the Social Model of disability to a selection of films. The third way would
be more applicable in other areas of investigation. Equally, this thesis is not about the
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development or non-development of disability theory, but it is concerned with the
application of the very specific Social Model of disability, as developed and articulated by
Oliver (1990; 1996) and others, to the films in the thesis. It would not be helpful in this
thesis to seek an alternative analysis not based on the highly developed and coherent Social
Model.
Interestingly, disability politics seems to have followed a path similar to that of feminist
politics, yet has omitted the initial stage of mass discussion and instead entered the
academy directly. However, since it is my intention not to explore the comparative
developments of other theories of social construction but rather to examine the application
of the Social Model as a theory of the social construction / creation of impairment as
disability to images of disability and impairment, Shakespeare (1993; 1994; 1998) is
recommended as a comparative work. The following chapters are written within a
framework of the Social I Medical Model dichotomy which is prevalent within academy
disability politics, from a Social Model perspective that interprets disability as entirely
socially created and constructed (constructed on film, in this case). The thesis is an
exploration of the way disability (principally within the Medical Model as identified by the
Social Model) works off, within, and into, popular culture's assessment of what disability
is: i.e., a personal tragedy theory (Oliver, 1990; 1996) that makes the individual concerned
both dependent and pathetic. This is a perspective rooted in the institutional assumptions
of impairment as synonymous with disability and is therefore, as such, a perspective which
deems the impaired as being naturally pathological and inferior to the normal.
Institutional definitions of disability create an ideology of disability as impairment, as, it
will be argued, do cinematic representations of disabled people. In using the term
'ideology' I mean that which Corr (1996) defines, using Althusser, as:
that system of beliefs and assumptions - unconscious, unexamined, invisible -
which represents 'the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions
of existence' (Althusser, Ideology, 1971, p.162); but it is also a system of practices
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that informs every aspect of daily life. Though it originates in particular cultural
conditions, it authorises its beliefs and practices as 'universal' and 'natural', for
instance, presenting ideas of health, illness and 'disease' not as cultural constructs
but as eternally and everywhere the same. (p.8)
The ideology of disability is perpetuated in popular culture by its representation of
impairment as disability in literature (Quicke, 1985), on television (Ctunberbatch and
Negrine, 1992; Klobas, 1988), on film (Norden, 1994; Barnes, 1992), and on the radio
(Karpf, 1988). Unsurprisingly, current Western culture obtains many of its ideas about the
disabled from past representations and practices and from a variety of cultures. Disability
throughout history has varied very little — it is usually negatively defined, and refined, and
very occasionally it is neutrally represented. However, since the period of the
Enlightenment (Stone, 1984; Barnes, 1992; Davis, 1995) it has invariably been represented
as pathological (in the Medical Model) rather than anything connected with how society
functions or is constructed (the Social Model). For a more detailed account of the
influence of the Enlightenment on the impaired body see Davis (1995), Mirzoeff (1995)
and, of course, Foucault (1977).
There have been exceptions; ancient Egypt treated people with impairments as equal with
everyone else (Davis, 1995). Ancient Greece and Rome (Edwards, 1997), on the other
hand, advocated their extermination (except in the case of war veterans), and Plato
suggested that babies born with deformities should be left to die in the sun or drowned
(Barnes, 1996; Barnes, 1998; Garland, 1995; Albrecht, 1976). The Old Testament of the
Bible reinforced an ideology of negation for people with impairments, particularly the lists
in Leviticus and Deuteronomy of what God finds abhorrent: lists aptly summarised by
Douglas (1966, p.41) when she labels Leviticus' list 'The Abominations of Leviticus', it is a
list that included dwarfs, the blind and the lame; indeed, descriptions that cover most ideas
of what, or who, is impaired / disabled. 'Sin' and impairment are repeatedly shown as
causally related in the Bible, so much so that Luther advocated infanticide; he felt that
impaired infants should be beaten to death (to please God) as they were the devil's work
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(cf. Barnes, 1996; Abrams, 1998). The recent controversy (1999) over the sacking of the
England football team manager, Glenn Hoddle, is a clear indication of the currency of such
ideas (even though, one suspects the case in question was exploited by non-disabled media
professionals for other purposes).
Statistically, the highest number of people with impairments, and those most disabled, are
the elderly, yet impairment is considered in the popular consciousness as predominantly
affecting and afflicting the young (Oliver, 1991; Rojek et al, 1988), especially within a
legislative and social work frame (Liachowitz, 1988; Vernon, 1993). Thus, the aged
disabled are constructed differently, as being natural (or logical), with state policies in
place to make the ageing and aged pay for their own disablement (i.e., pensions, etc.
[Featherstone et al, 1991]). Young people with an impairment, on the other hand, are
constructed as unnatural and thus suitable objects of charity, either state or voluntary
(Hevey, 1992). The films discussed here, in this respect, represent the ideological
mystification of disability in our society, as disability (as impairment) is indicated as being
predominantly the preserve of the young and the middle-aged.
One cannot, and should not, write about impairment and its social construction without
reference to the Nazis. Impairment, under the Nazis, was punished by death, with an
estimated half-a-million (intellectually and / or physically) disabled people put to death
because they had 'lives not worth living' or were classified as 'useless eaters' (cf. Gallagher,
1990). An outline and analysis of the facts of this treatment can be found in Poore's (1982)
article Disability as Disobedience?' (cf Proctor, 1988; Gallagher, 1990). Cinema in Nazi
Germany was a key instrument of the negative propaganda against its enemies (Rentschler,
1996; Schulte-Sasse, 1996), including the disabled; its power of persuasion through
technique and mystification has, as such, always been recognised in the negation of one
group by or over another. The 1941 German, and Nazi-backed, film Ich Klage An,
directed by Wolfgang Liebeneiner, is a good example. In kh Klage An a young woman
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contracts a condition similar to Multiple Sclerosis and subsequently begs, successfully, for
pro-active euthanasia for the benefit of herself and the state.
Normality is itself a largely fascist concept: a controlling hegemony in the interests of an
elite — in normality's case, a body elite — of which the real power is imaginary rather than
real (constructed rather than natural). In Davis' (1995) view, normality is a concept that
can be maintained (or even exist) only if the abnormal and deviant are first labelled and
isolated so as to compare one group to another (Canguilhem, 1989) for a purpose other
than mere classification. Consequently, it is impossible to isolate the concepts of
normality and abnormality, either intellectually or physically, from any discussion of the
treatment or construction of 'disability' because normality is as equally constructed and
erroneous as are gender, race and abnormality (Davis, 1997; Thomsom, 1997;
Shakespeare, 1998). As race and gender have their own sets of 'norms' through which they
are mediated (cf. Perkins, 1979, Butler, 1993; Cripps, 1977; Garland Thomson, 1996) so
does abnormality (disability). It is a perspective and philosophy — the re-interpretation of
body 'norms' - at the heart of Foucault's work (1977; 1978) and culture of medicine
sociologists such as Turner (1991, 1992; 1995) and Featherstone et al (1991). Just as there
is a totally different meaning to the terms and implications of sex and gender, so there is to
impairment and disability
One must also consider, in exploring disability, that bio-medicine is premised upon the
idea(1) that there is a normal state to which an ill or impaired individual can be brought
back (normalised and / or rehabilitated) or banished from (defined as sick or submitting to
euthanasia). As such, there is at work in the ideology of disability an ideology of
normality, a concept at the heart of this project. Such a premise (Higgins, 1985) may
explain the non-malicious complicity with which the medical profession has colluded in
the negation through objectification of those who do not fit that principle (Barnes and
Mercer, 1995; Turner, 1991; Turner, 1992; Turner, 1995) of normality. Following this
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logic, implicit in the Social Model's analysis and its identification of Medical Model
processes (Barnes and Oliver, 1998), the abnormal are, if nothing else, a constant reminder
of the fallacy of normality that undermines any profession's claim to be its faithful
defender.
Disability is created in society out of the lives of the impaired, through its many discursive
practices in ideology, as 'life not worthy of life', 'dependent and burdensome',
predominantly 'suffered' by the young and understood as uniform yet to varying degrees.
Society, through ideology, generalises impairment as disability, and to generalise is, as
defined by the American Heritage Dictionary, 'to render indefinite or unspecific [ ] to
reduce to a general form, class or law' (cited in Modleski, 1991. p.52). The disability
management policies of most Western States to normalise the abnormal through
integration can be seen as having a three-fold purpose: firstly, to smooth out the
contradictory evils inherent in capitalism - make it seem benevolent rather than
malevolent; secondly, to be, as Douglas (1966) says of symbols,
used in ritual for the same ends as they are used in poetry and mythology, to enrich
meaning or to call attention to other levels of existence. (p.40)
The third purpose is abstractly to define and create, through comparison, normality through
the creation of the abnormal, the disabled; with impairment as disability being used in
society to validate and classify as 'rich' a particular style of life (predominantly white
bourgeois 'able-bodiedness'). Cinematic representation of disability does not just validate
able-bodiedness due to the complex nature of all discourse, just as racist or homophobic
images are not only about being or not being black or gay; they are often about the nature
and structure of society as a whole.
This thesis will show how cinematic representations make visible these purposes and
ideologies, inadvertently revealing the discourses that support them. If a society says this
life is good, it requires that life which is bad to support such a philosophy. To make their
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point Utopias typically requires Dystopia. Simply put, how does one know what the good
life is unless there are signs of the bad life? Society needs to generalise the Other, the bad
life, in order to use it for its own ideological and cultural purposes which are to emphasise
the desirable norm. Disability, or rather impairment, to varying degrees, does this in the
films explored at the core of this thesis.
In relation to Otherness in different academic disciplines I would, for example, recommend
the following further reading: the sociological work on stereotypes by Oakes et al (1994);
the work on 'freaks' by Garland Thompson (1996); the early feminist thoughts of Simone
de Beauvoir (1976), and the psychoanalytical theory of writers such as Lacan (1977),
ICristeva (1982) and Jordanova (1989).
In society, people with impairments are labelled disabled, i.e., people who have had their
impairments made significant through the social process and institutional practices of
creating disabled people out of people with impairments. Hence, Oliver (1990, p.82)
creates the additional new term 'social creation' in addition to 'social construction' in
relation to disability, arguing that disability is created in the institutions of society as much
as the individual or collective ideologies which are shared in society. 'The disabled' are,
then, within the Social Model, those people with an impairment who have the shared social
reality and construction of being socially excluded, discriminated and labelled, on the basis
of their physical being. As such, in using the Social Model, one cannot write or speak of
'people with disabilities' (what is really meant is 'people with impairments') but one can,
and should, speak of 'disabled people'. From a methodology of the Social Model theory the
term 'disabled people' indicates a perspective of disability as external to the people's
bodies and that what 'disabled people' share is their social exclusion rather than their
impairments.
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The Methodolozical Framework of the Thesis
Disabling ideologies and the control over the hegemony of normality firmly place
disability as pathological, rather than as the social construct that it constitutes for the Social
Model theory of disability. Consequently, it is quite logical that popular culture's
representations of disability offer little that is different. This thesis aims to identify the
connection between the ideal world that entertainment offers in its representations of
society and culture, on the one hand, and the ideology of disability that creates the
impaired as pathologically disabled on the other. The Social Model of disability is rooted
in proto-structuralist and materialist theories that de-construct the pathologising tendency
of the ideology of the Medical Model of disability into a social constructionist analysis.
This thesis, in using the methodological approach of the construction of and representation
of materialist analysis, which is itself constructionist, brings together the two methods in
order to demystify disabling imagery. It offers a de-construction, in a typically social
constructionist methodology, to reveal how cinematic imagery and its micro-elements
(e.g., mise en scene) work to reinforce an ideology of disability as impairment.
By saying that disability is socially constructed and in using the Social Model, this thesis is
arguing that impairment in its social corollary of disability can be accounted for in terms of
social relations and material processes (Shakespeare, 1998) rather than as a pathological
reality, or in any essentialist terms. This is at the core of the Social Model conception of
disability. The Social Model of disability is, equally, a methodological approach which
theorises that disability can be accounted for in terms of its social relations and material
processes (Gleeson, 1999; Johnstone, 1998) rather than as any essentialist reality. Each
methodological approach is often — very much so in relation to the Social Model of
disability as exemplified by Oliver and Barnes (1998) — rooted in identifying the
ideological implications of that which is being deconstructed in material terms.
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The Social Model of disability is a constructionist versus essentialist explanation of the
disability experience within society and culture (Gleeson, 1999; Shakespeare, 1998) in
much the same way as is the dominant representational paradigm, in a representation of
methodology (Hamilton, 1997); each perspective is fundamentally socially constructionist.
Equally, ideology in an Althusserian structuralist (proto-constructionist) model of ideology
is a methodology applied to the identification of various ideologies. The thesis
demonstrates the connection between the ideological and the micro-elements of cinematic
technique through detailed textual analysis of the core films studied herein.
The Social Model of disability is not specifically a structuralist theory, given that it does
not reduce the entire experience of disability to essential macro-social phenomena, as some
have claimed (Gleeson, 1999). However, having said that, this thesis is not concerned with
the complexities of the Social Model per se but its application in a coherent way to
cinematic imagery using a constructionist methodology. As such, the imagery examined
and the method of its examination are proto-structuralist, considered genealogically, in its
identification of its ideological content and support of the essentialist philosophy of the
Medical Model of disability. At this point it must be made clear that the Social Model of
disability does not claim for itself that it is the sole repository of knowledge about
impairment, only that it offers an insight into the nature of the socio-materialist factors
affecting the social construction of impairment as disability.
For Gleeson (1999) the materialist Social Model of disability identifies disability as a
social experience which:
'arises from the specific ways in which society organises its fundamental activities
(i.e., work, transport, leisure, education, domestic life). Attitudes, discourses and
symbolic representations are, of course, critical to the construction of this
experience, but are themselves materialised through the social practices which
society undertakes [ ]. [ Importantly, the social, rather than merely
individual or even institutional, creation of disability means that structural
dynamics, such as production and consumption relations and cultural outlooks, are
implicated in its construction and reproduction. (p.25)
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It is, as Gleeson has identified above, even 'cultural outlooks' which play a part in the
'construction and reproduction' of disability. This thesis identifies those cultural outlooks
as exemplified in mainstream cinema and its concomitant ideological implications. As
Shakespeare (1994) has shown, along with Gleeson (1999), Social Model theorists have
neglected cultural representations of disability and the part these play in the social
construction of disability. Consequently, it is logical that the methodological approach
used herein should take the construction of I representation of school of cinematic de-
mystification as its theoretical basis because this school is fundamentally similar to that of
the Social Model of disability as revealed in the work of Oliver and Barnes (1998). This
thesis is only the application of the Social Model of disability to cinematic imagery of
disability. The Social Model of disability has moved beyond simple social constructionism
to what Oliver (1990, p.80) calls social creationism; a concept which moves forward from
identifying disability as simply an attitudinal problem within an ideology of individualism.
Social creationism recognises the role of institutions in creating a construction of a broader
cultural range of subjects through its discursive practices (i.e., disability, in this case). This
thesis, in using the Social Model of disability, identifies the cinematic constructions of
disability as impairment, and their role in the creation of impairment as disability.
Oliver (1990) writes that:
[t]he essential difference between a social constructionist and a social creationist
view of disability centres on where the 'problem' is actually located. Both views
have begun to move away from the core ideology of individualism. The social
constructionist view sees the problem as being located within the minds of able-
bodied people, whether individually (prejudice) or collectively, through the
manifestation of hostile social attitudes and the enactment of social policies based
upon a tragic view of disability. The social creationist view, however, sees the
problem as located within the institutionalised practices of society. (p.82)
Each term is closely entwined with notions of ideology and individualism, meaning that
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social creationists, as Oliver sees himself, see the 'spread' of creative influences as greater
and more widespread. As such, the institutional practices of mainstream cinema are
included as a whole (rather than individual ideological prejudice) within the social
constructionist methodology that Oliver is labelling social creationist (a broader, more
inclusive methodology within a social constructionist paradigm). The difference between
the creationist and constructionist perspective, in relation to this thesis, is that the social
creationist bent of the Social Model of disability is applied to institutional cultural practices
as a social construction (e.g., mainstream cinema). As a social construction, it thus
facilitates the Social Model application of disability as a notion of social construction /
creation to mainstream cinema — the essential nature of this thesis. As Althusser (1984)
has said, every theory must pass through a descriptive phase into a stage where a means to
identify and recognise the facts of oppression are made; Chapters Two, Three and Four are
intended to constitute such a passing.
Oliver, the father of Social Model of disability theory, in all of his work (1990; 1996; and,
with Barnes, 1998) is explicitly concerned with notions of ideology and hegemony in the
social creation of disability. Following on from Althusser's view that society is constituted
by levels or instances articulated by a specific determination such as politico-legal and
ideological, Oliver sees disability constituted (created in its construction) by instances and
levels of articulation. Oliver himself states that cultural images support the 'ideology of
individualism [ ] heavily influenced by the medical profession' (1990, p.62). By
including the ideology of individualism this thesis identifies other factors that have played
a part in supporting the role of the family, the body, stereotypes and archetypes through
employing cultural images which seem to confirm them and make them appear natural.
Implicit within these images is an ideology that is mainstream as much as it is disability
specific (i.e., the family). This thesis identifies mainstream cinema's use of various
constructionist ideologies of mainstream society in creating perfect worlds for
entertainment (familial, stereotypical / archetypal, and corporeal).
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Oliver (1990) sees individualism as a key ideology in the construction and creation of
disability in the Medical Model of disability as a personal tragedy. Thus, in the Social
Model of disability, a fundamental role is to identify the ideology of individualism in
practice — as is shown herein. Oliver's view of ideology is similar to Althusser's in that it
is 'a set of values or beliefs underpinning social practices, whether those social practices be
the work process, medical intervention or the provision of welfare services' (Oliver, 1990,
p.43). Oliver goes one step further though to differentiate between what Gramsci calls
'organic' and 'arbitrary' ideologies and hegemony (ibid). Oliver renames the organic and
arbitrary ideologies as core and peripheral. Individualism is an organic and core ideology
whilst medicalisation and normality are arbitrary and peripheral to individualism. As such
the thesis is about identifying the arbitrary ideologies implicit within the texts analysed
below — normalisation, medicalisation, and relationships - and linking them to the organic
ideologies of society such as individualism and the familial. In Chapter Two, the
difference between a stereotype and archetype of disability is articulated to indicate their
roles in various elements of ideology or, to be more precise, the hegemony of disability as
impairment and its significance to society at all levels and instances. As Oliver writes
(1990):
Mlle hegemony that defines disability in capitalist society is constituted by the
organic ideology of individualism, the arbitrary ideologies of medicalisation
underpinning medical intervention and personal tragedy theory underpinning much
social policy. Incorporated also are ideologies related to concepts of normality,
able-bodiedness and able-mindedness.
(p.44)
This thesis identifies the micro factors of cinema such as camera, lighting and editing, and
other more specific elements of mise en scene, to identify in various ideologies the
hegemony of normality - through individualism as exemplified by medicalisation at work -
in the films studied in detail in the following chapters. I do not explore bio-medicine as a
theoretical framework in itself; as has already been said of other theories, this thesis only
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refers to it (and other linked theoretical aspects) in passing as part of my examination of
medicalisation in reference to the disabling ideologies of the films examined.
Much of what is argued about the films studied in this thesis could equally be claimed
about the plays, books and other media from which the films discussed in detail come.
Indeed, much of what is claimed about these texts could be argued as applicable to most
images of disability; that is why those chosen are indicative films. Even though I have
chosen only a select few images to examine in detail, the results achieved are equally
applicable to the same narratives in other media and other narratives of a similar theme in
the same and other media. What I do show in the thesis, by looking at the core films
chosen, is the cinematic specificities of mainstream classic narrative cinema style,
technique and form that contribute to the construction, the creation, of disability as an
individualised personal tragedy rather than as anything else (identified through the
application of the Social Model of disability).
One final point to be made prior to addressing the films chosen for examination concerns
the concepts of normalisation and ideology. Althusser (1984) has identified that various
ideologies and ideological state apparatuses (familial, medical, et cetera) may appear to be
disparate, but that beneath them all is the ideology of the dominant ruling culture and class.
It is the ideology of individualism which is dominant in both mainstream cinema and the
Medical Model of disability and I use this thesis to identify these and other ideologies
which support a dominant cultural and class ideology of individualism: i.e., medicalisation,
normality, familial, able-bodiedness and health. I also identify the role played by
stereotypes and archetypes in such an ideological role. The seemingly contradictory
ideological content about disability is revealed as being ideologically coherent, through
examination of the two contradictory notions of euthanasia and normalisation identified in
the various films examined. It must be remembered that normalisation is 'a theory of
services not of disability' (Oliver and Barnes, 1998, p.52). Normalisation is a service
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controlled by professionals which enabled them to retain a key role in their delivery,
ensuring the adaptation of the medical profession in the era of deinstitutionalisation and the
new community-based services provision and practices (ibid). The final chapter of the
thesis, in looking at the body, deals extensively with normalisation.
The films examined offer a clear revelation of how films about disability represent and
construct core and peripheral ideologies in relation to their discourse around disability.
Equally, disability discourse (the construction of impairment as disability) is often utilised
in support of other core and peripheral ideologies. These are ideologies such as family,
health and notions of success and failure, as well as the obvious ones of individualism and
medicalisation of the everyday, let alone disability, which affect the whole of society.
I do not set myself apart from ideology — unlike Althusser - as the only individual able to
recognise it; far from it: we all live within ideologies that mediate our daily lives.
Althusser (1984) argues that ideology is a necessary component of human society, and
Comolli and Narboni (1999, p.755) further argue that 'the tools and techniques of film-
making are a part of 'reality' themselves, and furthermore 'reality' is nothing but an
expression of the prevailing ideology'. There is no escaping the omnipresent nature of
ideology, but that does not stop its being identified where it is identifiable — easily or
inadvertently.
Equally, I acknowledge that I write from a position of situated knowledge, a particular
standpoint that is intrinsically linked to my socio-cultural position in society as a disabled
person in a disabling society. My situated position, which is a disabled standpoint, is not
unlike that which, in relation to women feminist writers, Harding (1983, p.184) identifies
and labels as the `the feminist standpoint'; a perspective that often utilised 'feminist
empiricism' to great effect and for improved clarity. I do have a 'disabled standpoint' and
do, indeed, use 'disabled empiricism' in this thesis; I only hope that is effective and clearly
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additional to the fundamental constructionist methodology used here.
The Core Films of the Thesis
The films chosen have been selected on the basis that they are, in the main, an indicative
selection representative of a wider number of films that explore and represent impairment /
disability as part of their core diegetic structure. They have impairment as the main
thematic thrust of their narratives which, in turn, makes them ideal as they offer a wealth of
nuances and differences in representation. Other films which could have been selected for
examination on the basis that disability / impairment is highly visible within them often
have disability to heighten or validate a plot structure that is either generic or
fundamentally weak. For example, the use of visual impairment in films such as, for
example, Blind Terror (Richard Fleischer, GB, 1971), Cat O'Nine Tails (Dario Argento,
Italy, 1971), Jennifer 8 (Bruce Robinson, US, 1992) and Blink (Michael Apted, US, 1994)
is not about the exploration of visual impairment itself. Rather, these films use visual
impairment to create a motivational point, plot push or scenario in the 'woman in peril' /
thriller genre form. The same is true of the use of various impairments in other genre and
mainstream films as diverse as The Spiral Staircase (Robert Siodmak, US, 1945),
Crescendo (Alan Gibson, GB, 1969), Bad Day at Black Rock (John Sturges, US, 1955),
Jobman (D. Roodt, S. Africa, 1990), Dolores Claiborne (Taylor Hackford, US, 1995), A
Clockwork Orange (Stanley Kubrick, GB, 1971) and The Secret Garden (Agnieszka
Holland, US, 1993). As there are, quite literally, hundreds to choose from I recognise that,
in the end, any selection is rather arbitrary. However, this is an arbitrary situation which
makes those films chosen as indicative (or not) as any other selection or choices of films.
This is not to say that these films do not use the same ideological assumptions about
disability to create their effect; they often have to for the characters to imply all that they
do, given their superficiality as characters. A good example of this is a scene in Carlito's
Way (Brian de Palma, US, 1993) in which the film's lead character, played by Al Pacino,
27
is betrayed by an old friend. The betrayal is motivated — as well as being a development of
the narrative - by Carlito's friend now being in a wheelchair. It is a short scene in which
one of Carlito's friends, until then presumed to be imprisoned, visits him in order to tape
Carlito admitting to current illegal activity. In the scene this particular friend, who is now
in a wheelchair, finally breaks down upon being caught by Carlito in his deception. He
tells Carla() that he only agreed to carry out the deception because as a wheelchair user his
life is now lucked', and his only way out of prison was to agree to be wired for deception
purposes to implicate Carlito. No lengthy characterisation is given for the change from
friend to foe other than the fact that the friend is now in a wheelchair and, as such, his life
is, in his own term, 'flicked'. The wheelchair is the characterisation and total, complete
explanation in itself. It is, as Jameson (1992) says, always already read; acculturation into
what disability is deemed to be ensures that the logic of the narrative is clear without undue
explanation.
The films chosen are from the social issue school of film-making. It is appropriate here to
quote from Hill (1986) whose comments apply to my chosen selection of films when he
writes that:
Although such a bare listing undoubtedly under-emphasises the variations in style
and tone between films, what justifies their common grouping is their concern to
raise topical social issues within a commercial cinematic form. They are, in effect,
all examples of the [ ] 'social problem' film and it is through them that many of
the dominant ideological assumptions and attitudes of the period can be revealed.
(p.67)
Obviously the social issue is in the singular rather than the plural for my selection, i.e., the
ideological assumptions that I identify and discuss are around physical disability. The
selection could have included many other films from a variety of formal styles, including a
significant number of British-made films (co-)funded by Channel 4 or the BBC; films such
as Walter - and its sequel Walter and June (Stephen Frears, GB, 1982/3), Journey to
Knock (David Wheatley, GB, 1991), Frankie Starlight (Michael Lindsey-Hogg, US/GB,
1995), Go Now (Michael Winterbottom, GB, 1996) and Sixth Happiness (Waris Hussein,
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GB, 1997). Equally, the selection could have included many other conventional
mainstream films that have as a theme impairment. Films as diverse as: The Dark Angel
(Sidney Franklin, US, 1935); The Stratton Story (Sam Wood, US, 1949); On Dangerous
Ground (Nicholas Ray, US, 1951); A Patch of Blue (Guy Green, US, 1965); Midnight
Cowboy (John Schlesinger, US, 1969); Young Frankenstein (Mel Brooks, US, 1974);
Cutters Way (Ivan Passer, US, 1981); and Passion Fish (John Sayles, US, 1992). The
resulting thesis would have been the same; the same ideological content would have been
found within limited variation given the time-span in which the films have all been made.
The six films selected for close textual analysis in the thesis are: A Day In The Death Of
Joe Egg (Peter Medak, GB, 1970); The Raging Moon (Bryan Forbes, GB, 1970); The
Elephant Man (David Lynch, US/GB, 1980); Whose Life Is It Anyway? (John Badham,
GB/US, 1981); Duet For One (Andrei Konchalovsky, GB, 1987); and My Left Foot (Jim
Sheridan, GB, 1989). These six films have been selected because they have around the
subject of disablement seemingly different perspectives that affect their construction. This
means that although on the surface the ideology is quite different, fundamentally they all
reduce disability to impairment and reinforce the Medical Model of disability; the
following chapters show how this is achieved. For example, The Raging Moon is very
much in favour of institutionalisation whilst My Left Foot is not; whilst Duet For One is
not for euthanasia per se whereas Whose Life Is It Anyway? is. The films chosen do have
different perspectives around disability in their narratives that cover the period in which
they were made (and which are all still relevant today). The primary aim of the thesis is to
identify the films' different ideologies as well as their apparent differences, and to take
account of both of these aspects within the eras within which they were made. The thesis
will show that the films chosen vary very little in ideological content, given their
superficial differences in perspective, time of making and trans-national construction. The
additional aims of the thesis are a) to identify the various disabling ideologies within the
six films, b) to identify their differences in respect of a) and, finally, c) to place these
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within the social and political context of the hegemony of the contemporary Medical
Model through the application of the Social Model of disability.
If I were to be starting the thesis now I would include other films from non-English-
speaking counties, films that have been interesting in a number of ways. However, most
of them would leave the basic thesis of this work unchallenged. These films include
Poulet au Vinaigre (Claude Chabrol, France, 1984), Accion Mutante (Alex de la Iglesia,
Spain, 1995), The Eighth Day (Jaco Van Dormael, Belgium, 1996), Live Flesh (Pedro
AlmodOvar, Spain, 1997), Hana Bi (Takeshi Kitano, Japan, 1997) and many others.
The issues raised in the films selected are as relevant today as ever. Euthanasia is now a
major social issue that is developing daily; institutionalisation is still a big issue for
disabled people (Oliver and Barnes, 1998). Normalisation is still at the heart of many
disability strategies and policies now coming on stream (Oliver and Barnes, 1998; Drake,
1999) from a range of Western states. Moreover, the films chosen reflect my own life
experience as well as being products of the same Western culture that I inhabit. I will,
therefore discuss them with occasional reference to any special insights, from a 'situated
knowledge' position, that I can bring to them as a disabled person myself. Indeed, it is the
differing reactions of people I know — disabled and non-disabled — who saw the films upon
their initial release that led to my own subsequent desire to conduct this current research.
Each film offers the audience an apparently real interpretation of the lived experience of
supposedly 'real' people (whether fictional or actual people), whilst at the same time trying
to have a perspective and / or original viewpoint that comments upon reality. Each film
tries stylistically to approximate reality in order 'to show things as they really are' (cited in
Hill, 1986, p.5'7), as Raymond Williams once wrote (see also chapter four of Lovell, 1980).
However, it is a matter merely of style and not a depiction of social realism. The films
chosen are not alone in approximating a sense of verisimilitude of reality for their subject
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matter. The simplest example of this is The Elephant Man which claims to be the 'true'
story of a disabled individual. The film replicates the period (Victorian) and people
involved in 'realistic' detail, simultaneously offering up many surrealist, or 'unrealistic'
motifs and images to comment upon the reality that it is representing (i.e., it is shot in the
'unrealistic' shades of black and white).
Each film chosen has a key impaired person(s) as central, making them, as the
protagonists, open to interpretation and, therefore, available to a greater degree of
examination in relation to the representation of the disabled. These films are about 'the
disabled' as constructed by society but they are not about the processes of that construction.
Each film, and this is another reason why those chosen were indeed selected, was
successful in either another form (as a play or a book), financially (box office taking),
critically as films in the form of reviews (see below) and / or as winners of Oscars and / or
BAFTAs (Walker, 1997). More often than not, the films chosen were successful in a
combination of all four ways.
A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg was adapted for the screen from his own successful stage
play of the 1960s by Peter Nichols. It revolves around a middle-aged married couple and
their relationship with their spastic (cerebral palsy) daughter, whom they nickname 'Joe
Egg', and the film shows how Joe affects their interaction with friends and relatives. Joe
Egg is represented as a burden on the family and the film shows the couple's 'coping' with
their daughter's cerebral palsy. In the narrative the husband (Alan Bates) lives in a fantasy
world which eventually leads to him attempting to kill Joe Egg whilst his wife (Janet
Suzman) is shown deluding herself that Joe Egg will eventually get better and one day be
normal. The film concludes with the husband's leaving his family. The film, unlike the
play, was not a financial success — its release was delayed nearly two years - but it did
receive a fair degree of critical success (Clark, 1970; Editor, 1972; Ford, 1972; Pit, 1972;
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Tarratt, 1972). Significantly, the play is revived fairly regularly and seen as a classic of its
type.
The Raging Moon, written and directed by Bryan Forbes, from a successful novel by Peter
Marshall based on his own experiences, is about a working-class man (played by Malcolm
McDowell) who succumbs to a polio-like virus and moves into a Residential Home for 'the
disabled'. In the Home he meets and falls in love with another resident (Nanette Newman)
who subsequently dies. The film explores how McDowell's cha racter comes to terms with
his impairment and the relationship that develops between him and the other residents,
Newman's character in particular. It was a box-office hit on both sides of the Atlantic
(Forbes, 1992; Walker, 1997) and greatly admired by the critics (Caste11, 1971; Rich,
1971).
The Elephant Man, directed by David Lynch, is the 'true' story of the Victorian freak show
exhibit Joseph Merrick; it covers the time from which he was exhibited up until his
subsequent 'rescue' by Dr Treves, a legendary Victorian doctor. Merrick progresses from
being a carnival exhibit to a hospital resident, whilst always being the 'talk of the town'.
The film concludes with Merrick's death. An enormous critical (Screen International,
1980, 263, p.2; Norman, 1992) and financial (Screen International, 1980: 262; 263; 269)
success, The Elephant Man was also a key starting point for a virtual industry (Samuel,
1981; Darke, 1994[A]) in the life of Joseph Merrick (though he is called 'John' Merrick in
the film) and David Lynch (Woods, 1997).
Whose Life Is It Anyway? is the only film of the six chosen set in America. It is written
by the English playwright Brian Clark and based upon his own successful (and repeatedly
revived) play set in Britain (Berg, 1981; Milne, 1982). The film, as did the play, revolves
around Ken Harrison, a sculptor, who is involved in a car accident and, because of his
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quadriplegia, subsequently sues the hospital in an attempt to bring about his own death.
The hospital administration contests this, but eventually loses. A success both critically
(ibid.) and financially (Screen International, 1982: 334; 335; 33; 338), the play, which is
the basis of the film, is also seen as a modern classic and regularly revived in provincial
theatres.
Duet For One is another film version of a long-running and successful British play, but
one that did not achieve any success either critically (Jagr, 1986) or financially (Screen
International, 1987: 590, p.21; 591, p.25; 594, p.37). A critical and box-office problem
suffered by Duet For One was that it was released in the UK two weeks after Children of
a Lesser God (Randa Haines, US, 1986) and was unfavourably compared to it. As the
praise and box office takings rose for the glossier and more effectively marketed Children
of a Lesser God, which had also won a number of Oscars prior to opening in the UK, Duet
For One sank without trace (Screen International, 1987, 590). The difference in success
between the two films was undoubtedly linked to the way disability is represented.
Children of a Lesser God is, in essence, very similar to My Left Foot in that it proactively
advocates normalisation and integration of capable disabled people; the very opposite of
Duet For One. The narrative of Duet For One explores how a famous violinist named
Stephanie (played by Julie Andrews) comes to terms with the onset of multiple sclerosis.
The narrative deals with Stephanie's subsequent relationship problems with a variety of
people, both those who are long-standing in her life (husband, agent, maid, etc.) and those
who appear as the narrative develops (a lover, psychiatrist etc.). Eventually, the film
closes with the violinist's achievement of a degree of contentment, in the acceptance of her
condition, awaiting death.
My Left Foot, directed by Jim Sheridan, and based upon the autobiography of the
successful Irish writer Christy Brown who had cerebral palsy, is the story of Brown's life:
starting in poverty and ending up with success and love. The narrative is presented as a
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series of flashbacks which trace Brown's life up to the point where he meets his wife at a
literary reception. A huge success on both sides of the Atlantic financially (Screen
International, 1989, 719) and critically (Adams, 1989; Brown, 1989), it also started a
revival of interest in the work of Christy Brown (Lavery, 1993).
As will be shown in later chapters, the films chosen are not as 'realistic' as they seem, or
claim to be (Lavery, 1993; Howell and Ford, 1980), in representing either the experience
of impairment and disablement or the actual biographical 'facts' they claim to depict. No
reality, or film, is as simple as the 'facts' it depicts and below I shall explore the complex
issues in these filmic representations of disability from a Social Model paradigm, to reveal
the complexities and ideological paradigms that are hidden within them, thus, identifying
the ideological assumptions they exhibit when explored from a Social Model perspective.
Reception theory is not at all applied, since this thesis merely seeks to analyse the films as
if interpreted from the Social I Medical Model perspectives. They are all films which place
impairment as the cause of disability (the Medical Model of disability) but which are in
fact key cultural texts in the construction of the apparent civilised bounds and forms of
normality. I shall argue that these, and the many other films like these, are part of the way
our culture defines what it is to be normal and how normality is valued. Normality only
exists, in its varied contexts, initially, by its construction in opposition to abnormality.
Thus, the abnormal are central to both perpetuating the illusion that normality does indeed
exist, as well as validating it as supreme (cf. Canguilhem, 1989, on the body; Foucault,
1978, on sexuality; and Davis, 1995, on the Deaf).
The films will be discussed in the light of what I have written above, revealing the norm
that is highlighted (be that in stereotypes or archetypes, the family and the body) and the
subsequent disablement that is taking place. Firstly, though, I start with a review of the
literature on the subject of disability imagery.
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Chapter One:	 A Literature Review
'I am not an animal, lam a human being.
John Merrick (John Hurt) in The Elephant Man
This chapter is split into two parts. The first deals with general representation theories of
disability and the second with more specific issues of the stereotypical representation of
disability. I refer to the same writers in both sections due to the scarcity of available
literature on disability and impairment imagery.
The Representation of Disability (which is actually of impairment)!
There is more literature on images of disability in literature, both the popular and the
literary canon, than on film with Dickens (in general) and Edith Wharton (especially her
novel Ethan Frome, 1987, also filmed under the same title [John Madden, US/GB, 1993])
singled out for repeated criticism. It is interesting to note how film adaptations of Dickens'
work are largely ignored in the literature that exists on disability imagery in films. As an
example one need only look at films with 'Tiny Tim' in them, films such as A Christmas
Carol (E.L. Mann, US, 1938) and Scrooge (BD. Hurst, GB, 1951; Ronald Neame, GB,
1970 — a musical version). There is also the modernised American version, with the 'Tiny
Tim' character being black and mute, a film called Scrooged (Richard Donner, US, 1988).
Even The Muppets get in on the act with their own Muppet 'Tiny Tim' in The Muppet
Christmas Carol (Brian Henson, US, 1993). All these titles are adaptations from only one
Dickens ghost story but there are many other Dickens-derived films using disability. I
shall be discussing those critics who deal with cinematic representations of disability;
although these writers often combine the two (justifiably) in order to show the cultural
depth and influences that combine to create an abject image of disabled people. It is
interesting to note that most critics, especially from America, use the term 'disability' when
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they actually mean and are referring to impairment — if looked at from a Social Model
perspective. The social construction of impairment as Other is rarely intentionally
explored in any depth in disability studies (e.g., Gartner and Jue, 1987) apart from the
work on 'freaks' by Fiedler (1978), Bogdan (1988) and Garland Thompson (1996). In the
UK Tom Shakespeare starts to explore the issue in an article in the disability studies
journal Disability, Handicap and Society entitled 'Cultural Representations of Disabled
People: [	 ]' (1994).
Much of what I am about to review is short, intentionally superficial, and taxonomical —
listings with very little critical comment. There are now a number of World Wide Web
sites, some originating in the UK, with fairly good lists of films about impairment on them.
(A recommended listing site can be found at http.//www.caravanfreeserve.co.uk .) One of
the reasons for such scarcity is that impairment is seen, almost exclusively, to be as true in
reality as its metaphorical meaning in literature and cinema: tragic, sad and unbearable —
rooted in the personal tragedy theory of disability (Oliver, 1996). Many writers of fiction,
and academic-based literary or cultural studies, who address disability often use it as the
key to unlock the psyches of normal people; thereby reifying disability as a quantifiable,
justifiable, objective horror to be feared. Leslie Fiedler's book Freaks (1978) is a good
example of such a tendency. Bogdan (1988) states of Fiedler's work that his mythological
and psychoanalytical approach posits that:
human beings have a deep, psychic fear of people with specific abnormalities.
Dwarfs, for example, confront us with our phobia that we will never grow up. Yet
although Fiedler's study of 'human curiosities' shifts the focus from 'them' to 'us', it
also reifies 'freak' by taking 'it' as a constant and inevitable outpouring of basic
human nature. (p.7)
In other words, Fiedler accepts the Medical Model of disability as truth; for him the normal
are justifiably afraid of the abnormal (and will always be so) because abnormality exists
naturally — somewhat metaphysically - to mystify human comprehension. For Fiedler,
disability, abnormality and impairment are a natural state, and all the same thing in
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essence, that is, pathologically abhorrent; Fiedler argues that culture merely reflects this
abhorrence in the arts. Fiedler seems to be unaware — even dismissive — of the idea that
abnormality is in anyway a constructed state that various people socio-culturally inhabit
(voluntarily in many cases of 'freaks'). Bogdan, on the other hand, shows the process of
social construction of the freak in the freak show when he tells the story, in Freak Show
(1988), of a showman who meets a tall man. The showman tells him that he thinks that the
man is tall, then makes him an offer he cannot refuse: How would you like to be a giant?
Such a simple tale shows the extent to which being a giant is less redolent of abnormality
than it is of showmanship and publicity: i.e., a construction. Although neither has much to
say on disability as seen in the modern world of cinema, Bogdan's book is a useful tool in
understanding that the 'Elephant Man' was as much a creation in the freak show as he is in
David Lynch's film The Elephant Man. Although Fiedler mentions the cinema (i.e., the
'dwarf in Day of the Locust [John Schlesinger, US, 1975]) it is only to reinforce the idea
of abnormality as a natural worry to a normal psyche; a view that continues to mystify
abnormality as pathologically deviant and threatening.
Gartner and Joe, in Images of the Disabled, Disabling Images (1987), compile a collection
of essays that come much closer to questioning the construction of disability in life and
culture than any other book written prior to Barnes (1992) or Norden's (1994) studies of
disability imagery. Barnes and Norden are examined in detail later and in the following
chapter. Only one chapter of the twelve in Gartner and Joe deals with cinema specifically,
but it is placed within a context of the construction of disability in many discourses,
discourses that interact to make disability appear to be 'common sense'. By common sense
they mean the Medical Model of disability that places it as deviant, pathological and
suffered by the individual concerned, with society's only responsibility being to care for, or
cure, it. Gartner and Joe's book demonstrates that disability is as constructed in legislation
as it is in literature and classroom technology. The chapter on impairment and cinema is
Paul Longmore's 'Screening Stereotypes: Images of Disabled People'.
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Longmore looks at all forms of impairment on film and television: impairments of speech,
vision, intellect and physique. Longmore's first significant point is that there 'are hundreds
of characters with all sorts of disabilities' represented. They range from 'monsters' and
'crippled criminals' to cartoon characters like Elmer Fudd and Mr Magoo (p.65). The
reason we forget that images of the disabled are everywhere, for Longmore, is that
entertainment is an escape and, as such, the bits that do not help us escape we erase from
our memory. Longmore astutely states that such representations:
tell us that the problem is not as painful or as overwhelming as we fear, that it is
manageable, or that it is not really our problem at all, but someone else's. (p.66)
Longmore is beginning to explore a key element of impairment representations when he
argues that they are a functionalist exercise in social interaction (they enable people to
interact with one another more effectively). Longmore fails to continue in this rich vein.
Instead, he gives us mere examples of disability imagery he considers negative: negative
because, for Longmore, they make disability pathological and the determining
characteristic of the character as a natural characteristic of disablement (i.e., obsessive
behaviour in characters such as Ahab, Richard ifi and both the Doctors No and
Strangelove). Longmore gives us the first labelled stereotype of a disabled character: that
disability is a consequence of his / her own evil, which, in turn, makes him / her bitter and
vengeful. I do not disagree with this —there might be an element of truth within the latter
part of such a representation. The issue, from a Social Model perspective, is to
comprehend the ideological basis of such a representation as axiomatic yet without
dismissing the potential validity of such a representation (or behaviour) if it be from the
point of view of a character who has an impairment. However, as Longmore states, such
villainous and embittered characters do re-validate the generally accepted idea that
disability and impairment are inherently linked to evil and that such behaviour is a
pathological characteristic of having an impairment.
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Longmore is expert at demonstrating, with a list of examples, how impairment is shown as
being both less than human and indicative of a hatred of all that is human (Longmore
relates this to Goffman's (1990) assertion that such a labelling is part of stigmatisation).
Longmore (following on from Fiedler) sees disability portrayals as a threat to normal
psychology; he states that:
[W]hatever the specific nature of disability, it unleashes violent propensities that
normally would be kept in check by internal mechanisms of self-control. (p.68)
Although Longmore continues to explain that the result of this for the disabled individual
is social isolation, he fails to accept that the propensities are indeed the case in some
situations and this is, as such, a valid representation. By the rejection of a certain kind of
behaviour he himself turns into a socio-political negative similar behaviour by disabled
people themselves, in turn validating their expulsion from society by advocating its
expulsion from the cinema screen. In examining why disabled characters are often dead by
the end of the movie, giving The Elephant Man as an example, Longmore states that this
implies that it is 'better to be dead than disabled' (p.70). Again, I do not dispute such an
interpretation in theory, but he is not accepting that this can be the lived reality of some
disabled people. This is especially so when combined with Longmore's assertion (p.70)
that a film is negative because it states that 'disability [impairment] means a total physical
dependency that deprives the individual of autonomy and self-determination'. The
appearance of dependency is not in itself negative, it is the negation of it that is negative.
What undermines many of the representations of impairment that Longmore is concerned
about, from a Social Model perspective, is perhaps the films' lack of a critique of the
process of disempowerment of the impaired characters in them rather than the actual state
of physical dependency.
Longmore isolates two other stereotypes of disability portrayal: individuals adjusting to
their disability (or to be more specific, their impairment) and the asexual or hypersexual
disabled character. Within the stereotype of the disabled individual 'adjusting' Longmore
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sees the 'bitter' individual coming to terms with the impairment (and disablement, by
extension). However, this is only after the normal lead has shown them the way (e.g., The
Men [Fred Zimmermann, US, 1950] - Marlon Brando in a wheekhair for his first film -
being cited as a good example). Equally, newly impaired characters are often compensated
with some extra talent or special gift. A good example of the extra / special gift scenario is
the visually / hearing impaired having exceptional hearing / vision (i.e., The Story of
Alexander Graham Bell, Irving Cummings, US, 1939, and Blind Fury, Phillip Noyce, US,
1989, respectively) or both - as in The Story of Esther Costello (David Miller, GB/US,
1957). These are common cinematic themes indeed; Longmore's example of the blind
being better able to see into the heart of man is a wonderfully vague example that could be
applied to many 'blind' films. 'Blind' films such as The Enchanted Cottage (John
Cromwell, US, 1945), A Man on the Beach (Joseph Losey, GB, 1956), No Trees in the
Street (J. Lee-Thompson, GB, 1958) and Cactus (Paul Cox, Australia, 1986) to name only
a selection. The visually impaired also being innately musical is another good example of
the crassness of many images of visual impairment (Darke, 1997), as in Blink, Jennifer 8,
Frankenstein (James Whale, US, 1931) and Night Song (John Cromwell, US, 1947).
Each stereotype Longmore lists could, and often does, overlap with another; the 'brave' or
'tragic' impaired individual is often shown within, or alongside, their criminal, monster or
adjusting (and occasionally sexual) stereotype. For example, the 'Elephant Man', Merrick,
is made more courageous and then tragic by his adjustment to his deformity. Longmore is
right to assert that:
these stories put the responsibility for any problems squarely and almost
exclusively on the disabled individual. If they are socially isolated, it is not
because the disability inevitably has cut them off from the community or because
society has rejected them. Refusing to accept themselves with their handicaps, they
have chosen isolation. (p.71)
The above quote ascribes to cinema an ideology of impairment firmly placed within a
Medical Model of disability, but this is hardly a surprise when the Medical Model of
disability has an almost complete hegemonic dominance within most Western cultures
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(Oliver, 1991). It is a dominance supported by almost all other forms of cultural and social
discourse; be it in social policy (Oliver and Barnes, 1998; Drake, 1999), charity (Hevey,
1992) or legislation (Barnes, 1991). It is naive to expect anything different, yet it is unfair
to be overtly critical of those individuals with impairments who choose isolation. For
many disabled people isolation is better than humiliation, the usual result of many attempts
by the abnormal to try and enter the sphere of normality (Morris, 1996; Murphy, 1991).
The sexual aspects of impairment are, for Longmore, often portrayed contradictorily.
Some characters will be impotent at the slightest hint of disability whilst others will have
an insatiable need for sexual satisfaction (often depending upon with which other
stereotype of impairment it is overlapping). Longmore relates sexual impotence to the
desire of the audience to see disability as not worth living with and my later chapter on
disability and the family shows in detail how this is textually achieved. Longmore cites
both the play and film of Whose Life Is It Anyway? as, for him, the best example of the
stereotype of the disabled person as sexually inadequate. For Longmore it is a wholly
negative portrayal of a disabled person with sexual dysfunction as it portrays the individual
as 'only half a man' (p.73). Whilst not deviating from the principal point of Longmore's
argument, the Social Model of disablement would necessitate that the situation / scenario
be placed in its context of a social discourse (cinema itself, for example) of what
constitutes masculinity and therefore a man. In such a context the character is right to
assume that he is only half a man in his own culture, as he is seen by others both culturally
and in reality as, once disabled, sexually liminal. The film's limitations are revealed in its
support of such a supposition rather than if it had been either critical of such an attitude or,
at least, aware of it as a form of social construction. A strand of argument that Longmore
(and others) fail to pursue, the discourse of what man is, is the very discourse that is used
to marginalise the impaired and instigate their self doubt (what Gilman [19881 calls 'self
hate'). Such representations are not bad or negative in themselves; rather, there is nothing
essentially 'wrong' (socially or culturally) in being impotent or physically dependent.
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Perhaps the error of positive disability writers and their discourse is to argue that these
negative portrayals should not be presented (a view towards which Longmore leans).
Longmore's philosophy — and the films of which he is rightly critical - serve only to
marginalise those who are impotent (or the like) still further in the hope that those who are
not impotent (or physically dependent, for example) are treated more fairly. Longmore's
philosophical position reinforces the idea of normality and impairment as disability.
Longmore seems to want it both ways. He is critical of films that represent the disabled as
sexually dysfunctional as well as those that represent the severely impaired individual as
having no trouble attracting the opposite sex; he cites as an example the double amputee in
The Best Years of Our Lives (William Wyler, US, 1946). Prior to these examples he states
that 'even when a disability does not limit sexual functioning, it may impair the person
emotionally' (p.73). Unfortunately, although this is a statement about the negative way
some films attribute emotional problems to the sexually functional disabled the sentence is
stranded in isolation. It validates such a statement as a 'truth' in itself: the opposite of what
Longmore is actually trying to say, but which in many instances is the lived reality of
disabled people. Longmore is very close to Fiedler's tendency to concentrate on how they,
the normal audience, see us, the disabled, whilst having a view of us that, although based
on a Social Model of disability, excludes the social reality of having an impairment in a
society dominated by the Medical Model. Longmore (as with Fiedler) succumbs to
classifying having an impairment as being a victim, something he himself is trying to
condemn. Longmore continues to write that the upper-body limb amputee character in The
Best Years of Our Lives is accepted by his wife with no problems and that:
[T]hese depictions fly in the face of the real-life experiences of many handicapped
men and women who find that even the most minor impairments result in romantic
rejection. (p.73)
Unfortunately, Longmore, in stating the above, is forcing himself into an analytical corner
by arguing that disability with and without standard sexual functioning does impair the
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person emotionally but that any portrayal that shows this factor is inherently negative to all
disabled people. Longmore is concentrating on the representation as negative at the
expense of social discourse and, as such, he is failing to acicnoNN ledge that disability often
does lead to an emotional impairment due to the often prohibitive and contradictory socio-
cultural discourses experienced by an impaired individual (Barnes, 1991). This, though, is
not due to impairment itself but the social construction or view of it and its alternatives,
i.e., normality. Longmore continues that:
these features also reiterate, with the active complicity of the disabled participants
themselves, the view that disability is a problem of individual emotional coping and
physical overcoming, rather than an issue of social discrimination against a
stigmatised minority. (p.75)
Longmore is correct to sum up filmic representations of disability in the above manner.
What is unfortunate is the criticism of individual disabled performers' acting and working
in films, given the limited opportunities disabled actors have for performing in the film -
media - industry (Pointon, 1997). It is unsurprising that they choose to act in a way which
is required by the film (i.e., their employment conditions) in order to get experience and
seek to change an industry from within (Shaban, 1997; Fernandez, 1997); the alternative is
probably obscurity and unemployment. In brief, to show impairment in any other way
would be to devalue disability as it is lived by the vast majority of disabled people in this
or most other societies. In Western societies disability is about individual's coping and
overcoming impairments and this must be recognised in any broader cultural analysis.
Failure to do so would fall into the same trap that the Medical Model encapsulates: insular
dogmatism so abstract that it loses its relevance to the lived experience of those with
impairments. I would agree that social discrimination and exclusion is the flowering of a
Medical Model philosophy of disability construction, but its impact is rooted within the
individual's coping and physically overcoming those socially constructed barriers of
disablement as defined in the Social Model of disablement. An awareness of the
dominance of the Medical Model in current social processes, its hegemony over the
everyday lives of disabled people (Oliver and Barnes, 1998), at least explains why so many
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disabled people 'enjoy' negative images of their group. Longmore seems to hold the
underlying philosophy that the impaired are normal really; an interpretation that is
reinforced by his closing section on what a good or positive representation of impairment
is.
For Longmore the most important representational 'breakthrough' came in commercials
(for Levi Jeans, Macdonalds and Kodak) in the United States. In these, for Longmore,
disabled people:
are not portrayed as helpless and dependent, but rather as attractive, active, and
with it, involved and competitive, experiencing 'normal' relationships [ ] and
smart about what they buy [ ] these commercials offer perhaps the most positive
media images of people with disabilities to date. (p.78)
It is difficult to see how such representations can be classified as positive, even by
Longmore, as they are even less concerned with 'social discrimination' than the films of
which Longmore is critical. For Longmore the 'breakthrough' is in having disabled people
as normal consumers; a fact which flies even further in the face of reality as disabled
people are usually among the poorest people of Western societies (Berthoud et al, 1993;
Russell, 1998), increasingly so if you are both black and disabled (Stuart, 1993; Russell,
1998). Like most 'situated position' writing about what is 'positive', the problem of
positive / negative as a battle between the real and the ideal and as either positive /
negative is almost never resolved; its basic conclusions invariably tend towards being
reductionist. In my view, such positive images as identified by Longmore increase the
marginalisation of those who have impairments. Such images marginalise further those
who are not willing to be normalised or are not capable of being normalised - the
unattractive impairments, the severely speech impaired and the severely disabled who are
totally physically dependent - and cannot, or want not to, push themselves around in their
wheelchairs playing basketball in Nike trainers. To consider such pseudo-normal
representations as positive pushes further back the opportunities for equality than
supposedly negative portrayals such as The Best Years of Our Lives or The Elephant
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Man; at least these films show 'ugly' impairments being confronted by an able-bodied and
image-obsessed society. 'Ugly' impairment imagery in films such as The Best Years of
Our Lives or The Elephant Man does leave a lot to be desired, but at least they make
visible — and attractive, to some extent - impairments that are invariably socially
constructed as abject and unattractive. It is interesting to note that Longmore sees disabled
people as positive in the above-mentioned commercials because they are being physically
competitive; one of the most pertinent arenas (sport) of disabling social processes in which
the inability to be physically superior is defined. Whilst Longmore sees positivity in, for
me, the most negative area of representation, I would argue that such representations serve
to re-invigorate the supremacy of physical perfection; a supremacy that must be laid to
rest, as a question of moral superiority, if the disabled are to be seen or treated as equal.
Longmore's essay is excellent at showing how impairment has been used to show
contradictory impressions of disability, impressions that are not particularly positive as
they are based within, and upon, the Medical Model of disability. Perhaps Longmore's
error is that he tends to value normality too much, to the extent that he sees positivity only
in those representations which show the impaired as normal-like people. As the old
disability protest badge said: '[T]he problem with normal people is that they don't exist'.
Jenny Morris, in her book Pride Against Prejudice (1992), is another disabled writer who
writes from a Social Model of disability perspective and she also has one chapter on
disability imagery with, significantly, her main reference point being Longmore's chapter
in the book edited by Gartner and Joe. Morris erroneously makes the point that there are
very few representations of women with disabilities; there are a considerable number of
women with hearing or visual impairments in various films. There are films such as
Johnny Belinda (Jean Negulesco, US, 1948) and Magnificent Obsession (Douglas Sirk,
US, 1954), to name only two that both star Jane Wyman. There are also a considerable
number of films with female wheelchair users like Morris herself, for example: Kiss of
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Death (Henry Hathaway, US, 1947); The Man with the Golden Arm (Otto Preminger, US,
1956); The Wheelchair (Marco Ferreri, Spain, 1959); Whatever Happened to Baby Jane?
(Robert Aldrich, US, 1962); Notorious Landlady (Richard Quine, GB, 1962); Eye of the
Cat (David Lowell Rich, US, 1969); The Raging Moon; Annie's Coming Out (Gil
Brearley, Australia, 1984); Poulet au Vinaigre; Duet for One; Passion Fish; Crush
(Alison Maclean, Australia, 1992); Persons Unknown (George Hickenlooper, US, 1996);
and Dance to My Song (Rolf de Heer, Australia, 1998).
Of disability representations Morris states that:
[T]he crucial thing about [ ... ] cultural representations of disability is that they say
nothing about the lives of disabled people but everything about the attitudes of non-
disabled people towards the disability. (p.93)
Although cultural representations say an enormous amount about how society views
disability it is somewhat reductionist to blame individual non-disabled people for their
attitudes. The non-disabled are as equally constructed as are the disabled (Canguilhem,
1989) and, as such, are discouraged - even prevented - from thinking 'correctly' about
disability by a dominant social (society) discourse rooted in the Medical Model — that is the
reason for the creation of a Social Model in the first place. To perceive it differently would
be to embrace the simplistic idea that non-disabled people are obstructive merely out of
ignorance. Equally, it is not the case that such portrayals of impairment say nothing about
the 'real' lives of the disabled. The most negative portrayal possible validates the impaired
individual's own feelings of insecurity, confirming that it is society that discriminates
against people with impairments in its structures, relationships and processes (Barnes,
1990) and representations. This is true even in any of the similarly titled film versions of
The Hunchback of Notre Dame (Wallace Worsley, US, 1923; William Dieterle, US,
1939; Jean Delannoy, France/Italy, 1956; and Gary Trousdale and Kirk Wise, US, 1996 — a
Disney animation film). Cultural representations do tell us a lot about disability as it is
lived; they must do in order to posit themselves in any form or verisimilitude of realism (as
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most cultural representations of disability do). Even if cultural representations show only a
Medical Model view of disability, one must take into account that it is the model that
dominates the everyday lives of most disabled people (Turner, 1995; Rojek et al, 1988;
Armstrong, 1983; Armstrong, 1990). As such, they reflect such a nexus's hegemony back
to the majority of impaired individuals who live under its power, gaze and influence.
Morris concentrates, to start with, on My Left Foot; complaining that it never appreciates
Christy Brown's art or fiction but merely wonders at his 'overcoming all odds' (p.95).
Cinematically speaking, this is slightly unfair as to expect a bio-pic (biographical films)
genre film to do something different is a rarity indeed; most bio-pics concentrate on
personal tragedy and triumph rather than the actual work of the subject (Custen, 1992).
Equally, Morris is selective in her comments on the film as quite a few of Christy's
paintings are shown. The film is an 'overcoming all odds' drama about impairment that
does negativise by its sentimentalisation — the privileging of emotion over reason (Burgett,
1998; Ellis, 1996; Villa, 1998; Zwinger, 1991) - of Brown's achievements (which are
indeed considerable considering the time and the place of them - post-World War II
Dublin). Morris's next point about My Left Foot reveals her tendency to see as positive
impairment portrayal when it is shown as normal-like (see Longmore's comments above), a
rather surprising contradiction in a book sub-titled Celebrate the Difference. She writes:
[A]t a formal dinner in a restaurant, Christy abuses the woman who has just told
him that she loves someone else, shouting and pulling the tablecloth off the table.
In other words, he behaves in an oppressive, aggressive and intimidating manner,
not an unusual thing for a non-disabled man to do but film critics seemed to think it
was amazing for a disabled man to behave in this way. Somehow, it is supposed to
be 'progressive' that a disabled man was portrayed as behaving in a thoroughly
obnoxious way. The makers of this film are not actually portraying the lives of
disabled individuals; rather the disability is a vehicle for exploring the pain of
dependency and vulnerability for men. (p.95)
What Morris seems to be suggesting is that obnoxious disabled characters should not be
shown since they give a bad impression of disabled people. If solely obnoxious characters
were shown such an assumption could be true, but, as they are rarely shown in that
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manner, it cannot be claimed that it generalises disabled people as obnoxious. To some
extent, the scene should be identified as positive by Morris as it is shows a normalising
degree of Christy's impairment in its attributing stereotypical male norms to him. As
Morris states, it is typical male behaviour — though, even here, she is ignoring female bad
behaviour both socially and cinematically. If we combine the above comments with
Morris's earlier comments that the films in question show nothing of the lives lived with an
impairment, we can see that she is setting a particular agenda for how disabled people
should be portrayed and how they should behave: an agenda that is a sanitising
generalisation and mystification of the disability experience, even more so than that of the
film-makers of which she is critical. Personally, the only piece of My Left Foot that I felt
really captured my experience of disability was the 'obnoxious' scene, a scene that I had
'lived' in my late adolescence. For Morris to describe the scene as the woman telling
Brown that she loves someone else is also a slight misreading of the film. Morris implies
that there was a particular relationship between the two characters to start with, when there
was not; it could be argued that what the scene does show is the emotional immaturity that
many disabled people experience when they are isolated and prevented from participating
in usual adolescent emotional experience. Consequently, I would argue that My Left Foot
does show, in this incident, a great deal about disability as it is lived. The point is that it is
often lived through isolation and ignorance; especially so in post-war Dublin. Within the
framework of the Social Model what is wrong, and films such as My Left Foot fail to
clarify this point, is that such ignorance and isolation is social constructed and that such
constructions legitimate disabling barriers and social exclusion.
Alternatively, Morris sees Coming Home (Hal Ashby, US, 1978) as a positive
representation of disability because, fundamentally, the main impaired character (played by
Jon Voight) is not impotent (a misreading, since he is impotent; and that is the intended
positive point of the film). Again, we have the assertion that positive images are those that
are as close to being normal as possible. Morris's major criticism of My Left Foot (and
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Born on the Fourth of July [Oliver Stone, US, 1989]) is that it:
depends on the stereotype that to be in a wheelchair is to be impotent, unable to be
a complete (hetero)sexual being, and therefore not a complete man. (p.96)
The question of impotence as a stereotypical characteristic of disability (lower limb
paralysis especially) is an interesting one, but Morris has completely misread My Left Foot
as, despite other negative characteristics, Christy Brown is not characterised as impotent.
Born On The Fourth of July, to its credit, examines the shock to an individual - grounded
in machismo militarism - who becomes the cultural antithesis of all that he was: potent
became impotent. As such, it did confront a real experience lived by many men who
become, or became, disabled in such a manner I agree that impotence is a generalised
theme for the wheelchair user, but there is a reckless tendency to assert potency at the
expense of those who are impotent due to their medical condition or physical impairment.
By stressing that all images of impotence are bad and 'stereotypical' one is merely
relegating into the abyss of ignorance and stereotyping (or archetyping) those further who
indeed are so. What Morris is advocating is that disabled people be represented only as
normal human beings; and by 'normal' she means that they fulfil standard criteria as laid
down in constructed social processes for independence and employability. Such a
perspective will result in selective, and attractive, disabilities being included in both
cinema and society but such a philosophy (one to which Morris adheres, such as when she
states that the advertisements admired by Longmore are 'a joy to watch' [p.113]), is
problematic from a Social Model perspective. The perspective is problematic as it creates
a hierarchy within disability and necessitates further exclusions for many severely
impaired people.
Morris is excellent at describing the way in which various films, which emphasise
disability as an individual problem, fail to offer the viewer all the alternatives that could
give the disabled character a better understanding of his situation. 'His' situation is a key
thread of Morris's criticism. Disabled women are for Morris almost excluded as cinematic
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characters except when as deaf or blind people. Yet she fails to give a detailed reason for
this except to blame male domination of the movie industry and its own concern with its
fear of impotency and dependency. Such a view is somewhat reductionist since it ignores
the reality that (financially and often educationally at least) women are constructed in
discourse as naturally 'disabled' by their being women; as Aristotle wrote: 'the female is as
it were a deformed male' (cited in Davis, 1995, p.126). Freud was equally malecentric in
his analysis of male / female identities. The notion of 'woman as disabled' adds to the
complexity of the issue and indicates the way in which a range of social constructions of
various categories of people (by race, gender and sexuality, for example) do not work in
isolation but that they affect and effect one another. Significantly, though, Morris does
point out that no alternatives are given to explain how various impairments and the
subsequent disablement can be overcome and / or made less stressful with the use of aids
and finance, for example, on the eradication of destructible barriers.
Morris's book is overly concerned with how disabled women get a raw deal in the politics
of disability — an emphasis that is not quite true and furthermore belittles those women
who have led the movement. A strong riposte to such a view, with examples, is given in
Barnes (1996; 1998). Equally, Morris is often contradictory in her treatments of similar
situations where there is a male and not a female in the given situation. If one looks at her
view of Duet For One, for example, this becomes obvious. She writes:
[T]he (film) is very powerful, not least because it reflects not just the loss which is
sometimes an integral part of having a condition such as multiple sclerosis, but also
how the nature of that loss is determined by what went before rather than the
condition itself. (p.105)
It is difficult to see how Born on the Fourth of July and Whose Life Is It Anyway? (and,
in a different way, My Left Foot) fail to do exactly the same. The whole thrust of those
movies, and their concern with sexual functioning, is that it is for most people different to
have been normal and then become abnormal, especially if the individual has not 'changed'
as a person. Thus, I would agree that to examine the past could be a pertinent and valid
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exercise in looking at acquired impairment, but just as much for a male as a female writer
or for disabled characters. Morris misses the point in Duet For One's narrative conclusion
that the protagonist's (a)moral past is the implied reason given for her present condition, a
representation that is an even more suspect use of patriarchy than Morris identifies in the
film; but when a male character uses his past to justify his present psychological state, in
Whose Life Is It Anyway?, Morris condemns this:
'[lit is surprising', he remarks of her behaviour when in his room, 'how relaxed a
woman can become when she is not in the presence of a man'. To Ken (a newly
disabled quadriplegic), paralysis has robbed him of what his masculinity meant to
him, and he is thereby robbed of what he defines as his humanity. (p.106)
It is justifiable to say that Ken is mistaken; impairment has not robbed him of his
masculinity (if you re-define masculinity as not solely residing in heterosexual penile
power), except in his own eyes and those of society in their constructed socialisation of
what is masculinity and a 'real' man. The film leaves us in no doubt that his past value as
a human being was strongly rooted in the power (both symbolical and literally) of his
penis, a power he no longer has. Significantly, the statements that he makes do, for many
similarly impaired males (whether impotent or not), have a strong element of truth. The
film's failure, from a Social Model methodology analysis, is that it does not question of
what masculinity consists; it only reinforces one view of it by equating the loss of penis
power with death. The film's failure is in not stating that Ken is seen differently by women
(et al) because he is now impotent (a realistic portrayal). That disability (rather than
impairment) robs the individual of his / her sexuality in this society is a fair statement;
what is at stake is that it happens through construction and not as a result of some natural
course of action. It is not the impairment that is significant, but the social construction of
impotency as emasculation. Morris' philosophy, the idea of a positive representation being
that which shows disabled people as normal, robs the individual of the right to see that in
this society it is not normal; nor is it experienced - or constructed - as positive to have an
impairment. To take it a step further, I would argue that the least positive disabled images
are those that show disability as 'a secondary characteristic' (p.112) - the very images that
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Morris thinks of as extremely positive - because, above all else, disability is not a
secondary characteristic for many who are impaired / disabled, as the Social Model and
this thesis using that model clearly demonstrate. The positive images, so admired by
Morris and Longmore, marginalise those with severe impairments even further because the
latter are unable to imitate any semblance of normality or benefit from the attempt to
normalise them.
Morris, as is Longmore, is good at listing the types of disabled people that exist in
cinematic representation, such as when she states that:
the most common representation of disability in television and on the cinema
screen is a wheelchair user because the wheelchair offers the most obvious and
easiest way of presenting a recognisable disability. (p.98)
Morris is right, statistically speaking - for detailed statistical data on disability imagery on
television, and films shown on television, see Cumberbatch and Negrine's 1992 study on
the subject, a study which is discussed below. As such it can be said that the common
perception of the disabled is related to it: to be impaired is to be in a wheelchair. On
reflection, that wheelchairs are the most common images of disability in cinema is not
wholly surprising considering that it is an image-based medium that requires speed of
recognition in order to establish rapid identification; 'broad bush strokes' as Dyer calls it
(1993[a]). Stereotypes, however simplistic, ensure through their symbols faster
understanding of the director's (writer's / film's) intentions. It could also be said that the
wheelchair user is the most often noticed, irrespective of numbers, because they are what
constitute 'disability' in the eyes of the viewer and culture at large. The wheelchair and its
user are the symbol of disability (even when parking). Personally, I notice more
wheelchairs because I use one (as does Morris). In society at large, epileptics have always
been a little harder to spot as they are members of that massive army of people with
invisible impairments. As such, in films, it is quicker to include a shot of a wheelchair
than attempt to portray epilepsy, et cetera.
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Another of Morris's main source books is Lauri E. Klobas' Disability Drama in Television
and Film (1988). The weakness of Klobas' text is that it has undertaken the massive task
of indexing American references to disability on television (in particular) and on film. It is
split into sections (e.g., one on 'blindness', another on 'small-stature), and gives brief
production details, synopsis and a comment on whether it is a positive or negative
portrayal of disability. Although it is extensive, it is an American orientated text, it does
make major omissions of examples from British cinema: films that range from Mandy
(Alexander Mackendrick, GB, 1952) to more recent films such as Woman of Straw (Basil
Dearden, GB, 1964) and Baxter (Lionel Jeffries, GB, 1972).
Klobas' text is an excellent introduction that is, above all else, taxonomical. Its
introduction and conclusion, though very brief, list all the formulae and stereotypes that
appear to her to be symptomatic of disability representation. They do not vary
significantly from those of Longmore and Morris, but are, none the less, important as a
guideline of what to expect when viewing an impaired character on the screen. Klobas
states that:
[A]ly critic worth her / his salt will argue that for the most part, film and television
stories are repetitive regardless of subject matter. That may be true, but those
pieces play to an audience that can evaluate what is being seen from personal
experience. On the other hand, the general audience is uninformed about persons
with disabilities and has little cautionary discretion for guidance. People with
disabilities are broadly defined onscreen as falling within one or two character
types: They are defeated, angry people who require help, or they are 'never-say-die'
types who accept disability as a 'physical challenge' and go out to conquer the
world. (p.1)
I agree, to some extent, with Klobas' two types of stereotype (as my later chapter on the
validity of calling all images of disability stereotypical demonstrates), yet the same could
be said of blacks, gays, women and even men. It is an analysis that is useful as a starting
point but needs developing if one is to appreciate fully the specificities, causes and
attributes, of representations of impairment and disability. Klobas does not really extend
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her analysis, understandably, in any greater depth; instead, she simply lists all the examples
she herself and her colleagues can collate — of which there are hundreds.
A key reason for the survival of simplistic stereotypes is that the audience is informed (not
uninformed, as Klobas states) by personal experience. Personal experience is as socially
determined, or mediated, as is film; equally, disabled people have to live their lives, and
base their everyday philosophies, upon the medicalised models that influence cinematic
representation. When Klobas rhetorically asks: 11D]oes it ever end?' (p.437), the answer is,
without a doubt, 'No'. No, because the disabled inhabit a 'state' that is placed upon them.
Taken to its full extent, if a character or individual in life does not fit one of the two
stereotypes Klobas states, he / she is not 'disabled'.
Klobas sees positive representation of impairment (although she also calls it disability),
just as do Morris and Longmore, in the advertisements that show disabled people 'as part of
life' (p.438); stating that: 1 [F]or once, episodic television and movies should take a cue
from the commercials'. Klobas also writes that the love scene in Coming Home is 'a
beautiful and honest love scene' and that it was 'the first decent and honest piece to come
along since The Men, twenty eight years before' (p.136) and, as such, it is not difficult to
identify Klobas' polemical perspective. For Klobas, positive representation is primarily
that which shows disabled people as normal, sexually satisfying and attractive characters.
Yet, as I have already pointed out, this bears little relationship to disability as lived by most
people and it relegates those unable to fulfil that role (either physically or due to social
constraint) even further down the scale of acceptability.
One can already see that the disabled movement is setting an agenda of what are
acceptable 'good cripple' and unacceptable 'bad cripple' representations. There is, however,
a misreading of the central character's ability in Coming Home to be sexually penetrative
since he is not so. An interpretation of the sex scene in Coming Home which, from a
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Social Model perspective, is more positive. It is progressive because it shows disability
and impotency to be mutually conducive in offering sexual fulfilment and gratification;
imagery which is thus antithetical to the conventional. Interestingly, the only film I have
seen to date that actively shows oral sex as positive - apart from Coming Home - is a
horror movie directed by George Romero, made in 1988, called Monkey Shines (George
Romero, US, 1988). Nevertheless, even this potentially positive representation is negated
through the central character's receiving a miracle cure at the end of the film; thereby
ensuring that the superiority of normality is eventually reinforced over difference. More
recently the Spanish film Live Flesh had a similarly constructed positive view of oral sex
but even in this film it was negated in favour of a conventional bourgeois able-bodied
familial conclusion.
Cumberbatch and Negrine's study for the Broadcasting Research Unit, Images of
Disability on Television (1992), is perhaps the best view of disability imagery that I have
so far found. This is mainly because it places disability within a context of social meaning
and it works with the idea that images are, by their nature, limited in a formula industry.
Although it is a study of television, most of the representations discussed are from films
that have been shown on television. Relating back to Longmore's point that there are
hundreds of portrayals of disability on film, Cumberbatch and Negrine state that:
[T]he type of programme most likely to include people with disabilities (in a study
of six weeks television) was feature films, of which 41 per cent portrayed
characters with disabilities. (p.51)
However, factual programmes came a very close second with repeated portrayals of
impairment in a charity or medical context where they were either 'plucky' or 'brave'. As
disability is so often portrayed 'factually' as medicalised or dependent, it can be no surprise
that fiction creates its portrayals in a similar vein. The success of Cumberbatch and
Negrine's book is in its statistical appraisal of impairment characteristics, even though it
fails to connect statistical data to the social constructionist nature of disability.
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The false public perception of impairment is that it affects and afflicts the young (Oliver,
1991), and media representations seem to be where the misconception is either coming
from or being reinforced. Cumberbatch and Negrine, based on the population census a
calculation of the percentage of the disabled for various age groups. They then compared
their findings with 'television population' statistics that they compiled, an exercise that
makes quite astounding reading. The actual number of people under the age of fifty who
are disabled in the 'real' world is 16.5%, whilst the number in 'television's world' is over
sixty per cent. Thus, in the television world, which includes a high proportion of cinema
films, not only are younger people much more likely to be disabled in some way but infant
disability seems almost compulsory. Cumberbatch and Negrine offer convincing statistical
evidence that severe impairments are the most often shown, and that the occurrence is
over-represented in comparison to the real population. They state:
[L]ocomotor, behaviour and disfigurement problems are relatively overrepresented
in the television population, whereas communication and continence problems are
relatively underrepresented. We may explain the prevalence (of one above the
other because) they are easiest to represent, they are immediately apparent [ ] in
a single camera shot. Incontinence may be underrepresented because of lavatorial
taboos. (p.25)
Cumberbatch and Negrine are beginning to see that two factors are vital in an
understanding of representations of disability in film and on television: firstly, simplicity
(and therefore the severity of an impairment) of image is vital; and secondly, that the social
process is just as important in determining what image is shown. They continue:
[A] further set of reasons for the choice of disabilities featured on television can be
suggested by reference to the ubiquity of the wheelchair as an index of disability,
and the readiness with which it is called to mind in relation to disability. People
working in (the media) are both a part of our culture, and are themselves aware of
it. Thus when they want to include a disabled role, they are likely to think of
locomotor handicaps necessitating a wheelchair, and that this is an icon of
disability that the public will recognise. (pp.25-6)
Cumberbatch and Negrine accept that film-makers are as constrained by public
conceptions as by their own imaginations, which, in turn, are equally socially mediated and
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constructed.
Cumberbatch and Negrine reveal the importance of seeing the 'disabled role' as an
important benchmark for all the other roles in the film. They use as an example The Good,
The Bad and The Ugly (Sergio Leone, Italy, 1966), citing the scene in the film where Lee
Van Cleef s character is engaged in conversation by a character who is a double leg
amputee called 'Half Soldier'. Cumberbatch and Negrine not only suggest that amputees
are seen as half human but that 'the incapacity of "Half Soldier" contrasts with the physical
excellence of the character played by Lee Van Cleef (p.44). Consequently, we can see
that, for these authors, impairment has more than its own specific limitations and / or
metaphor in play in the narrative. They give an unidentified example of when the police
are chasing a criminal and a wheelchair is blocking the road, causing the police to lose the
criminal. They argue that such an incident shows more than just the ability of disabled
people to block the road: 'it is almost as if disabled people are interfering with the proper
running of society' (p.50). Cumberbatch and Negrine are the first writers I have come
across who say more than just 'stop it, it's not true' in relation to what they still see as
negative representations of the disabled probably because they themselves are not disabled.
Interestingly, the disabled critics (Longmore and Morris, for example) talk of the disabled
as a homogeneous group much more than do the non-disabled writers. Cumberbatch and
Negrine state that impairment is a multiplicity of conditions that, at the very least, mean
different things to different people.
One of the primary methods cinema uses to perpetuate disability (or any) stereotypes, and /
or archetypes, is by leaving certain factors absent. Cumberbatch and Negrine state that:
[lit is instructive to examine what films tend not to emphasise. We very rarely see
the topic of disability introduced as a social issue. The customary highly
individualistic struggle masks the possibility that disability results not only from an
individual's limitations but also from an environment which is designed with only
able-bodied people in mind. There are strong suggestions in many films that
disability is about courage and achievement rather than suggesting that it is an issue
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for which society as a whole should take responsibility. 	 (p.54)
It is, for Cumberbatch and Negrine, important to look as much at what is absent as what is
present; as such, it is a methodology which enables one to see how impairment is
constructed as the Other. Other writers fleetingly mention disability as the Other, but only
as a reference to disability as a narrow stereotype that panders to public misconceptions.
They do not de-construct the mechanisms by which it is constructed; nor do they relate it to
a direct multiplicity of discourses that both affect and effect it.
Cumberbatch and Negrine defme three broad categories of disability stereotype in cinema:
the criminal, the subhuman and the powerless or pathetic character. I see no reason to
challenge these categories as broad taxonomies; the main difference between this, the other
works looked at and my research, which follows, is revealed in Cumberbatch and Negrine's
conclusion on films and disability:
[I]t is difficult to avoid the impression that there is usually an ulterior motive for
the inclusion of disabled characters in films and dramas. Perhaps the most obvious
is the use of suffering and disadvantage, followed by bravery and willpower, to stir
tender emotions in the audience; though the mechanisms whereby this occurs
remains elusive. Other motives are the use of disabled characters [ ] to enhance
an atmosphere of deprivation, mystery, violence and menace. 	 (p.61)
The aim of my research is to reveal the mechanisms used to create such atmospheres and
place them within a context of alternatives. This thesis would argue that Cumberbatch and
Negrine under-estimate the power of stereotypes (and archetypes) whilst at the same time
acknowledging that they recognise their own text's theoretical insularity. They claim:
[N]ot to condone the actions of [the media but it] is first and foremost a medium of
entertainment rather than a medium of 'social engineering'. (p.102)
Whilst agreeing, to some extent, I would argue that cinema does enable people to construct
their own sources of identity and interpret various social processes. Conversely, I do not
think that positive images of disability per se would create a more socially equal society;
positive representations of disability are not viable as disability is a negative social
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construct. The negativity of disability is inherent within it and promoted by disability's
existence as a category (Canguilhem, 1989).
Steve Dwoskin (1991) postulates the idea that disability suffers a media apartheid because
stigma is always attached to disability and it is, by logical corollary, negative. Dwoskin
fails to see that disability can be nothing else but negative because it exists as a devaluing
grouping or label, and is, consequently, created as a socially stigmatised existence that
needs to be separated at worst, or simply identified at best, from the rest of normal society.
'Disability' per se, in its existence - construction as a reality - ensures that it is interpreted
negatively by any group who sees, constructs, labels and interprets impairment as the cause
of disablement. Logically, 'interpreters' have no alternative if they wish to maintain the
illusion that normality and abnormality are pathological realities as opposed to social
constructs: i.e., that disability exists a priori.
The only writer to see that positive images of Otherness cannot exist in a society that
constructs an Other - our society - is Sander L. Gilman, who in Disease and
Representation (1988) states that:
[A]ll images, artistic or scientific, whether they enter naively or self-consciously
into our awareness, are abstractions from diverse phenomena. (p.12)
As disability is constructed within society by a multiplicity of discourses, as a negative
experience, as a pathological reality that speaks for itself, then it is irrational to expect a
vital, normalising, part of social discourse (cinema) to break free from its own shackles,
and from those of a wider society. David Hevey, in The Creatures Time Forgot (1992),
shows how charity photography and advertising degrade and make dependent those
disabled people they attempt to help (by using black and white photography, in contrast to
colour, alongside dehumanising text). Yet, where he advances the idea that alternatives are
possible if charities do not exist (i.e., capitalism does not exist), he defeats his own
argument. If charities do not exist, disability cannot exist due to the fact that is charities -
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following Hevey's own argument - who solely create it: creating it out of their use and
abuse of people with impairments, thereby constructing disability as impairment as they
carry out their disabling activities of objectifying and (often) institutionalising the
impaired. Consequently, it must be stated that positive images of disability cannot exist in
a society where disability is constructed or exists, be that by charities or any other
disabling discourse. Impairment will always exist, but disability need not; it is disability
not the impairment which disables the impaired (Oliver, 1990; Oliver, 1991; Barnes, 1991)
from the Social Model perspective.
The value of all of the texts that I have looked at is that they provide, in total, an index of
the way the disabled are stereotypically represented. What they fail to do is to show that a
recognition of the significant differences in those stereotypes is vital in order to
understanding how disability is used to construct and protect a fragile idea(1) of what is
normal. The impaired, as an image, are a fairly stable creation (in their many forms they
are what normality is not) of what the Other are. Later, I shall show the mechanics through
which normality is asserted as positive and how the idea of the disabled stereotype is far
too simplistic. For Cumberbatch and Negrine disability can be categorised fairly generally
in the following ways (though they use the term disability' when they actually mean
impairment — even from their perspective):
- disability as an emblem of evil;
- disability as 'monstrous';
- disability as a loss of one's humanity;
- disability as dependent and lacking in self-determination;
- disability as maladjusted;
- disability as sexual menace, deviancy, danger and impotence;
- disability as the object of fun or pity;
- disability as the object of charity;
- disability as having 'Other' (abnormal) talents;
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- disability as being in need of extra effort or adaptation.
Simply Stereotypes?
Much of the writing on impairment imagery seems to be little other than semantics; a
dense jungle of words whose variance is negligible. The difference(s) between a
stereotype, archetype, type, prototype and sub-type, or even a myth, seems to depend upon
the perspective of the writer or the academic discipline that he, or she, is representing; the
inclusion of 'disability theory' only serves to muddy the waters further. The most
problematic area of definition is between stereotype and archetype. For the sake of
clarification I shall start by giving my definitions of the two key problematic areas. A
stereotype is a social construction (image, representation or whatever) which denies the
truth of that which it represents by replacing it with an alternative which the stereotyper
presumes to be true but which is, in reality, socially constructed. A stereotype does not
inherently reveal that it is a social construct but passes itself off as a truth. An archetype,
on the other hand, works in a similar manner but it is a creative interpretation that is
presumed (and designed) to be a universal truth without question by those who construct,
consume and appraise it; it has the appeal of a timeless truth which the stereotype does not.
Significantly, an archetype may become a stereotype when the subjects of that archetype
stand up and challenge the archetype; as was the case with women in feminism (Perkins,
1979), blacks in challenging racism (Cripps, 1977) and gays in Queer Studies (Dyer,
1993[a]). Within stereotypes and archetypes there is no acknowledgement that they are
social constructs, but - and this is the key - archetypes are seen as true whereas stereotypes
are seen as false by many who consume and appraise them (Oakes et al, 1994). The
difference is academic, quite literally, but significant when trying to challenge images (i.e.,
of the impaired) which are omnipresent and assumed to be universally true.
In general terms I would argue that images, and the reality, of disability are seen and
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created more archetypally than stereotypically (the accepted view) because disability and
abnormality are seen as axiomatic; as self-evidently abhorrent or as a timeless and natural
part of Otherness. The next chapter focuses on this more specifically when A Day In The
Death Of Joe Egg is used in an analysis of the issue in depth.
Perhaps the reason most disability imagery criticism argues that disability is portrayed
stereotypically is partly because it is premised upon a broad definition of what a stereotype
is; thus, little escapes its seemingly limitless parameters. As when Barnes, in Disabling
Imagery & The Media (1992) writes that:
[D]isability stereotypes that medicalise, patronise, criminalise and dehumanise
disabled people abound in books, films, on television and in the press. (p.38)
Barnes' view that images of impairment in the media are somewhat repetitive and seem to
be particularly enduring in that they medicalise, patronise, criminalise and dehumanise
those portrayed as disabled is sufficient for him to label them stereotypical. I would argue
that this factor alone does not make them stereotypes. 'Part Two' of Barnes' monograph is
sub-titled 'Commonly Recurring Media Stereotypes' and this sub-title itself seems to
encompass the definition of stereotypes that Barnes uses. For Barnes, the very fact of
recurrence seems to make an image stereotypical, but that they are enduring and pervasive,
and 'commonly recurring', would indicate that they are more than merely stereotypical.
That Barnes then lists what he considers to be a fairly exhaustive taxonomy of stereotypes,
including eleven sub-types, further indicates, as stated above, that the definition being used
is a fairly broad one.
Barnes' eleven stereotypes of disability imagery are:
the disabled person as pitiable and pathetic (which would include The
Raging Moon and The Elephant Man);
as an object of violence;
as sinister and evil;
62
as atmosphere or curio;
as 'super cripple' (which would include My Left Foot);
as an object of ridicule;
the disabled person as their own worst and only enemy (which would include
Duet For One);
as burden (which would include A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg);
as sexually abnormal (which would include Whose Life is It Anyway?);
as incapable of participating fully in community life;
and 'the disabled person as normal'.
When Barnes states in the first line of 'Part Two: Commonly Recurring Media Stereotypes'
that: 'the link between impairment and all that is socially unacceptable was first established
in classical Greek Theatre' (ibid, p.15), it becomes fairly clear that even he sees the images
as slightly more than stereotypes. However, he fails to take his observation to its logical
conclusion and label them as cultural archetypes, or even myths, about disability and the
impaired.
It could be argued that archetypes are simply unrecognised stereotypes. To be more
precise, an archetype becomes a stereotype when those that are represented stand up and
say they have had enough of being portrayed mythically and / or archetypally. After all,
the identification of representations as stereotypical, by definition, implies an awareness of
their social construction by those who label them as such. Archetypes and myths, on the
other hand, lead one to infer a degree of truth about their subject. It is that inference of
'truthfulness' that perhaps makes some representations of disabled people archetypal rather
than stereotypical, especially in their reception and initial construction by film-makers. As
most of the writers discussed seem to be more polemical — and writing politically - than
academic it should not be doubted that their use of the word 'stereotype' is functional
rather than analytical. In other words, what they are really saying is that they disagree with
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the way disabled people have been portrayed so far, as it fails to reflect their perception of
the realities (or political dimensions) of physical or mental impairment and disability as
these authors personally and politically perceive it.
Disability and impairment imagery has yet to be fully understood, and as a movement
disabled people are, at present, much more concerned with getting their point across than
with the nuances of theory or philosophy. Such a perspective will, undoubtedly, be more
beneficial in the short term, although its long-term drawbacks have yet to be fully
understood. It is perhaps the polemical perspective which explains why most writers on
disability imagery are often reluctant to go into too much detail, i.e., in providing
definitions, or the scope, of terms like stereotypes. Thus, popular conceptions of complex
matters (stereotypes) are often left to stand by themselves as entities that are either
axiomatic or superfluous to requirements. Even so, it is significant that filmic images of
disability are always dismissed as being merely stereotypical. Even Cumberbatch and
Negrine's statistical work, which does not have a particularly polemical directive, falls into
the same trap as Barnes by using the similarly simplistic idea that repetition alone makes a
stereotype (see lists on page 60-61 and 62-63). Equally, such lists are so encompassing
that little else is left that one could be represented as being.
Cumberbatch and Negrine's philosophy in categorising all images of disability as
stereotypical is revealed when they quote from a study of images of disability in newspaper
advertising (Scott-Parker's, They Aren't in the Brief 1989, p.16): '[S]tereotyped images
define people by their disability [ ] people with differences (should be) seen first and
foremost as people'. The main thrust of Cumberbatch and Negrine's work (as is Scott-
Parker's) is that the images are stereotyped because they are wrong both factually and
morally. In other words, they are not as they - or other interviewed disabled people -
would want them to be; what Macherey (1978) has labelled the 'normative fallacy' (which I
return to below). It is a perspective which brings us back to the point that the emphasis of
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these works is polemical and not essentially academic in analysis.
This is not to say that they are wrong, or that they should have been more analytical in
their perspective; rather, that they are executing a very specific polemical analysis in an
easily understood popular shorthand. As is the case in, for example, the work carried out
on: 'cripples in literature' by Leonard Kriegal (1987); on images of the deaf in cinema by
John Schuchman (1988); on Disability in Modern Children's Fiction (1985) by John
Quicke; and the recent history of physical disability in American cinema by Martin F.
Norden (1994). All of those just listed have a similar result to the works of Barnes,
Cumberbatch and Negrine, and Scott-Parker: they tend towards being polemical and
taxonomical rather than analytical. Kriegal lists four stereotypes of disabled people
(impaired characters) in literature: the 'demonic cripple'; 'the charity cripple'; 'the realistic
cripple'; and 'the survivor cripple'. Schuchman, on the other hand, lists eight deaf
stereotypes: the dummy; the fake deaf person; the deaf person as an object of humour; the
unhappy deaf person; the expert deaf lip-reader; the dummy label; the perfect speaker; and,
finally, the curable deaf person. Here we can see that many of the stereotypes attributed to
disabled people in general are sub-divided for a sub-category of specific impairment
disabled people, i.e., the Deaf and / or the deaf.
Rarely does a work on disability imagery escape from being a list of repetitions and, as
such, a list of supposed stereotypes. Quicke borders upon a much more critical analysis of
disability imagery, yet even he resorts to creating a taxonomy of types, types which include
the 'romantic' (where the potential of a disabled character is dramatically revealed to be in
excess of their real capabilities) and the positive stereotype (the pseudo-normal abnormal).
However, Quicke does give us a clue to his definition of a stereotype, when he writes that:
[I]n general, the problem with stereotypes is that even when they are 'favourable'
(e.g., as when the child is portrayed as a 'virtuous victim') they are still counter-
productive [ ] a stereotype is a trap because it restricts the characterisation to
one dominant social identity. (p.156)
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For Quicke, a stereotype is that which 'restricts characterisation' or fails to present the
disabled character, within any given narrative, as having multiple opportunities.
Considering that most cinematic narratives — especially classic Hollywood narratives
(Bordwell and Thompson, 1993) - close off opportunities for all their characters (closure is
one of the key pleasures offered by fictional narrative that life does not) I would argue that
disabled people are often highly developed characters, more so than any other conventional
character in a narrative, whether filmic or novelistic. The problem for Quicke, and most of
the other disability imagery critics reviewed here, is that if the characterisation of a
disabled character is not to the disabled critics' liking it is dismissed as stereotypical, when
in fact, at least by Quicke's own definition, this is not the case.
As some writers have shown (Dyer, 1993; Perkins, 1979; Oakes et al, 1994) stereotypes
can be, and often are, complex in character, containing subliminal information and
adopting the manner in which one stereotype reinforces another stereotype. Quicke
demonstrates an awareness of this complexity and mutual support, as does Norden, when
they both mention the way in which disabled characters often reinforce stereotypical views
about women and their normative roles as carers and 'earth mothers' towards the abnormal.
Quicke (p.158) writes that: 'if the mother is always portrayed as the key figure in caring for
the disabled child to the exclusion of a father, then this can only reinforce the conventional
view of a woman's role'. Such a perspective could easily be applied to My Left Foot (see
the chapter, below, on the family). Norden, on the other hand, writes that 'the stereotype of
physically disabled people is conspicuously related to the gender issue' (1994, p.315).
Norden continues to explain that in his view all images of disability in mainstream films
are the enactment of the Oedipus scenario; something which a Social Model methodology
cannot accept, as not all people perceive, or treat, the impaired in a universally uniform
manner. Psychoanalytic theory is antithetical to a Social Model methodology and, as such,
the Social Model perspective interprets psychoanalysis as a normalising 'eugenics of the
mind' (Davis, 1995, p.39). Davis calls psychoanalytic theory a 'eugenics of the mind' due
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to its roots in the medicalising hegemony that is the legacy of the Enlightenment. For the
Social Model, disability is a social construct, not an innate psychological state of being; for
the Social Model even the very personal aspects of impairment are mediated through the
culture in which they are experienced.
The degree to which people with mental health problems have adopted the Social Model
(in opposition to a psychiatric model) is testament to the degree to which the Social Model
and its supporters reject any link with psychoanalysis. See, for example, the work of
mental health user groups Survivors Speak Out and Survivors Poetry (Beresford and
Croft, 1993). This is not to say that psychoanalysis would not bear positive fruit in its
interpretation of disability, only that it would be out of place within a Social Model
analysis such as that adopted for the purpose of this thesis. Equally, impairment /
disability imagery and psychoanalysis constitute a topic for a thesis in themselves.
One final issue is the question of the 'Kernel of Truth' debate which seems central to much
stereotype discourse (Perkins, 1979; Oakes et al, 1994; Leyens et al, 1994). The problem
with relying upon such criteria is highlighted by this quote from Quicke (1985, p.157):
1 [E]ven the stereotype of the disabled person always being "brave" is objectionable,
because for many disabled persons it is a distortion of reality'. Alternatively, it could be
argued, such a 'stereotype' actually acknowledges that for many disabled persons it is not a
distortion of reality; thereby making the 'Kernel of Truth' debate far too empirically
dependent (see Neale, 1993; and Oakes et al, 1994) to be of much constructive use. I
would argue that to go through life in a disabling society that more often than not inflicts
unnecessary pain, hatred, mistrust, contempt, stress, strain and intolerable barriers on the
impaired, does require courage.
It is perhaps the individual experience of impairment that is the key to understanding why,
and how, many disabled people enjoy 'negative' and 'recurring' stereotypes of disability.
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The 'Kernel of Truth' debate seems in reality to be fairly, though not totally, irrelevant
when one considers the stereotype of disability. This is perhaps at the core of how Dyer
(1993, p.72) can write that stereotypes can offer: 'an image of Otherness in which it is still
possible to find oneself. Although traditional cinematic narratives individualise what are
social problems - or socially constructed inequalities - such situations are experienced in
everyday life on an individual basis; after all, we exist as individuals even if it be within a
society.
Oakes et al (1994) devote their entire study of stereotypes to developing the idea that
stereotypes are highly complex and actually reflect the true realities of inter-group relations
within society. They write that 'stereotypes represent group-level realities' (ibid, p.193);
not objective realities but the realities of inter-class / group conflicts, interests and
identities, which, by extension, means that the apparently objective realities that are so
often held up as invalidations of stereotypes are not applicable in an analysis of
stereotypes. Thus, the 'Kernel of Truth' debate about stereotypes should not be about an
individual's lived reality, or essential truth, but about a higher level of socio-political
reality; only then can we acquire a better understanding of the question of ideological
function and discursive practices of stereotypes and archetypes.
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Chapter Two:	 Archetypal or Stereotypical
'I am not a human being, I am an animal.'
The Penguin (Danny DeVito) in Batman Returns (Tim Burton, US, 1992)
In this chapter I shall explore and reveal how different films about disability portray
disabled people either archetypally or stereotypically. The chapter starts with a close
textual analysis of A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg in arguing that it represents disability
archetypally rather than stereotypically. It then moves on to demonstrate how impairment
is represented stereotypically in the other core films of the thesis, demonstrating the
nuances of each form of representation as it proceeds.
The Archetypal
A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg, from a disability perspective, is a film which advocates
the segregation and the creation of a formal euthanasia programme for people with severe
or congenital disabilities. It legitimates its exploration of disability with a supposedly
intellectual debate under a facade of balance. For example, when one character argues for
mass euthanasia and another states categorically that she means 'the gas chamber', the first
replies: 'that makes it sound horrid'. The implication is that from her perspective the gas
chamber for disabled people is not horrid as a form of progressive and necessary social
policy (a perspective that the film supports). Surprisingly though, the disabled character is
not portrayed stereotypically but prototypically and mythically: a representation that has no
doubt of its own universally applicable truth and validity.
Dyer, in an essay in The Matter of Images (1993[a], p.13), makes it clear that stereotypes
are historically and culturally determined and that they define social types. To be more
specific, they define the limits of social reality, order and control and the parameters of
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normality for us (the normal), in comparison to them (the abnormal). Dyer argues that if
such 'types' are seen as universal and eternal then they are archetypes. Equally, archetypes
are the matter of myths, and it is my contention that the Joe Egg character in A Day In The
Death Of Joe Egg is an archetypal character: archetypal because she is shown as an
ahistorical truth that represents a social group seen as a universal and constant truth beyond
rational explanation. It is still a creation but it is constructed in intent and meaning as an
archetypal truth outside of any culturally specific influences. Archetypes are no more nor
less 'true' or 'false' than stereotypes. The point is that they are utilising a different set of
narrative forms and / or cultural beliefs.
This is not to say that Joe Egg is a universal and eternal truth that represents her 'type'
truthfully; the opposite in fact: Joe Egg exists as a stereotype doe, a socially mediated
construction. The difference is in the manner of representation. The narrative is not about
defining the character Joe Egg within the film since she is so self-evidently abhorrent that
this requires no elaboration. The point is to discuss - or more precisely, argue - its own
agenda: what we should do about them. Joe Egg - the character - is quite literally
speechless. She has to be, because to have given Joe Egg a voice would have put into
doubt the whole point of the drama; it would have meant that she herself would have had a
voice to be listened to. Giving Joe Egg a voice would have made her a stereotype rather
than an archetypal or mythical character. The process of stereotyping by giving the
disabled character a voice can be seen at work in Whose Life is It Anyway? (a film
examined in detail later in the thesis).
A personal anecdote demonstrates my point. I went to a revival of the play of A Day In
The Death Of Joe Egg and attended a pre-performance discussion with the author (who
also wrote the film's screenplay) at The Everyman Theatre in Cheltenham in 1994. It was
a small group and I made it obvious to both the chair and the author that I wished to ask a
question. Sadly, they were not going to let me speak because my very presence - as a
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participating disabled member of society - nullified the philosophy and point of the play. I
did not persist despite the constant references to the better 'facilities for people like that'
(people with cerebral palsy) nowadays. The irony of the situation was that I was not going
to challenge the ideology of the play in the least; I just wanted to know whether the author
felt the film to be a more perfect version of the play.
In the first scene in which the audience is shown Joe Egg, the spectator is left in no doubt
that she is a symbol of all congenitally disabled people used as a prototype to enact the
archetypal function of her role in the myth of the inferiority of Otherness. The camera is
focused upon a door handle that is pushed towards the camera, which goes off-screen left,
and it reveals the arrival, in medium close-up, of the emerging figure of Joe Egg. Joe is
slouched on her detachable wheelchair shelf, as if asleep, with a pillow under her head to
demonstrate that this is no temporary aberration but the constant reality of her existence.
To emphasise the point, Joe Egg's eyes are open; thus she is not represented as a sentient
being but merely an anoetic body.
A conversation takes place between the mother (Sheila) and the father (Bri), with each
answering their own questions to Joe Egg, clarifying the point that she does not, and
cannot, indulge in conversation, intelligent or not. Bri says to Joe Egg, off screen, with the
camera solely on Joe Egg: '[H]ome again: safe and sound'. This is an opening gambit on
the welfare of the disabled - safest at home - but the irony soon becomes apparent as Bri
takes it upon himself in the narrative to kill Joe Egg for the benefit of all concerned. It is
this infanticidal quest that makes A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg aspire to truly mythic
status. Bri, we are shown, is a good man who wishes to bring love and joy and peace into
the world: he is a secondary school teacher. Thus, he has chosen the path of a vocation and
not the sordid route of commerce (as his friend Freddie, in comparison, makes clear later
on in the film). Equally, the constant sexual fantasies that Bri indulges in about Sheila,
through inter-cut shots of a naked Sheila draped in white silk or lace, also leave us in no
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doubt that this is a man of passion who still deeply loves his wife after ten years of
marriage.
Soon after this initial meeting Joe Egg is left alone with Bri. Bri then sits in a rocking
chair, by the side of her, and begins to rock backwards and forwards. This is a medium
close-up shot of Bri that pans left and right as he goes to and fro. Upon each rock forward,
pan to the left, Joe Egg is seen laying face down on her pillow on her wheelchair shelf in
an equal medium close-up. As Bri rocks he talks:
[W]hat's that? You sat by the driver. There's a clever girl. Saw the Christmas tree
eh? And the shops lit up. What was that? Saw Jesus. Where was he, eh? You
poor softy. (Joe Egg makes a moan like a baby, or animal, that is unconscious.) I
see.
In the background of this shot, at the very end, we see Sheila come in from the kitchen
door. We cut to a medium shot of Sheila, which pans to watch Sheila walk to Joe Egg,
lean over her and kiss her on the head. At which point she remarks: 'I'm lonely she says'.
To which Bri retorts, as if it is Joe Egg who is speaking: 'Mad but lonely'.
The mise en scene of having Joe Egg come in and out of the rocking shot clearly displaces
Joe out of the harmony that the scene had hitherto implied. The combination of jarring
visuals with the fact that as Bri talks he does not even look at Joe leads one to conclude
that breaking point for Bri has been reached. As Bri's tone is one of monotonous routine
(the implication is he that has obviously had this one-sided conversation thousands of
times already and is getting tired of it) the point is subtly reinforced. A breaking point has
been reached for Bri, the scene indicates, due to the strain that Joe and her abnormality are
putting upon the family. The strain on the eye of the visuals, which are particularly jarring
if you consider that they are close-ups with fairly rapid pans from left to right and back
again, are particularly effective in reinforcing the point. Equally, the nature of the dialogue
ensures that the 'reality' of living under such a stressful situation is seen as intolerable.
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As the story takes place on Christmas Eve there can be little doubt that the story is
symbolic of the stagnant morality and alienation of modern life. Joe Egg's grandmother,
later in the film, even talks about the 'bad taste' of bringing religion into Christmas. A
statement which, by extension and intention, metonymically comments on the condition of
Joe as caused by modernity and a lack of Christian spirit (i.e., Joe's not being allowed to
die a natural, 'good taste', death). Again, this would seem rather tenuous if it were not for
the fact that Freddie's wife discusses these matters rather explicitly later in the movie with
an intensity that gives her value system a high degree of kudos that the film both validates
and supports.
A sense of modern alienation is highlighted both within Joe Egg's character (modernity
saved and saves her whereas 'naturally' she would have died) and by all the other
characters' reactions and relationships to her (Freddie and his wife are, for example, the
epitome of superficiality). Consequently, Joe Egg's character is a symbol of the modern
society that has created both Joe Egg as she is and the social inability to deal with the
problem of Joe Eggs in general. Though Joe Egg's existence may have been created by
modern technological advances, the 'nature' of her condition is not; her condition
(impairment cum disability) is thus shown and seen archetypally.
One way in which myth works is through the creation of prototypes of significant
characters of its subject, a prototype being the ideal version and representative of a group
(which because it is seen as universal and eternal, makes it archetypal rather than
stereotypical). As is shown below, in a speech by Freddie's wife Pam, the film does at one
point offer a parallel between a list, a whole catalogue, of congenital and acquired
impairments, and Joe Egg's condition, thereby making Joe Egg the prototype of the
mythically archetypal character of Otherness. If we look at the name given to the Joe Egg
character we can see that perhaps subtlety is not Peter Nichols' strong point. We are told
that 'Joe Egg', Joe's nickname, is the name Joe Egg's grandmother gives to people who sit
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around and do nothing. While significant in itself, taken in conjunction with the gender of
the name 'Joe Egg' we can see that it is supposed to cover all abnormal people: Joe with an
'e' is the male version of the name, whilst Jo, without an 'e' is the female version. Joe, in
the story is female; thus 'Joe Egg' ensures that both female and male 'Jo(e) Eggs' are
included. Joe Egg's real name is Josephine - a name synonymous with sexuality since the
time of Napoleon — thus the direct contravention of such a sexual myth guarantees that this
Josephine is pitied even more.
Joe Egg is not purely a 'type' because she is much more than a cipher: she carries a
significant degree of cultural capital within her body. As Barthes (1983, p.117) has written
about myths, 'the meaning is already complete, it postulates a kind of knowledge, a past, a
memory, a comparative order of facts, ideas, decisions'; and that: 'we reach here the very
principle of myth: it transforms history into nature' (ibid. p.129). Thus the 'common
recurrences' that Barnes, and the other disability imagery critics, have written about have
been the genealogical discourses drawn upon by A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg to create
Joe Egg as an archetypal character in the mythic narrative that the film is emulating.
Barthes acknowledges the historical construction of the archetype and mythic character
whilst seeing that they are much more than stereotypical because of their ability to
transcend the apparent influences of contemporary life. Their age and apparent
'naturalness' is seen as 'common-sense' and ensures that they as constructions escape the
confines of the much more susceptible stereotype. As Barthes (1983) also writes:
[Mythical speech is made of a material which has already been worked on so as to
make it suitable for communication: it is because all the materials of myth (whether
pictorial or written) presuppose a signifying consciousness, that one can reason
about them while discounting their substance. (Barthes' emphasis - p.110)
If examined in the light of A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg's drama, this would explain
how so much can be interpreted from the presence of Joe Egg in the narrative despite the
fact that she does, and says, virtually nothing. Socio-cultural meaning is explicit within
her archetypal symbolism and her represented essence; as Barthes (in general) has pointed
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out, this has been achieved by discounting its subject's (her) substance. The disabled body
does not essentially reveal the character within it. Mythically, the disabled cinematic body
has become a self-revealing meta-language; a meta-language easily understood by the
audience and consumers and users of such a language, making the abject view of disability
axiomatic. As such, it is a language that requires no translation or elaboration. It is a
language developed in films as diverse in subject, genre, period and form as Freaks (Tod
Browning, US, 1932), Gigot (Gene Kelly, US, 1962), Kings Row (Sam Wood, US, 1942),
Life Begins at Eight-Thirty (Irving Pichel, US, 1942), Mandy, On Dangerous Ground,
Sorry, Wrong Number (Anatole Litvak, US, 1948) and The Story of Esther Costello, a
language further developed and refined in subsequent films such as Carlito 's Way, Crush,
Brimstone and Treacle (Richard Loncraine, GB, 1982), Gattaca (Andrew Niccol, US,
1997), Gummo (Harmony Korine, US, 1997), Hana Bi, The Switch (Bobby Roth, US,
1993), Touch (Paul Schrader, US, 1997) and many more.
Joe Egg's character is archetypal in construction because of her supposedly universal and
eternally constructed nature, and truth, of impairment as disability; thus she is a character
in a supposedly mythic tale; none the less socially constructed, but mythic all the same.
Joe Egg does not label herself, nor is she signified by the others around her. It has already
been done for her in the last two thousand years (Hevey, 2000). Barrett (1989, p.20) has
written: 'archetypes [...]refer to the chief or principal types, which are not necessarily the
original ones', and there is no sense in which Joe Egg's character is an original (that Hitler's
treatment of people like her in the past is mentioned later in the film ensure that she cannot
be seen as the 'original'), but the portrayal of Joe Egg is given as prototypical for her
(arche)type: the congenitally abnormal.
When Hitler's treatment of the disabled is mentioned, both as a point of view and as
specific to another era, Joe Egg is further restricted to being an archetypal character;
especially if we consider Barrett's point (1989, p.13) that: 'the universal aspect of [an
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archetype's] character [is believed to] transcends any particular [ ] society', the word
believed being the key in the above quote. The whole point of the film, and play, is not to
debate the relative worth of the disabled but to challenge any, or all, society's treatment of
them. Thus, the argument from Pam, Freddie's wife, to put them in gas chambers places
Joe Egg and the other key characters in the sphere of being archetypal players in a mythic
tale. As Rushing (1995) has written:
the cultural expression of a myth responds to historical and political contingencies
and may appropriate archetypal imagery, consciously or unconsciously, for
rhetorical means - that is, to further the ends of a particular person or group of
people or to advise a general course of action. (p.96)
The 'particular person' in this instance is the author. It is significant to note here that Peter
Nichols himself had a daughter with severe cerebral palsy and is quoted as saying that:
I [W]e put our child in a home, which of course is what the parents in the play should have
done' (Editor, 1972, p.358). The political mythologising nature of A Day In The Death Of
Joe Egg is encapsulated by Rushing (1995) when she writes that:
[I]t is when myths are unconsciously lived that they lean to regressive wish
fulfilment or take on a sinister cast. (p.96)
The personal passion with which A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg is written makes the
film a politically motivated piece of rhetoric that passes itself off as reality (until those it
depicts as 'useless eaters' challenge it). Martin and Ostwalt (1995) make another point
about mythic tales in contemporary cinema that is equally applicable to this film, when
they write that:
Myths narrate an encounter with the mysterious unknown, with terrifying or awe-
inspiring or enchanting Otherness. They do so by describing a sacred place and
time, by portraying the quest of a hero, and by probing universal problems of
human existence and belief. Mythic films do the same. (p.69)
They continue to write that mythic heroes usually go on a quest and that they strive:
towards a greater insight and freedom or to better the conditions of others. In many
versions, the quest takes the hero from a state 'of psychological dependency' to a
condition 'of psychological self responsibility'. (p.70)
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Joe Egg's father, Bri, fulfils Martin and Ostwalt's criteria for a mythic tale hero. When
combined with the fact that the time of the scenario is the 'sacred' time of Christmas and
the 'sacred' place is within the family home A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg's narrative
can easily be read as mythic in intent. Also, the film is explicitly about Bri's struggle to
free himself from an alienating dependency upon his wife and child. In one of the opening
scenes of the film, when Bri first arrives home from school, he attempts to indulge in some
form of sexual foreplay with his wife Sheila. It is a long shot of the two of them on a
couch: Bri puts his hand up Sheila's blouse, to start with, and then, after she has pushed
him off, he immediately returns to put his hand up her skirt. At which point Sheila pushes
him off again and they indulge in a little aggressive banter which goes as follows:
Sheila: What's the point in starting now. Joe's home in a minute.
Bri: Well?
Sheila: Well! She's got to be fed, bathed, exercised. You know that.
She can't wait can she.
Apart from the obvious implication that having a disabled child makes a parental
relationship somewhat frigid, we have the father, Bri, appearing 'psychologically
dependent' by his infantile behaviour. When Sheila pushes him off and tells him that they
must stop, as Joe is due home, Bri sits up and moves to the furthest point away from Sheila
on the sofa. Bri then adopts the attitude that is the standard pose of an aggrieved
adolescent who can't get his own way. That the foreplay - fumbling on a sofa - is as
equally indicative of awkward infantile or adolescent behaviour serves to reinforce the idea
that Bri has become emotionally weak and as equally dependent upon Sheila as Joe Egg is
physically. That his name - which one presumes is Brian - has been halved, leads us to
conclude that he is an emasculated male (half-man); emasculated by his acceptance of
what is, in the logic of the film, a deformed version of the family. When we hear that Bri
and Sheila cannot have any more children, the idea that Bri is the victim of emasculation is
left in no doubt. Thus the film becomes a mythic journey, Bri's journey, as Martin and
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Ostwalt have demonstrated in their definition, towards greater insight, freedom and
psychological independence for himself and his wife. Consequently, Bri tries to kill Joe
Egg by leaving her out on a cold night and when that fails he leaves — quite literally, as it is
a journey on a train - to start a new life. Not that this is shown as a selfish quest: the
closing scene of Bri on the train to London, lying on a train seat in the foetal position, is
ambiguous enough to suggest that he is not being selfish but 'cruel to be kind'. Bri's
actions will force Sheila to face her psychological dependence upon what is, symbolically,
a dead child, as much as they will make Bri face his own situation. Bri, in true mythic
style, is being unselfish rather than selfish.
Joe Egg's physical being, which does little except lift an arm every now and again whilst
having an epileptic fit (and sneezing once) makes the representation of such an individual
appear as one of the living dead; worse even, the suffering living dead. When a joke about
putting the cat down is taking place as Joe Egg is having a fit, the irony is adeptly used to
equate Joe's condition with that of a suffering animal. The joke takes place during a shot
that is very staged and theatrical, a tableau of a death scene. All the characters of the film
are in the shot with Joe forefronted, lying on a bed, with the rest of the cast leaning over
her in positions that indicate their importance to the plot. The joke maker, the
grandmother, is furthest from Joe, making her dialogue and Joe's presence the key
signifiers of the shot. Creating a mise en scene that easily nullifies Freddie's subsequent
piece of dialogue that the idea of putting something (one) down applies to the cat (an
animal) and not Joe (a human being). The point is that Joe is an animal as she is not, in the
view of the film, capable of thought or pleasure or movement.
Sheila is also an archetypal character (see Rushing, 1994, for a greater elaboration on the
feminine archetype) in that her archetypally constructed 'mother instinct' is absolute; this
is no Eve to be tempted by sexual promiscuity or immediate pleasure (as in her past).
Sheila's dedication is total and she will, as she says - in extreme close-up to emphasise the
78
strength of her conviction - look after Joe until one of them dies. Such a characterisation is
seen as a transformation from her previous lifestyle: Bri and Sheila have a love scene, one
that is Bri's recollection in flashback, informing us that prior to Sheila's marrying Bri she
was extremely sexually active. Thus, the transformation of Sheila acts not only, in the first
instance, as an ideal role model but also as a morality tale of the dangers of 'promiscuity'
and sexual activity during pregnancy: one's children will bear the sin of their parent(s).
The point about trying to demonstrate that not only Joe, but also Sheila and Bri, are
portrayed as archetypal characters in a mythic drama is to clarify the fact that the manner
in which other characters are represented can affect the way in which the central character
is seen. Thus, I am not arguing for Joe Egg to be seen as a mythic symbol in isolation, but
as a member of an ensemble that plays together to create a highly charged moral, and
seemingly universally applicable, tale which the film's makers articulate as being true and
valid. Although the film's makers may think of the film in that light, it is as socially
constructed, and culturally mediated, as any other drama or representation. It is a
theorisation of this film that makes the term 'regressive wish fulfilment' equally as
applicable to this drama as it is does to any Carry On (Gerald Thomas/Ralph Thomas, GB,
1959>1992, generic) film. The only difference, apart from content, is the stage-like mise
en scene that is used throughout to give the drama intensity and a claustrophobic
atmosphere that gives it an illusion of verisimilitude.
We are told about Sheila's pre-marital sexual activity through a recollection of Bri's as he is
getting Joe Egg ready for bed. Bri looks straight at the camera - at the audience - after
saying 'I tell you' to Joe, and repeats: 'I tell you'; thereby leaving the viewers of the film in
no doubt that the film is aimed at them. Thus, the film makes it clear that this is an
educative drama specifically aimed at us, the audience. As these recollections are about
the previous promiscuity of his wife - the idea that God has punished them for making
blasphemous comments — as well as the dangers of smoking and sexual activity during
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pregnancy, the intended meaning of the film is clear to the audience. The film creates a
narrative structure clearly implying that the question of Joe Egg's state of being is a
question of personal, religious and moral philosophy applicable to us all.
I shall now conclude this first section of the chapter by examining in detail the two main
monologues by the mothers in the film: Sheila, and Pam, Freddie's wife (Sheila and Bri's
best and oldest friends). It is an examination that reveals the narratives as mythic and
archetypal rather than merely stereotypical. Sheila's major monologue, which
demonstrates her 'motherly instincts', actually follows on from Bri's own reminiscences
that have just been discussed. The closing scene of Bri's recollections occurs when Bri and
Sheila have gone to church to see what the vicar thinks. He offers the usual platitudes
about the abnormal not pleasing God, but he also offers a potential cure through baptism.
He tells them of another child who was similar to Joe Egg but who can now 'tap-dance'.
To ridicule all the characters in his recollection, cum fantasy and flashback, Bri plays them
all himself: i.e., parodying a vicar by having him sing and dance Shirley Temple tunes. At
the end of the scene with the vicar, Sheila looks at the camera and starts to talk and, after a
few lines of dialogue, there is a cut to a close-up of Sheila looking into a mirror, still
straight at camera, revealing to us her innermost feelings. Bri and Sheila's fantasies /
recollections and realities thus merge, repeatedly, into and out of one another such that
they emphasise the disorientation of their lives caused by the arrival of abnormality.
Sheila puts it thus:
[T]he vicar was a good man. But Bri wouldn't let me do [the baptism]. I join in
these [fantasy re-enactments of the past] to please him. He hasn't any faith that
[Joe's] going to improve, whereas I have you see. I am always hopeful. (Cut, here,
to Sheila looking in mirror at camera.) Always on the lookout for some
improvement. One day when she was - what? - about 12 months old (at which
point the camera moves in ever so slightly to concentrate on Sheila's eyes filling
with tears), I suppose she was lying on the floor kicking her legs; I was doing the
flat. I'd made a little tower of bricks - plastic bricks - on a rug near her head. I got
on with my dusting and when I looked again I saw she'd knocked it down. I put the
four bricks up again and this time watched her. First her eyes, usually moving in
all directions, must have glanced in passing at this bright tower. Then the arm that
side began to show real signs of intention (a pause as Sheila wipes tear from eye)
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and her fist started clenching and spreading with the effort. The other arm - held
here like that (Sheila touched her shoulder with her hand) - didn't move. At all.
You see the importance - she was using for the first time one arm instead of both.
She'd seen something, touched it and found that when she touched it whatever-it-
was was changed. Fell down. Now her bent arm started twitching towards the
bricks. Must have taken - I should think - ten minutes' - strenuous labour - to reach
them with her fmgers [ ] then her hand jerked in a spasm and she pulled down
the tower. (Sheila pauses, upset, etc.) I can't tell you what that was like. But you
can imagine, can't you? Several times the hand very nearly touched and got jerked
away by spasm [ ] and she'd try again. That was the best of it - she had a will,
she had a mind of her own. (She continues to explain that Joe Egg became ill and
she no longer tried to knock the tower down.) But look what it meant: she was a
vegetable.
At this point the image changes to one of Joe Egg running out of a primary school class
and then skipping and singing with her class mates, 'normally'. Sheila's monologue
continues on the soundtrack:
Bri's mother's always saying 'wouldn't it be lovely if she was always running about',
which makes him hoot with laughter. But I suppose women can't help hoping.
At this point the noise of the school playground becomes audible, and the scene changes to
a close-up of a beautiful ten-year-old Josephine skipping and singing: 'Mrs D, Mrs I, Mrs
FFI, Mrs C, Mrs U, Mrs LTY' (repeated twice). We then cut back to Sheila at the mirror
with Freddie walking in through a door behind her; it turns out she is at her amateur
dramatics rehearsal; she has just had an emotional breakdown and been composing herself.
In the first part of the monologue Sheila (Janet Suzman) beautifully captures every
emotion, attitude and nuance of a mother's dilemma in having a 'monstrous' child. Sheila's
tears appear at appropriate times; every glance down, and back, at the camera is done with
consummate skill and confidence in the representation of the total commitment and
emotion of a mother's love for a child. The camera's unrelenting stare on her ensures that
the audience can escape none of the trauma that she is going through. That she ends the
whole piece with the phrase that women — the archetypal mother in this case - just 'cannot
help hoping' guarantees that we see Sheila as a desperate woman who is trapped into doing
all that is required of her to the extreme. She must stay with Joe Egg until one of them dies
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because that is what motherhood, as defined by herself and her (our) culture, dictates. The
film is not about challenging the worth of impaired people, but about their treatment; given
that they are seen as a constant burden, in this case the film is about adjusting to the
dictates that archetypes of disability require in relation to motherhood, not in relation to
abnormality.
The immediate juxtaposition of Sheila's trauma with the visualisation of her mother-in-
law's words that it would be 'lovely if [Joe] was always running about', reinforces the idea
of Joe Egg as tragic and a 'useless eater'. The juxtaposition also serves to reinforce the
film's overall point that mothers should not have to be so heroic when burdened with such
children. Sheila, in investing ten years of hope after the incident of Joe's knocking over
some toy bricks - that may well not have happened or been merely accidental — portrays
that which is tantamount, for this film's makers, to an immoral waste of individual and
social time and effort. When one considers that Sheila herself (inevitably) accepts that Joe
Egg is a 'vegetable', it is difficult to read the narrative in any other way.
Sheila's monologue defines, primarily for Pam's later monologue, the parameters that
constitute a worthwhile person, such as when she states that 'she had a will, a mind of her
own'. Thus, as long as that was the case, hope, dedication and perseverance are acceptable.
Following this logic, then, those who can be normalised can be valued to some extent: a
theme of impairment-oriented films that continues to this day in films such as The People
vs. Larry Flint (Milos Forman, US, 19960), The Horse Whisperer (Robert Redford, US,
1998), The Might (Peter Chelsom, US, 1998) and There's Something About Mary (P. &
B. Farrelly, US, 1998).
Once a parent accepts, as Sheila herself does, one's child is a 'vegetable', such parental
responsibility and dedication is not required. For Nichols, mercy must take its place; that
Nichols is confident enough to generalise and provide us with a list of conditions suitable
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to be classified as 'vegetables' (see below) makes one recall Rushing's point about 'wish
fulfilment' and a 'sinister cast'.
The visualisation of the mother-in-law's (Joe's grandmother) wish that it would be 'lovely'
if Joe could have been normal acts in two ways. Firstly, the film's narrative signifies Joe
as even more tragic than had been considered before - the very process of comparing an
impaired Joe to a normal one makes no other interpretation possible. Secondly, the
audience is reassured, in their desire for entertainment, that the child actor playing Joe Egg
is not really as Joe Egg is supposed to be: that would be far too depressing and in many
ways, bad taste in 'entertainment', however educational in intent (Darke, 1995). In
impairment-centred films the opposite is true of what Comolli (1978, p.44) argues about
there being 'one body too much' in films about 'real' people. In impairment-centred films,
once an audience begins to accept the actor as the 'real' character, via the suspension of
disbelief, the drama becomes too depressing. An actor must always be seen to be acting
both to provide entertainment and win Oscars (Husband, 1999); after all, portraying
disability is one of the rare opportunities to showcase both your own acting skills and the
profession as a whole (Darke, 1995).
By having the child actor actually do normal childhood things (skip, hop, jump, sing, and
run) the spectator is reassured that the film is to be seen as a mythic exploration of a tricky
subject in an entertainment format. It is significant that a similar theatrical device and
direction takes place in the play: the little girl playing Joe Egg, just prior to the interval and
in order to dispel some of the to depressing fears that the child might actually be like that,
appears as a normal girl. In the play the child playing Joe Egg comes on skipping to tell
the audience that the second half is not as depressing because Freddie and Pam enter, thus,
she will not be so central and is not really disabled. Ironically, given the obsession of
advertisements with the ideal (body, lifestyle and pleasure), the television station (Channel
4) on which I saw the film also had an advertisement break there. Interestingly, the stills
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collection from the film at the British Film Institute, London, also includes a multiplicity
of stills, from a fairground scene in which Joe is normal, that do not appear in the released
version of the film since they were cut from the final cut of the film.
The length of Sheila's monologue is also unusual (well over three minutes) in that it gives
the scene a monotonous intensity not very common on film; it is made to seem to be, while
technically it is not, a single long take. That the film comes virtually untouched from the
play makes it very static in mise en scene, and indicates the director's desire and decision
to keep the limiting nature of the play intact in order to intensify the film's drama.
A final point should now be made about how the helping professions' use of various terms
plays an equal part in constructing Joe Egg as an archetypal character within the film.
When Joe returns from her day-care centre, early on in the film, Sheila and Bri read a letter
from its management that explains why Joe has run out of an anti-convulsant drug; they
write that there had been a party due to the birthday celebrations of 'one of our kind'. The
film is making it specific, and explicit, that Joe is one of a kind and that all who are
labelled as she is bear a striking resemblance to one another. What makes this interesting is
that in the play (Nichols, 1967, p.18) the same piece of dialogue takes place but the person
whose birthday it was is actually named: 'Colin's'. As a consequence the film further
negates any attempt to humanise Joe Egg by objectifying others of her ilk, even outside the
narrative confines to which we are privy, through keeping them anonymous.
Giving another impaired character a name could potentially make Joe a human being and,
as the whole point of the film is to portray her as archetypal in a mythic tale trying to
justify killing her, humanising her (or them) would have been counter-productive. Also,
the film in attempting to simplify its point has had to erase nuances that made the play
appear slightly contradictory. The film is surely Nichols' perfected version of his own
play. The view of the disabled as 'useless eaters' is strengthened in the film to a much
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higher degree than in the play. That the doctor - though played by Bates as Bri in comic
fashion - subsequently calls Joe a 'vegetable' serves only to simplify an already simplified
tale.
Pam's monologue, although superficially extreme, is at the crux of the film's philosophy
and, I shall argue, it is validated both as she delivers it and by the subsequent unravelling
of the narrative. It takes place with only Pam, Freddie and Bri in the room; Sheila is
upstairs checking on Joe after Bri has said how he wished he had killed her when he had
tried in the past. The scene goes as follows:
Pam:	 I can't stand anything N.P.A.
Bri:	 What?
Pam:	 Non-physically attractive. I know it's awful but it's one of my
things; we're none of us perfect. But, old women in bathing
costumes, and skin disease and weirdies (something she has
called Joe Egg earlier). But I can't help feeling a little on
Bri's side (Bri having earlier expressed a desire to kill Joe
Egg). Can you?
Bri:	 Oh!
Pam:	 I don't mean the way [Bri] means: everyone doing away
with their unwanted mums and things. No. I think it should
be done by the state.
Freddie:	 Hitler was the state.
Pam:	 I know you won't hear of it, but then he loves a lame dog.
You know every year he buys so many tickets for the
spastics' raffle he wins the TV set; and every year he gives it
to the old folks home. He used to try taking me along on his
visits at one time. To the blind, the deaf, the dumb, the halt
and the lame, and spina bifida and multiple sclerosis.
Freddie:	 Not for long.
Pam:	 One place we went there were these poor freaks with - oh,
you know - enormous heads (at which point Pam opens her
palms about two feet apart) and so on. And you just feel 'Oh,
put them out of their misery'.
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Freddie:
	 Darling, this is not the time or the place to talk like this.
Pam:	 They wouldn't have survived in nature. It's only modern
medicine, so modern medicine should be allowed to do away
with them. A committee of doctors, do-gooders, naturally,





	 That makes it sound so horrid, but if one of our kids was
dying and they had a cure that we knew had been discovered
in the Nazi laboratories would you refuse to let them use it?
Freddie:
	 That's hardly an excuse for killing six million people.
Pam:
	 I love my own immediate family and that's the lot. I can't
manage anymore.
Freddie:	 Then it's time you tried.
At which point Freddie forcibly leads Pam up to see (not to 'meet', that would be to
humanise) Joe Egg for the first time.
Pam, as we can see, is the complete opposite of Sheila on the surface. Pam just wants to
kill all 'types' of Joe Eggs and put them out of their misery, even though her concluding
remark makes it clear that she loves her own children just as much as Sheila does Joe. The
difference is in the ability to show - what this film's makers consider to be - compassion
and mercy. Pam accepts she would do what is considered socially unacceptable for her
children (benefit from Nazi research), whilst at the same time accepting that enough is
enough when it comes to suffering.
Somewhat disturbingly (from a Social Model perspective), the monologues from Pam and
Sheila discussed here, out of the play of A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg, have become
standard '0' and 'A' level drama teaching tools and practicals. Pam's monologue proposes
the 'gas chamber' as a positive alternative to simply placing a burden on the parents and, as
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scenes earlier in the film clearly demonstrate, respite care and institutionalisation are seen
as equally evil: they merely shift the responsibility from one group to another. The
narrative of the film is that the problem of the disabled should be solved, not passed on.
When Pam is in full swing the camera follows her from one side of the room to another as
she moves from being next to Bri and then next to Freddie, and back again. Also, for
almost all of her dialogue (written above), Pam is standing whilst the other two in the room
sit, a factor which gives her authority both apparent and real.
All this would be irrelevant if it were contradicted by the narrative as a whole, but Pam is
only verbalising what Bri has already said (the film's hero) and what he tried to bring about
when he attempts to kill Joe Egg. The attempted murder of Joe Egg fails as an ambulance
crew revive Joe Egg. It is the ambulance crew's resuscitation of Joe Egg that necessitates
Bri's leaving in the end to become 'psychologically self-responsible'. Even when Pam
goes up to see Joe Egg, and she comments upon the beauty of the impaired child, she
makes the tragedy of impairment seem to be greater. Pam's entry disrupts Bri's attempt to
murder Joe Egg - whom the only consistently anti-euthanasia character, Freddie,
immediately decides to protect by lying to the police — and thus appears to validate Pam's
position above all others. Pam's position is ultimately validated at this point because her
system has 'safeguards', unlike Bri's, his is susceptible to the moment of passion (justifiable
homicide).
Pam is consequently portrayed as being more significant and morally correct than Sheila.
Sheila's monologue shows that she is trapped by her circumstances and is forced to believe
in hope. Joe Egg is her daughter and that is what she is supposed to do; she is too close to
the situation to mention or discuss it dispassionately. Pam, on the other hand, is
dispassionate, perhaps a little too much so, but none the less she appears as an objective
observer who at least knows what it is like to be a mother: she does have three children of
her own who are described as 'perfect'. When Pam states that she cares for her 'immediate
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family' she also makes explicit the point that it is the family that matters and not one
individual in it at the expense of any of the others. Again, the fact that Bri leaves at the
end of the film makes it clear that Sheila has (mistakenly) placed the interests of Joe as an
individual above those of the whole family: i.e., Bri and, significantly, Sheila herself.
What is particularly revealing about the drama as mythic tale, and what makes it less of a
stereotypical representation of the disabled character, is that the film's author's seems to be
oblivious to the fact that disabled people act as modern-day guinea pigs for a contemporary
medical establishment (Turner, 1992). If, as Pam argues, disabled people were allowed to
die, then the vital treatments to maintain the illusion of normality for the ordinary citizen
would fall behind. Just as Pam argues that she would happily use the results of Hitler's
genocidal policies, she ignores the advances of modern medicine achieved during the
routine treatment of disabled people in her own culture (Morris, 1996; Trombley, 1988).
Many advances in neuro-surgery, orthopaedics and urology have all been perfected on the
disabled. Pam is thus happy to benefit from Hitler's regime but is unaware of medical
advances in her own culture achieved through similar actions (Cohen, 1983; Goldberg,
1987). This constitutes a significant point, given that a lack of knowledge is symptomatic
of a mythic tale, and a mythic tale is about a higher morality and not dogmatic self-interest
within the confines of its own culture.
The exaggeration, and generalisation, of the impaired conditions listed by Pam would,
superficially, make the film appear stereotypical in its view of those conditions.
Impairments are seen as totally interchangeable and the impaired are seen as having an
essentially 'life unworthy of living'. The nature of impairment for Nichols et al is seen as
irredeemably pointless; no credit is given for questions of degree, severity or other factors
such as class and education.
Sheila and Bri, and Joe Egg, all combine to create a mythic drama of, what the film's
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makers believe to be universal significance and eternal relevance, it is such a perspective
which makes A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg a representation of the impaired Joe Egg
archetypal. This is in spite of the fact that it is a representation none the less socially
constructed as a stereotypical representation of the disabled in films such as Whose Life Is
It Anyway? and The Raging Moon. Thus, I would argue, Joe's character transcends being
a stereotype because of the manner of the narration (mythic) and the specificity of her
representation - and not because it is more or less truthful.
The Stereotypical Representation
There are two specific ways in which the stereotypical differ from the archetypal: the first
is the process of self-labelling, or self-definition, in the interests of defining the parameters
of that specific society's limits on self-identity and in giving it a legitimacy that it would
not otherwise possess. Secondly, stereotypes assist in the creation of an in-group and an
out-group that is defined within the text itself (not by a morality extrinsic to the film's own
sense of reality) in order to create the basis of inter-group relations. Whose Life Is It
Anyway? and The Raging Moon demonstrate the process of both practices particularly
well. Stereotyping, unlike the use of archetypes, provides legitimacy and identity
maintenance where ambiguity exists. The 'commonly recurring' images that appear on our
film and television screens indicate that little ambiguity exists in the public consensus. In
the case of archetypes, there is no sense in which there is any ambiguity or crisis of
legitimacy: the in-group is obviously us, with the out-group them. The in-group and out-
group theory also explains the idea(l)s behind the positive stereotype: i.e., when one of
them is a bit like us and vice versa; a hypothesis that could partly explain the popularity of
a film such as My Left Foot.
If one looks at the self-labelling aspect of stereotypes it is immediately obvious that this is
not an issue in A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg. In Joe Egg's case the labelling is done for
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her by others who do not consider it an issue; the issue in her case is her existence and not
its relative worth. Whose Life Is It Anyway? reverses the issue. All the other characters in
the film seem, initially, to want to validate Ken Harrison (Richard Dreyfuss) as having a
worthwhile life (yet not 'equal'). Thus, he must himself dispel that potentially valid notion
to restore the supremacy of normal identity. Ken does this through self-labelling.
Similarly, the film does it in the overall narrative by creating a normal past for Ken (and
for us to have a visual comparison) to compare with his abnormal present. From the initial
onset of abnormality, two identities are created and paralleled: the normal and the
abnormal, portrayed stereotypically.
As Dyer (1977, p.29) has stated, stereotypes are one of the 'mechanisms of boundary
maintenance'. Ken's latter existence within the bounds of abnormality is paralleled with
his previous self to create the boundaries of acceptable abnormality. Equally, as Linville et
al (1986, p.198) have said: 'stereotyping is a matter of degrees'; unlike archetypes, which
allow very little deviance from their intended meaning, stereotypes are polymorphous even
within the same context or text. For example, Ken Harrison's own self-devaluation ensures
that normality is not blamed for the differentiation (or boundary construction) with
legitimacy achieved by having the abnormal themselves testify to the 'reality' of their
abnormality and difference.
In one of the lower-key scenes of the film self-definition and devaluation are laid out very
clearly by Ken. In consultation with a therapist who wishes him to view his rehabilitation
as the opening to a new life, Ken gives the following retort to the therapist's suggestion that
he use a computer to write, rather than dwell on his own inability to sculpt any more. He
states:
[D]o you think you change your art like a major in college? I am a sculptor, my
whole being, my imagination speaks, spoke, to me through my fingers. I was a
sculptor and that was what my life was all about. Now, you people seem to think
about survival no matter what. If I'd wanted to write a goddamned novel I would
have done it, if I'd wanted to dictate poetry I'd have done that.
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Ironically, Ken is talking about identity maintenance, his past and present one, but here it
serves to devalue his present one and not discuss identity per se (a key element of
stereotyping for both the stereotyped and the stereotyping). Ken is shown in a medium,
low angle, shot, in which he is slightly slouched forward with his upper-body held up by a
wheelchair strap. Ken is in a manual wheelchair to reinforce the central idea that his
identity is now dependent upon others. The ability to create something of one's own choice
is also paralleled to the ability to create one's self; now Ken is seemingly unable to do that,
he has decided that his life is no longer of value. The low angle of the shot gives Ken the
status dictated by his own choice of a future: suicide as a member of the Other.
Ken fulfils two functions: he labels himself as not worthy of life and he creates the
boundaries that constitute 'worthy living'. As Dyer (1993, p.16) has written, one of the
stereotype's functions is to 'maintain sharp boundary definitions, to define where the pale
ends and thus who is clearly within and who is clearly beyond it'. Consequently, in Ken's
case, the limits of 'survival no matter what' are defined by those who inhabit the outer-
edges of the boundary, with the legitimacy of his view confirmed by its being his own
reality. As Dyer has also written, and are exemplified by Ken's testament to his own
worth(lessness), stereotypes legitimate the use of a specific entity by defining the position
for it that becomes abuse. Whereas Dyer was talking about alcoholism, Whose Life Is It
Anyway? is about modern medical practice. A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg is not
defining boundaries, or limits, but stating its own views as axiomatic, thereby portraying
impairment and disability archetypally - not, as Ken Harrison is, stereotypically.
Ken validates the social process of medical rationalisation and the marginalisation of the
physically impaired from the mainstream of society. This occurs primarily because the
film's entire narrative is Ken's ultimately successful legal fight to have the right to commit
assisted suicide. Stereotypes are ideological in intent and, as Perkins (1979), Dyer
(1993[a]) and Oakes et al (1994) have implied, realistic in that they represent the realities
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of inter-group conflict and identity maintenance. When Perkins (1979, p.155) writes that:
'stereotypes present interpretations of groups which conceal the "real" cause of the groups'
attributes and confirm the legitimacy of the groups' oppressed position', she encapsulates
their essence as ideological functions. If we apply her analysis to the representation of Ken
Harrison's acquired quadriplegia, we can see that Ken is himself confirming the position of
an able-bodied society when he confirms that his is indeed a 'life unworthy of living'. The
Social Model of disability would postulate that the true cause of Ken's disability is socially
constructed and extrinsic to his own body, even though Ken's self-devaluation interprets it
as being pathological.
The film's wider ideological position - medical rationalisation and the discrediting of its
interpretation of abnormality as valid in its own right - is revealed when the film is
analysed from a Social Model perspective to demystify the stereotype. The Social Model
interpretation confirms Byars' (1991, p.'73) perspective (which echoes and acknowledge
Perkins' [1979] work) that 'stereotypes function to reinforce ideological hierarchies by
naturalising'; naturalising, in this case, the idea that impairment is pathologically inferior to
the idea(l)s of normality. The financing of medical treatment is used in Whose Life Is It
Anyway? as a false argument that Ken's preservation is not the appropriate priority for
finite resources - the starving of Africa would be better recipients, in the stated view of a
black orderly - but such an argument is mistakenly pitted against an emotive issue which, if
Ken were allowed to die, would not fundamentally change anyway (such funding would
not be re-directed to solving Third World poverty and debt). Ken's self-devaluation is thus
made logical as a hierarchical imperative for the survival of mankind and, although
ridiculous in the extreme, it is perfectly acceptable in the narrative and to a disablist
culture.
Prior to Ken's session with the therapist, there is a flashback to Ken while he is sketching
his girlfriend dance, and it is immediately followed by his telling his girlfriend to go and
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find a 'real' man now that he is disabled. It is a cinematically constructed chronology that
ensures that we see without undue ambiguity Ken's dismissal of rehabilitation. The
sequencing of the narrative, which repeatedly juxtaposes the good normality to the bad
abnormality, insists that we see and share Ken's perspective of his impairment as not only
valid but truthful. Such a call to 'truth' is a key element of the stereotype even though this
ignores significant information and the interests that are served by such a stereotypical
representation of impairment. The same is true of archetypes but the difference, I am
arguing, is in the degree of apparent construction in its creation and its subsequent
potential reception.
A socio-political problem or situation is often culturally identified through stereotypes:
taking on a form in which it can be efficaciously comprehended and ideologically
mystified by society. This leads to the development of stereotypes as an ideological
attempt to overcome any given socio-political problem — usually for the benefit of the
stereotypers, the normal in this case, rather than the stereotyped. On this basis, stereotypes
can be classified as culturally specific. Thus, A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg (which
argues its philosophy as a point of belief even though it comments upon modernity) is very
different to Whose Life Is It Anyway? (a film which is dependent upon modernity for its
interpretation even if it also draws on a 'widespread-belief system' [Fraser and Gaskell,
1990]). The self-labelling that takes place in one, and not the other, also seems to support
the hypothesis that the process of self-labelling is a key element of a stereotypical
representation and not an archetypal one. A good comparison can be seen in A Day In The
Death Of Joe Egg, when the label is already there, compared to Whose Life Is It
Anyway?, where self-labelling is carried out by the characters within and throughout the
text and its drama.
The Raging Moon is equally adept at using self-devaluation as a legitimating process of
various ideological agendas and self-labelling as an aspect of its stereotypical portrayal of
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disability. For example, early on in the film, when Bruce (Malcolm McDowell) is in
hospital having collapsed after his brother's wedding, he articulates his own philosophy
and that of the film with an absolute and honest conviction. Lying in a hospital bed,
unable to maintain his balance, Bruce tells his brother: 'you don't say "ill" to people like
me'. He then goes on to tell him that he has got a place in 'a Home for the disabled' (people
whom the brother had earlier called 'cripples').
Differentiation is both immediate and final in this instance: Bruce is no longer normal and,
as such, must seek isolation in order to fulfil his own devalued sense of self. The
ideological hierarchy to be legitimated in The Raging Moon is the segregation of the
physically impaired, articulated as the best solution for the impaired / disabled. Bruce
chooses it himself and then learns to accept it, which means that his self-denigration is both
complete and correct in the context of the narrative. As with Whose Life Is It Anyway?,
The Raging Moon is replete with examples of this process: i.e., it is a narrative that
inadvertently reveals self-labelling to be part of its impaired characters' stereotypical
representation.
In a further similarity to Whose Life Is It Anyway?, The Raging Moon creates a past
normality which is compared with a subsequently impaired life. Some critics and
academics have termed this a similar process to ethnocentrism. However, self-labelling
and devaluation are slightly different in that the individual, or group, that is negatively
stereotyped are one and the same and, more often than not, it is they themselves who make
the negative comparison. By having 'them' label 'them' the legitimacy of the argument is
in no doubt. Cripps (1977) aptly writes that:
[M]ost stereotypes emerge from popular culture that depends upon imaginative use
of familiar formulas for its audience appeal. Deriving as they do from the familiar,
they tend to assert a conservative point of view that speaks of a changeless status
quo in which [the stereotyped] take up a well-known position. (p.15)
He later continues:
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[T]hus in a society of many groups, stereotypes affirm the values of the dominant
group. If these stereotypes become popular, then they easily assure, soothe, and
support, thus growing into political spokesmen of the status quo. [ ...] Even at its
most effective, the stereotype may merely reinforce attitudes rather than convert its
audiences to new ones. [ ] Thus, in a society of many groups, stereotypes affirm
the values of the dominant group. (p.18)
Cripps encapsulates the idea of the stereotype acting ideologically in concert with the
status quo; the status quo of normality in this case is antithetical to the interests of the
abnormal. The stereotypes of abnormality and impairment always confirm the values of
normality against abnormality: i.e., the values of the dominant social group. The
specificity of stereotypes is that they 'speak of a changeless status quo' that is not a
changeless status quo at all; they speak of it as if it were. It is the nature of the
representation of the status quo that defines whether or not an image is stereotypical or
archetypal. In Whose Life  Is It Anyway? the status quo is apparently under threat (due to
medical and technological advancements), whereas in A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg the
status quo is not under threat, only its behaviour is in question; thus they are (along with all
my other points) stereotypical and archetypal, respectively. Both stereotypes and
archetypes call upon apparently universal norms and values, which is why so many of each
endure. The crux is to what degree they are unintentionally revealed and socially agreed
upon, and how they are intended to be received (real or not).
The closing scene of The Raging Moon demonstrates the point. In the final scene Bruce,
having been told of the death of his beloved Jill, is being taken back to the Home in the
Home's minibus when he admits that he has 'pissed' himself. The carer tells him that it
does not matter, but he insists: '[lit does matter. Everything matters, if I don't believe that
I've had it'. Objectively, this is a fallacy; 'piss' is just 'piss' and as such it does not matter,
but subjectively - in the context of a normalising hegemony that sees 'piss' as much more
significant - it does matter. Consequently, Bruce validates such a normalising hegemony
as a truth that he (and the abnormal and normal alike) must live his life by, thereby making
the disability stereotype act as the boundary marker for what is acceptable and not
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acceptable as normal in this society. The degree to which the issue of boundary marking is
significant in any given image (either intentionally or unintentionally revealed) is equally
significant in defining the image as either stereotypical or archetypal. The stereotypical is
more of an impairment-centred film (defining normality itself) than is the archetypal
(which is about defining the behaviour of normal people and not about life as lived by the
disabled).
The aspect of stereotypes discussed so far in The Raging Moon and Whose Life Is It
Anyway? are elements that define the parameters of what is acceptable and not acceptable;
i.e., setting the boundaries of, and for, 'civilised' existence. The point about in-group and
out-group aspects of stereotyping is that they define the more specific constituents of group
identity in the present, creating for each other their own sense of self-esteem; an identity
for both them and us, whichever group one belongs to.
Hamilton and Trolier (1986, p.131) have written of the in-group / out-group situation that
'they are all alike, whereas we are quite diverse'. Of course, the converse is also true,
especially in the case of disability. But, following on from Hamilton and Trolier, the in-
group (normal people, in this case) perceive themselves as having shared ideas within a
broad range of variation, whereas the out-group are seen by the in-group as being virtually
homogenous, with no degree of variation. This fits my earlier definition of the archetype
in A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg. Here, however, its main applicability is to the more
culturally specific question of stereotypes because, as Linville et al (1986) have written:
The more experience a perceiver has with the members of a given social group, the
more differentiated the perceiver's representation of the group will tend to be. [ ]
People will tend to have more highly differentiated representations of members of
'in-groups' than 'out-groups'. (p.182)
In the films under discussion the disabled are the Other, the out-group, and the normal are
the in-group; thus a minimum function of the disabled stereotype is to construct an in- and
an out-group in order to enable inter-group relations to appear legitimate rather than
96
unequal and socially constructed. I would go further than Linville et al (1986) and argue
that people have the capacity to override the knowledge that regular contact with out-group
members can provide and to challenge any given stereotype one may have of (0)thers, in
order to make it fit (or not) their own stereotypical and archetypal perception of that out-
group or its members.
Significantly, a stereotype in its construction does not only define inter-group relations; it
also defines intra-group relations. Ethnocentrism plays a very similar role when it places
the out-group member in an in-group position and then negatively equates the two; the out-
group member is invariably left lacking certain intrinsic aspects of the in-group member
that makes the out-group member tragic and / or Other. The key point to be addressed now
is how specific characters in The Raging Moon, Whose Life Is It Anyway? and My Left
Foot are constructed as out-group members in order to create group boundaries and
simultaneously ensure that those individuals stay within that out-group.
In films about impairment / disability the process of in-group / out-group differentiation,
via stereotyping, is used more subtly to dictate the definition of what good Otherness is.
Stereotypes are not utilised to marginalise further the out-group, but to control the
boundaries of acceptable behaviour that they (and those of the in-group) should inhabit. In
Whose Life Is It Anyway?, for example, Ken Harrison is given as the good Other in that
his actions (suicide) are seen as not only for the benefit of himself but of the community in
general. The camera does a pan and tracks over the I.C.U. unit to represent other people
with quadriplegia as lifeless. Significantly, Ken is alert and imaginative; Ken is listening
intently to a piece of classical music on headphones and enjoying it. In this sequence the
film's makers are cinematically articulating a perspective that sees Ken as the good Other
whilst the (generalised) other people in the ward are the bad Other. This is because Ken
still wishes to benefit the community, by committing suicide, whilst the rest of the people
in the ward exist merely as a burden to society. Ken is still articulate and able to obtain
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pleasure from a source, thereby making Ken's suicidal tendencies seem altruistic rather
than selfish (Armstrong, citing Durkheim, 1990) and appear socially responsible.
Ken is thus different from other members of the homogenous out-group of Otherness, not
in order for the film specifically to marginalise that group farther (which it does by
extension), but to educate its members on how they should behave, and to educate the in-
group on what we should do to solve the problem of disability / impairment. Ken
represents what we should do if ever we find ourselves in that situation: legalise
euthanasia, and / or commit suicide. In this way a positive Otherness is constructed
alongside a negative one; a positive or negative stereotype depending upon the paradigm
applied: it is negative from the Social Model and positive from the Medical Model. Ideal
Otherness is, then, ethnocentrically and hierarchically, on a scale of in- and out-group
representation, paralleled to normality (in-groupness) to boost the self-esteem and values
of the in-group norms. Thus, the stereotype of disability in these films is as much about
intra-group relations as inter-group relations; just as Ken's actions are deemed good, so in-
group behaviour is modified by creating an etiquette in dealing with Otherness.
Stereotypes, it could be argued, enable the stereotyper and the stereotyped to create a
clearly defined set of rules by which interaction and inter-group relations can, and cannot,
take place in the present. A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg does not attempt this. It argues
from beginning to end that interaction (integration) is just not an option: abnormality is
essentially abhorrent, as it is an abject essentialist state of being. A Day In The Death Of
Joe Egg is not about ameliorating or changing or adjusting a current boundary, but about
eradicating existing ones.
The scene in The Raging Moon where Bruce and Jill take a trip out of the institution, with
a married couple as their carers, to get an engagement ring, acts in a similar fashion. The
two disabled people act as a parody of a heterosexual romance, therefore showing that it
need not just be an individual who is stereotyped. The parodying of a heterosexual
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romance is here the enactment of an ethnocentric stereotype; they are constructed as
pathetic by their inability to measure up to a comparative normal heterosexual romance.
The two carers are included to portray a normal, sexually active couple. The point about
in- and out-group differentiation is that such an aspect of the representation of abnormality
and Otherness both defines good and bad Otherness as well as justifying the validation of
one group at the expense of another. Jill and Bruce are shown as different to the general
mass of the disabled in their Home: no one else is having a relationship or ever leaves the
premises. As such, they are used in the narrative as in the similar process of
ethnocentricism, to demean themselves using the in- and out-group paradigm. Jill and
Bruce define their own suitable behaviour. They subsequently raise the self-esteem of the
in-group with its normality validated through Bruce and Jill's mimicking of it, whilst they
themselves are seen as the optimum version of Otherness.
As Dyer (1993) has written:
The role of the stereotype is to make visible the invisible, so that there is no danger
of it creeping up on us unawares; and to make fast, firm and separate what is in
reality fluid and much closer to the norm than the dominant values system cares to
admit. (p.16)
The impaired, the disabled, are often presumed to be culturally invisible - this is one of the
mystifying processes of images of Otherness - but images of the disabled (Otherness)
abound (Davis, 1995). Only as Otherness are they presented and mystified as being a
hidden minority. The disabled as Other are indeed a recurrent image in cinema (Norden,
1994), a realisation that enables us to see Bhabha's point (Bhabha, 1994); he echoes Dyer's
quote, above, about groups as Other being as true of disability imagery as they are of the
black Other of which Bhabha writes. Bhabha argues that society must constantly re-
interpret the Other in order to make solid that which is elusive and prone to slip through
the net of cultural purification.
The point must also be made that stereotypers prefer to remain superior to the stereotyped,
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a process achieved by letting the Other incriminate themselves into Otherness; as Jaspars
and Hewstone (1990, p.127) have written: 'in-group favouritism [is] actually far stronger
than for out-group derogation'. Such a process increases the legitimacy of the stereotyper -
to let them stereotype themselves is always more efficacious.
A scene from My Left Foot aptly encapsulates my point about the in- and out-group aspect
of stereotyping. In My Left Foot Christy Brown is encouraged to go to a physiotherapy
class with a group of similarly physically impaired people. The scene starts with a long
shot, from a very low angle, of the clinic physiotherapy room. The camera then tracks into
a medium close-up of Brown and in the background of the shot, once we have reached
Brown, we can see other, younger, people with cerebral palsy: 'cripples', as Brown calls
them. We then cut to a point-of-view shot from Brown's perspective: a floor level shot, in
close-up, of a small boy with an equally severe form of cerebral palsy. The boy has a
glazed intellectually 'retarded' look that epitomises every negative culturally popular view
of what a spastic is. The shot then changes to one that shows all the atrophied spastic legs
and arms of those around Brown on the floor and Brown is horrified and wants to
immediately go home. He does, never to return to the clinic. Brown is thus shown as
different but special because he then gets his therapy at home and away from all the 'bad
spastics'.
The mise en scene detailed above shows Brown seeing other people with cerebral palsy as
an homogenous group of cripples with him as different from them (which is supported by
his doctor's and family's perspective and actions). As such, it makes him a positive
representation for the culture outside the film: the able-bodied audience. The film clearly
places Brown within the stereotyped world of the Other and the out-group, yet he is not
like them in totality. The film's makers ideological intent, by their version of Brown,
invalidates the invalid; it bolsters society's weak self-esteem by representing the only 'good
cripple' as one who does his / her best to be like the normal. Consequently, Brown acts to
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facilitate an act of social valorisation of normality. The ambiguity of stereotypes is not that
they define explicitly what constitutes the non-stereotyped, but that they define what is
stereotypically the Other. Stereotypes defme what is not acceptable or agreeable explicitly,
and only implicitly that which lies within specific cultural confines (usually laid out within
specific texts).
Although Christy Brown's story has certain elements of the stereotypical, as I have argued
above, his story (and most 'inspirational cripple' stories) is on the whole much more mythic
than stereotypical, with principal characters both stereotypically and archetypally
represented. Brown is also represented as an archetype in that he represents the mythic tale
of man's struggle against himself and his environment. If we return to Martin and
Ostwalt's point about a mythic hero being one who goes on a journey of self-discovery
from psychological dependency to self-reliance, we can see that Brown, the 'heroic
cripple', is a mythic hero with typically archetypal characteristics: i.e., embodying aspects
of the 'human condition'. Consequently, archetypal characters can, and often do, act
stereotypically concomitantly. Films such as The Stratton Story, The Miracle Worker
(Arthur Penn, US, 1962), A Patch of Blue, The Waterdance (N. Jimenez and S. Michael,
US, 1992), Forrest Gump (Robert Zemeckis, US, 1994) and many others represent the
impaired in a similarly dual way that is both archetypal and stereotypical.
In many disability / impairment-centred films the stereotypical ending is either cure or
death - the ideological endorsement of medicalisation - and a cure is achieved in these
films (My Left Foot and The Raging Moon for Bruce's character) even though no one is
medically cured. The cure is the cure of rehabilitation or normalisation. Death is equally
seen as a cure of some sorts, in the other films in question, as it is shown as the ultimate
cure of Otherness. Cure, as in the restoration of the impaired self to a conventionally
normal self, is prevalent in a high number of disability films, especially around specific
impairments such as visual and hearing impairments, but also paralysis. Such diverse
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films as these are indicative: Afraid of the Dark (Mark Peploe, GB, 1991); Paula
(Rudolph Mate, US, 1952); Elmer Gantry (Richard Brooks, US, 1960); Brimstone and
Treacle; The Lawnmower Man (Brett Leonard, US, 1993); The Piano (Jane Campion,
Australia, 1993); Almost an Angel (John Cornell, US, 1990); and Leap of Faith (Richard
Pearce, US, 1992). The cure is often - in the films listed and through normalisation in My
Left Foot - a matter of personal will-power and motivation. Thus, these films are
inadvertently articulating the ideology of 'the positive stereotype' and 'the negative
stereotype' as being linked to individualism. Gilman (1985) writes that:
The bad Other becomes the negative stereotype; the good Other becomes the
positive stereotype. The former is that which we fear to become; the latter, that
which we fear we cannot achieve. (p.20)
That which we fear we cannot achieve, as demonstrated in these films, is the courage and
fortitude needed to be a 'Supercrip'. If we were faced with a disabling condition, what we
fear to become is the bad Other of the generalised cripple: dependent and pathetic or one of
the living dead. Brown, in My Left Foot, is the good Other as he not only represents the
mythic ideal of courage in the face of what is considered a tragedy, but also because he
validates normality by striving for it at the expense of validating his own impaired body.
The good Other is a representation that many disability imagery writers have considered to
be a positive image in general of disability (see above), but what they are acquiescing to is
the 'normative fallacy' (Macherey, 1978). Equally, the notion that negative images are
devoid of anything positive is a weak argument. It fails to explain why so many of the
stereotyped enjoy — or gain something out of - those bad images of their group. The point
about stereotypes and archetypes as reflecting true inter-group relations might help us to
appreciate why that is the case; the pleasure could be that as they, the disabled, are
discriminated against and feared, the negative image, at least inadvertently, acknowledges
and reveals that. Although the images and the ideological bent of the impairment /
disability films examined here (and most others) blame the stereotyped, they do at least
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allow those depicted to acknowledge a significant part of their reality. Such images of
disability — in being part of the actual socio-cultural process of disablement - inadvertently
acknowledge for the disabled the reality that they inhabit the world of the Other for,
perhaps, the purpose of reinforcing the sense of self-esteem of the 'normals'.
The main problem in advocating the positive image - which in the impaired body's case is
one of potential normality - is best summed up by Bhabha (1984) when he writes that:
[T]he demand that one image should circulate rather than another is made on the
basis that the stereotype is distorted in relation to a given norm or model. It results
in a mode of prescription criticism which Macherey has conveniently termed the
'normative fallacy', because it privileges an ideal 'dream-image' in relation to which
the text is judged. The only knowledge such a procedure can give us is one of
negative difference because the only demand it can make is that the text should be
other than it itself. (p.105)
Apart from its being redundant to argue for something to be other than it is, the normative
fallacy, as Bhabha has said, argues for a dream that is either not possible or not wanted by
many of those stereotyped. Thus, the problem of arguing, in isolation, for the positive
image, falls into the tap of accepting the fallacy that there is an ideal manner in which to
live and be represented: i.e., as normal. By accepting that the ideal exists, that normality
exists, one then becomes implicated in the very process that has been for centuries
marginalising and negating the Other: the ultimate disablement of the abnormal. It is not
surprising that many disabled people like the idea of the 'positive' per se as they, to
paraphrase Mary Douglas (1966), perhaps seek to remain on the 'clean' side of the
pollution boundary.
The 'normative fallacy' confirms that impairment / disability centred films, as in the films
discussed herein and as a type, act to define the predominant moral and cultural attitudes to
Otherness, which, in this case, is the existence of impairment and abnormality. The key is
to de-construct the stereotype, the archetype and the mythical symbolism that the disabled
are used to represent, to reveal the limits imposed upon what is good or bad. This is not to
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argue that we should be allowed to be cohabitant with the 'normals' in their illusion, but to
discredit that illusion so that the parameters and boundaries are dismantled such that each
individual is enabled to be whatever one wishes to be. Consequently, a sphere of freedom
would be created for both them and us - you and me - to be whatever we are or wish to be
in the future.
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Chapter Three: Family and Disability
'I was their number one son and they treated me like number two; but it's human nature to fear the unusual.
Perhaps when I held my Tiffany baby rattle with a shiny flipper instead of five chubby digits they freaked, but
I forgive them.'
The Penguin (Danny DeVito) in Batman Returns
This chapter discusses how the family, and idea(l)s of the family, are represented in films,
in order to suggest how they effect the representation of disability, demonstrating how
issues and ideals of the family have a direct and specific effect upon such representations.
The central film under discussion will be My Left Foot and this is followed by briefer
studies of the other key films used in the thesis to show any similarities, or none, whilst
extrapolating whether or not familial ideological discourse constructs impairment as being
specifically valid or invalid.
My Left Foot is examined at length to explore the relationship of the disabled character
Christy Brown to his Mother and Father in order to identify familial ideology and its role
in the construction of disability. In examining the family this chapter identifies, above all
else, the normalising effect of the family upon the impaired individual and how this effect
is subsequently utilised therein to create the normalised good cripple. Conversely, it is also
identified as negating the impaired individual due to his / her inability to match the
normalising hegemony of the family as either a unit or a procreative base.
The ideological conventions identified are little more than the conventions of mainstream
commercial film form and style; the originality of the chapter is in demonstrating their
application to disability within familial ideology and the identification of how each
ideological structure (familial and disability) works to support the other. For example, in
identifying that abnormality is negated in comparison to normality, then normality is likely
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to be reinforced as positive and thus superior. In the core films of this thesis such a dual
scenario occurs in relation to disability and the family; this chapter shows how.
Throughout the chapter, as in other chapters, identified non-core films further demonstrate
the point that the processes identified in this thesis are not restricted to the selection of core
films studied here in relation to disability. Equally, the identified processes are often the
same ideological conventions as those of non-disability films.
My Left Foot is the most appropriate film to study here as it is specifically about a family,
and the film's premise is rooted within an acceptance of the family as an ideal and as a
natural way of life. Consequently, My Left Foot is a clear affirmation of traditional family
ideology, given that it fails to address any other social relevance, agency or factor in the
creation (or perpetuation) of familial ideology within it. The film fulfils for family
ideology exactly that which Nichols (1981, p.290) ascribes to it: 'ideology seeks to hide [
] ideology seeks to [make representations] appear other than what they are'. My Left Foot
is a selective view of the Brown family's history, a view that hides the social consequences
and ideology of the film's and the family's social place and time whilst appearing to
portray a realistic account of what it is / was 'actually' like. The film utilises the ideology
of the family as a way of entertaining us by saying that no matter how bad it is out in the
'real' world, especially and ideally, we still have our families.
The other elements of family life, what it is to be a brother or a sister, for example, are all
just as 'ideally' (and ideologically) constructed as the Mother in My Left Foot and in
culture. The siblings of Christy Brown are as idealised by My Left Foot as is the Mother;
they are constructions saturated in the idea(l)s of what it is to be a good brother or sister as
much as by Brown's own lived reality. My Left Foot, being about Christy Brown, who had
twenty-one siblings of whom 12 survived, cannot help but advance a view on Brown's
existence as a sibling, but it is a perspective that turns out to be nostalgic at the very least.
The uncritical form and style of My Left Foot, which abdicates creative responsibility by
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its claim to being a bio-pic, ensures that it unreservedly shares all the illusions of family
ideology that it can. Equally, such an uncritical form ensures that the story of Christy
Brown remains sentimental because of its adherence to the ideology of the ideal family.
The Browns, especially the Mother, are offered to us as an ideal family through their
dedication to the family via self-sacrifice. The only negative character within the family is
the Father, a character who is not capable of representing the ideal Father as he is unable to
discipline himself to the required ideal level of self sacrifice. Significantly, the Mother is
not given a name; she is either Mother or Mrs Brown, even in the credits: her role is the
role of the archetypal mother, in the kitchen and wearing a kitchen apron, dressed in the
uniform of domesticity.
The brothers and sisters, who vary in both number and character throughout the film, all
portray an almost saintly degree of self sacrifice as well, whereas disharmony (except in
relation to the Father) is never an issue. Just as the family is romanticised so is poverty;
that the Mother had twenty-two children, of whom nine died in infancy, is never addressed
- except in that Mrs Brown is (or seems to be) pregnant in almost every scene of the film.
That some of the deaths of her children must have been related to their poverty / social
conditions is never raised; consequently, grief is non-existent in the film. The family is
thus given as the key requirement in the transcendence of poverty through love and, it
could be argued, 'love' is considered as natural only when within the family. The family
here transcends everything and, consequently, all love that is outside the 'traditional' family
- homosexual or purely sexual - is constructed by extension and through its absence within
family ideology as unnatural. The common-sense view of the family as ensuring the
existence and perpetuation of such an ideology is, as such, reinforced. In My Left Foot,
the Mother gives her 'love' and self unconditionally to all members of the family and at all
times.
Kaplan (1992) talks of the early modern Mother as being primarily concerned with the
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production of children; Mrs Brown is represented as little other than a being whose
existence is purely for procreation and familial support. Because Mrs Brown is as central
to the film as Christy Brown is, one could almost see the film as being addressed to, and
for, women. Mrs Brown is a maternal role model embedded in melodrama; an idea of
melodrama as described by Kaplan, quoting Brunsdon (Kaplan, 1992), when she states that
melodrama is that which addresses the female audience with issues pertaining to women's
presumed familial responsibilities. In the case specific to My Left Foot the issues are
pregnancy and the 'domestic' upheavals caused by a deformed child. Significantly, if we
also use the roots of the Greek meaning of melodrama - music plus drama in a two-
dimensional characterisation - My Left Foot would again clearly be generic of this form.
This may be a simplistic definition of melodrama, but, and this is my point, the film is a
simplistic representation of the life of poor working-class Irish people who have numerous
children, one of whom has severe cerebral palsy. The use of music in the drama has the
effect of wringing every last drop of emotional feeling from the spectator, with the violins,
symptomatic of extreme feeling, reducing every instance of emotional or physical intensity
to a pathetic 'isn't it brave / sad' moment of pure sentimentalism.
My Left Foot is more a melodrama (although even this is superficial) than any of the other
films explored in the thesis precisely because it has at its core a significant woman
alongside the disabled character of Christy Brown. Whilst the other films have central
female characters they are there either for the ideology of feminisation or disability to work
more effectively (Ken in Whose Life; Bruce in Raging Moon; Joseph Merrick in Elephant
Man) or to indicate how impairment desexualises (Stephanie in Duet for One; Jill in
Raging Moon; Joe Egg). My Left Foot is a melodrama within a conventional mainstream
social issue drama rather than one in the more complex — and well documented — social
realist mode (cf. Hill, 1986). As such its use of melodrama is rather more conventional
than complex in entertainment, rather than being campaigning and informative or rather
than polemical or dogma driven.
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If, traditionally, the Mother represents the gentle side of the family, then the Father is its
discipline and violence (Segal, 1983; Atwood, 1997). The Browns fit such a paradigm
comfortably. The Father first appears in a flashback (flashbacks constituting most of the
film) surrounding Christy Brown's birth. When Brown's Father, Paddy, is walking to the
maternity ward we are left in no doubt of his physical presence even though we do not see
his face. Paddy's entrance is tracked by a high angle close-up of his feet - in heavy
working men's boots - the camera tracking back as he walks towards the camera and
maternity ward. The diegetic sound is nowhere near fidelity; it grossly exaggerates the
sound of his boots (and baby crying) so that they seem to echo around the hospital. The
concentration on his walking style and its awesome noise leaves us in no doubt that this is
'the man' of the family: the Father. Upon being told of his son's abnormality, Paddy goes
straight to the pub, ordering a short and a pint, and head-butts a fellow customer for
implying that he will not have any more children. The film thereby gives us further proof
of his status as masculinity personified in Fatherhood and marriage: i.e., the proud family
man. Both the nurse who tells him of his son's deformity and the man who is head-butted,
are much smaller and weaker in comparison to Paddy, so these scenes serve to emphasise
that his power and authority are based upon his physical rather than his mental strengths.
As a result, the Father is signified as the epitome of the masculine early on. The ideology
of patriarchy, and the position of the Father, is an ideal (to advocates of the bourgeois
family unit, that is) that places the Father as either a good Father or a bad one; if his power
is invisible but effective (usually categorised as earning 'respect') he is a good Father. If
his power is visible and aggressive, not under his control, he is a bad Father. Mr Brown is
a bad Father due to his inability to control his aggression and drinking, which result in his
becoming violent and unreliable (a common, stereotypical representation of Irish
masculinity [Caughie and Rocket, 1996; Rocket, 1996]). Masculinity in itself is not
criticised, only its excesses.
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The dining table - again, both in culture (Segal, 1983) and this film - is a central motif of
the whole family and its attitude. A significant number of scenes, and shots, in My Left
Foot revolve around the dining table, because the family dining table is the traditional
gathering place where the 'true' meaning of family life reaches its zenith. Thus in My Left
Foot the central ideology of the family is acted out in the mise en scene; in the first scene
at the dining table, and there are at least seven more dining table scenes, we are shown the
hierarchy of power within the household. Initially, one son is not coming down for
breakfast quickly enough but a few threatening words, and implied violence, from his
Father brings him down instantly; meanwhile, Brown is sitting under the stairs, separate
from the table (where he remains until he is able to prove that he can think). Once all the
other children are eating at the table we get a point-of-view shot from Brown under the
stairs: a medium shot from a low angle looking up (as Brown is on the floor) and in deep
focus. To the forefront are the other children sitting at the table eating whilst in the
background is Paddy. Paddy is standing central in the frame, towering over his family, his
authority visible and overtly implied. Interestingly, Paddy leaves the shot - to go to work
one presumes - and we are left with exactly the same shot except the Mother has been
revealed to be directly behind Paddy. Consequently, we can read this as signifying that the
Mother is behind the Father, to act as support and buffer between the Father and the
children. It is a literal visualisation of the saying that behind every successful man is a
good woman.
The mere presence of the Father as the symbolic, and actual, controller of behaviour is
further signified by another medium shot in the film. In a scene later than the one
discussed above, the Father is shown to be the all-seeing eye over his children and wife as
they do their home, or house, work at the dining table. One shot during this scene is a
point-of-view shot from the Father, sitting in his comfortable chair reading his paper, from
which we (and he) can see all that happens in the living room and kitchen - including
Brown under the stairs. Paddy, the family Father, is thus seen as much as a presence as a
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subject. Paddy never helps with the housework (clearly the Mother's domain) but
maintains order, behaviour and silence when required. Paddy's physical attitude is
sufficient and his natural role is implied by a lack of criticism either from the film or from
within the Brown family. The only criticisms of Paddy as a Father are when he crosses the
line of implied violence to impending or real violence. The Father's discipline, 'respect', is
clearly seen as necessary and ideal, with the bad Father manifesting in Paddy when he
appears to be out of control and excessive. Mr Brown's character is so two-dimensional,
closed, that he, his representation, acts as little other than a simple example of either a
good or bad Father.
When Brown first starts to write (an 'A' and then 'Mother' in chalk on the floor) one of his
brothers - aged about ten - comes down the stairs, stopping half way, and says to the
gathered, hushed, family: '[W]hat's up?'. In a series of shot / reverse shots - with the Father
presented from a high angle in medium close-up and the son in low angle medium close-
ups - the Father angrily tells the child to: l [B]e quiet!'. To which the child replies: TAP I
said was "what's up?", and sits down. The child's assertion that he asked a simple
question, combined with the effect of the Father's stature in reply (the height of the camera
angle down in his portion of the shot / reverse shot clearly reduces his stature), leaves us in
no doubt that his reaction has been an excessive reaction. My interpretation is a view
further emphasised by the Mother's reaction of giving Paddy money to go down to the pub.
He remonstrates with his wife at this point, demanding that: 1 [A]ll I need to be is obeyed in
my own house!', which further demeans him. Paddy's anger and unnecessary aggression
act as signs of what is, for the film's makers familial ideology, the bad Father, made
apparent when the status of the Father is abused by its unnecessary exercise. Paddy is
partly redeemed, as a Father, to the family by his immediate admiration of Brown's writing
'Mother' on the floor: with tears in his eyes he carries Brown off to the pub, signifying that
he 'loves' them all really — and that he will now treat Christy as he would any other son of
drinking age.
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In a later shot the Father's violence is again implied as excessive when he is shown as
volatile under duress. The Father is now unemployed. Brown makes a joke that
undermines the Father's position. Brown's joke makes the Father react angrily, at which
point he rushes across the room to hit Brown, who is sitting on the settee. We then have a
plan americain shot of Brown on the settee with the Father's right hand in a clenched fist
on the very left of the frame. The fist is not in focus as its presence is enough, it is within
the family frame; its hazy appearance is sufficient to re-assert the power of the Father. No
one laughs at the Father there or again within the film.
One of the key roles a Father must play in the traditional family, to be a good Father, is the
role of breadwinner; as Segal (1983) states:
the traditional family model of the married heterosexual couple with children -
based on a sexual division of labour where the husband as breadwinner provides
economic support for his dependent wife and children, while the wife cares for both
husband and children - remains central to family ideology. (p.13)
My Left Foot seems to support Segal's view, in the representation of the Father of Christy
Brown, as not only true but also ideal. A good example of this is when the whole family is
plunged into the depths of poverty - eating 'porridge for breakfast, dinner and tea' - through
an irresponsible (in his wife's view) outburst of violence by the Father at his place of
employment. The Father's outburst of violence is seen as irresponsible in itself, making
the Father appear to be selfish and, therefore, a bad father. When the Father tells his wife
(whilst the family is at the dining table, of course) that he has been laid off, her enquiry as
to 'Why?' is met by the Father's retort of: ID]on't you question me in front of the children'.
During this scene the Mother and Father are in a medium shot with the Mother in the light
to the left rear of the scene, with the Father sitting at the table. The top lighting lights the
Mother very clearly - positioning her positively - whilst the Father's eyes are shaded by his
trilby hat. Consequently, the Father's (re)actions are seen as resulting from his dark
(violent and irresponsible) bad side. The Father further tells the family that he was laid off
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because: '[A] brick hit the foreman, accidentally on purpose, in the head'; indicating quite
clearly his irresponsible nature. The other male members of the family (now young adults)
laugh at this, whilst the daughter (given a strong identity as a pillar of the family by her
dedication and love for both Brown and her Mother) frowns and appears unamused. The
daughter's disapproval, highlighted by a close-up of her face with full frontal lighting, acts
as a signification of 'feminine' awareness at the consequences of the loss of money and an
awareness of the results of the Father's irresponsible behaviour: i.e., porridge, frequently.
The Mother's question: '[W]hat about Christy's wheelchair?', reinforces the male as
unthinking towards his family; making it the 'duty' of the wife / mother to think ahead and
the Father's to provide the money for her to do so.
The long-term welfare and preservation of the family as the duty of Mother is strongly
reinforced by her regularly saving money to buy Brown a wheelchair. Immediately after it
has been established that the family is poor - by porridge eating and the stealing of coal —
Mrs Brown's money saved for a wheelchair is discovered by the Father. The film's
audience is aware that the Mother has been saving for it, from an earlier scene, but the
Father is not aware until this point. The money box, with the cash in it, is hidden in the
fireplace and when it falls into a raging fire the Father proceeds to recover and open it,
discovering that there is £28.8s.3d in it and is told that it is for Brown's wheelchair. He
says to the Mother: '[W]e've been sitting here in the freezing cold eating porridge for
breakfast, dinner and tea and you have £28.8s.3d up the fucking chimney'. The Mother
does not reply, and there is a cut to another scene, but what is significant about the scene is
its mise en scene. The Father and Mother are both shown in medium close-ups, the Father
sitting down in his chair and the Mother standing up facing him. In a series of shot /
reverse shots, done in a conventional dialogue style, their relative family attitudes are
revealed, one as good or ideal and the [O]ther as bad or anti-familial. The Mother's image
is clearly lit, with her being looked up to (from the Father's point of view in the shot /
reverse shot sequence), and she is framed firstly by, a door frame, and secondly, by two of
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her children who are clearly focused in the background. The two of her children framing
her, both young male adults, place her actions firmly in the interests of the family; that the
children are clearly focused by the deep-focus shot draws your attention to their presence
and meaning in the context of the scene. It must also be remembered at this point that the
reason for their poverty is a result of the irresponsible actions of the Father. The power of
the Mother as central to the family in the above image is reinforced by the mise en sane of
the Father's shot. In the series of shot / reverse shots under examination the Father is shot
from a high angle, the Mother's point of view as she is standing making him look small and
demeaned. More significantly, the Father is framed by nothing, the depth of his shot is
black and bleak, thereby making him appear isolated. Consequently, we are led to see the
Father as isolated from the family by his non-comprehension of self-sacrifice in the name
of the family by all of its constituent members.
The Father is not specifically criticised for his lack of forethought, as forethought is
assumed by the film to be the responsibility of the Mother (if for no other reason than that
she takes it). In My Left Foot the Father is merely supposed not to impede the Mother in
the execution of her duty. As long as the Father remains a breadwinner his actions are seen
as insensitive but natural due to his character: i.e., he is physical rather than emotional -
signified when upon building an extension for Brown (poverty inexplicably becomes an
irrelevance at this point) the Mother tells Brown that: '[T]hat's the nearest he'll ever come
to saying he loves you'. The Father is shown as practical (earlier he also builds Brown a
mobile cart / chair) but emotionally impaired. Significantly, the only affection we see him
give his wife is a caress of the cheek in the street. Thus, parents are denoted as non-
emotional breeding stock in My Left Foot. The Mother seems to be pregnant all the time,
and the Father's head butting of a fellow pub customer for impugning his fertility at the
beginning of the film seems to emphasise the rightness of the Father's role as providing his
wife with the fulfilment of her natural being: motherhood. The universality of sexual
reproduction is thus assumed to justify the logic and 'naturalness' of the family and its
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procreative role (Close, 1985), meaning that Mrs Brown's options are zero and she lives as
she 'should'.
The Browns seem to be the epitome of Harris's view, quoted by Close (1985), when he
states that:
the bourgeois family is child centred [and that] with proletarianization, the family
becomes the only creative sphere left to parents [ ] the children signify not the
continuation of their parents' identity (as is the case of the bourgeois family) but
their parents' capacity for production. (p.41)
The family is, by extension, reinforced both socially and in My Left Foot as the only place
to have, rear and love children: a viewpoint reinforced by the manner in which a daughter
becomes pregnant and has to get married 'on Friday' (it is a 'shotgun' wedding).
The daughter's pregnancy is initially given as her only escape from the repressive violence
of the Father against her (in an 'I'm pregnant' scene) though subsequently it is of great
happiness to her. The happiness is demonstrated later in the film by her Mother's looking
at photographs, of the daughter happy and smiling with her children; she is now a proud
Mother herself. Pregnancy is a woman's only option in this film and as it is validated as
the only suitable option it is seen as natural. By having no alternatives to procreation,
motherhood and the family - and the idea that the only way out of one family is to create
your own / another - are seen uncritically as the only true roles for women within the film.
The eradication of options for women in My Left Foot provides us with this logic in order
to see the film as supportive of the ideology of the family. The ideological process is
revealed by the principle that the ideology of the family function is to: 'obscure the nature
of how we live [and] legitimate [the] single dominant form of "family" (Segal, 1983,
p.11). Having no options for the daughter (and her subsequent happiness within the one
role she can have - motherhood) obscures the fact that there are options outside, and
within, the family - need all daughters who become wives become mothers by natural
progression? Consequently, the film legitimates the 'single dominant form of "family" by
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its acquiescence to its logic within the narrative.
The Father is constructed as a functional being in My Left Foot; he is the breadwinner and
'father' and little else, such as when, for example, the Mother is concerned for Brown's (and
the pregnant daughter's) emotional well-being. Paddy is concerned that Brown can talk
more clearly (normally) or that his daughter's pregnancy will reflect badly upon him; even
when Brown gets an exhibition of his paintings his Father would rather be in the pub -
however understandable that may be due to his lack of sophistication and position.
Consequently, as Barrett and McIntosh (1982, p.78) state: '[I]t is the over-valuation of
family life which devalues [ ] other lives', the film's devaluation of Brown (as tragic) is
in that he cannot have children (the spectator is led to presume) like those in the (his own)
ideal family. Thus 'the family' not only values itself but devalues others unable, or
unwilling, to replicate its own idea(ls).
The construction of the (ideal) Mother in relation to disability in the film will now be
addressed. The role and duties of the Mother, a mother, are established very early on in
My Left Foot. In the first flashback of Brown's life, from the literary reception, we quickly
cut from his birth to his being ten years old - Brown and his Mother are not actually in the
birth scene - a scene in which his Mother is giving the family breakfast. Once all the
family leave (for school or work) Mrs Brown feeds Brown; in a medium close-up shot,
from a low angle, the Mother sits on a stool and feeds Brown, who is sitting on the floor
with our view being from the side. Consequently, Mrs Brown's authority is established
synchronically and asynchronically as she towers over Brown. Mrs Brown is heavily
pregnant and as she opens a locket around her neck and shows it to Christy Brown she
states: '[T]hat's my Ma, that's my Da. I was their baby. I'll get this house organised before
I go [to have the next baby]'. During this speech to Brown the shot cuts into a close-up of
his Mother from a low angle, giving her words, and their ideological bent, a naturalness of
logical progression: i.e., it is what my parents did, therefore I must do it. Here, then, the
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ideology of motherhood is given an aura of naturalness that has distorted its historical
relationship to society - making it seem logical and progressive - whilst mystifying its
historically oppressive reality. When she goes into hospital - immediately, as she injures
herself carrying Brown upstairs after having fed him - a neighbour comments about her
kitchen that: 'there is enough [food] to feed an army. You'll never go hungry'. This is a
statement that further emphasises the Mother's duty to 'provide' for her clan even if she is
about to give birth. This scene confirms and reinforces the ideology of housework and
cooking as being the Mother's exclusive domain, especially as so many scenes in My Left
Foot, especially those around the dining table, involve the Mother preparing, serving, or
cooking food or washing up having eaten it. That she is seen laying the table, ironing and
fetching, whilst her husband reads the paper and her children play, acts as further
validation of the Mother's duties as self-evident.
Rojek et al aptly state that: 'the fact that women bear and nurture children creates an
imbalance in family structures which underpins all other oppression'. He continues,
quoting Engels, that: 'the modern individual family is founded on the concealed slavery of
the wife' (Rojek et al, 1988, p.78). Mrs Brown, by talking of her parents, confirms the
'slavery of the wife' as historically based but, as such, that it is difficult to challenge due to
its traditional base. The film's makers, by uncritically representing the Mother as placing
herself in a historically logical position, support the view that it is her role and duty which,
in turn, makes the film itself part of the cultural ideology that supports the fallacies of the
familial as ideal. In romanticising Mrs Brown and the problems of poverty, infant
mortality and physical hardship that she endures, all are revealed in their absence to be an
irrelevance in the 'naturally happy' role of motherhood.
There is never any question of others helping (or even offering to help) the Mother, not
even, surprisingly, the daughters, but Mrs Brown is not unhappy with this situation since
she sees caring and providing as her role. This is a factor signified when she becomes
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positively jealous when someone else usurps her role: she watches Dr Cole give Brown a
drink (usually the Mother's role in the film) at the gallery exhibition of his work. There is
a reaction shot in this scene of Mrs Brown that clearly leads us to read her distress or
dissatisfaction at the loss of her role as the 'mother'. The reaction shot is a medium close-
up of the Mother sitting down against a white wall, turning her head away and down whilst
biting her lip. She has clearly lost her uniqueness as the only one to nurture Brown.
The principal enigma of the film, that needs closure for a classically satisfactory ending, is
whether Christy Brown's future can be assured (for us), knowing that the Mother will
eventually die. It is a problem that the film opens and closes in the first few minutes of its
running time: the rest of the film merely explains it. On arriving at a benefit for 'the
cripples' at the beginning of the film the Mother hands Brown over to 'nurse Mary' (a shot
in which the Mother steps aside from behind Brown's wheelchair to let the nurse take
over). Nurse Mary is clearly to be Brown's 'Mother' from now on: her name is an
indication in itself and, equally significant, her strong physical build is a virtual replica of
the Mother's. Pertinently, Mary states at one point that Brown should not think that she is
his Mother, proceeding to then feed Christy a drink exactly as his Mother does: she holds a
glass of whiskey to Christy's mouth as he drinks it from a straw. Narrative closure, the
happy ending, is achieved in My Left Foot through Brown getting the nurse to 'go out' with
him; it is followed by a screen credit that tells us that they subsequently many. As one of
the functions of a dominant ideology is to make things appear happier than they are,
Mary's becoming the / a Mother astutely fulfils such an ideological role smoothly and
coherently. The nuances and alienating elements (including sexual) of Christy and Mary's
relationship are completely erased and or naturalised through a combination of Mother
references and the absence of sexual ones.
In My Left Foot the role of the Mother is clearly defined in, and around, domesticity.
Whereas the Father's occupation as a bricklayer is mentioned and rarely seen, the Mother's
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role is clearly and repeatedly shown. The way in which the film plays to the ideology of
the family and patriarchy is in giving the work of the mother (Bernardes, 1985) as her role
(i.e., it is not work that requires pay, or work that creates alienation from the self). The
Father's work is never seen (except in building Brown an extension - when it is an act of
'love' rather than work) yet we know it to make him unhappy; the Mother, on the other
hand, is shown working in her role for the family and happy with it. The film thus makes
familial life for the Mother happy, and her work part of her role and, as such, natural to it
(Kaplan, 1992), despite the fact that it is oppressive and very hard work indeed, even in the
reality of the film. Consequently, the supportive work of the wife / mother to capitalism
(the status quo) is mystified: the father would be unable (or less able) to give his all to his
employer if he had to do the work the mother has to do as well as his own but this element
is ignored. A mother's work is mystified and naturalised in ideology to obscure its function
(Kaplan, 1992) in relation to the father and capitalism (Close, 1985). My Left Foot does
not explicitly show this, but it is possible to de-construct the film to reveal how it acts as
part of the current discourse that invokes and supports family ideology; primarily through
having the Mother fulfil a 'role' while the Father 'works'.
When the female Doctor first comes to help Brown we are given numerous reaction shots
of the Mother looking on and being disturbed by the Doctor's relationship with Brown,
especially as Brown falls in love with her. The Mother, Mrs Brown, is shown to be jealous
but accepts that she has to give Brown over to medicalisation (the Doctor and nurse Mary)
for his own benefit. She thereby makes the self-sacrificial nature of motherhood apparent,
ensuring that Mrs Brown's sole purpose in life is shown as that of a central family cog
existing for the whole family and not any specific individual within it. As has been stated
above, the Mother saves to buy Brown a wheelchair, something that only she could have
thought of and done, with the agreement of the family, except for the Father. Also
(particularly in the scene of the Father's isolation against a black background and the
Mother's framing by her family), the Mother's actions are clearly highlighted as necessary
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and positive in the realm, and preservation, of the family and its members as a unit. It is
interesting to note that The Elephant Man achieves a similar beatification of the disabled
character's mother, achieved by having Merrick's mother inform us at the close of that film
that 'nothing will die' and that Merrick will be looked after (if not become normal) in the
after-life because she is already there, 'there' being - one is led to presume — heaven.
Merrick's mother speaks as Merrick's spirit (a 'puff of pure white steam!) enters the
galaxy, signifying her eternal care for Merrick and placing her as Merrick's 'mother of love'
for eternity. The ideal mother, so The Elephant Man would have us believe, looks after
her children even after both their deaths.
In My Left Foot the Mother's looking after her children is seen as natural. Yet they also
need a moral upbringing, in order to conform to social norms. Just as Mrs Merrick had
taught her son to read and recite the Bible, for instance, Mrs Brown provides a moral up-
bringing for Brown by taking him to church in order to pray for souls on All Souls Night -
you pray to transmute a lost soul from purgatory to heaven. Mrs Brown teaches Christy all
about it. In this scene we see Mrs Brown as concerned for all souls, not just her own and
the family's; as such, she is shown as a truly moral person. This interpretation had already
been indicated when she had earlier brought the priest around to give Brown a talk and told
Brown that God is watching him and that it is a sin to steal (i.e., coal). During the church
scene Mrs Brown leans down to Brown in his wooden cart, in a medium close-up, and tells
him that they should: 'say some prayers for all the poor souls in purgatory'. What is
significant about this shot is the method of lighting. Mrs Brown is placed in front of a wall
that has light reflected upon it to appear as a semicircle of light around her, similar to
representations of saintly light - halos - in religious iconography and icons. That she is
telling Brown of lost souls is no coincidence: she is clearly as concerned for her family's
spiritual and moral well-being as for its physical state. The family's decency, signified by
the saintly light around Mrs Brown, is made equally apparent in the brothers' and sisters'
attitudes towards Brown. For example, his family integrate Brown as much as they can in
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their lives, taking him along to their games (Brown is the goalkeeper and penalty taker in
the scene of his brothers playing football) and liaisons with other people (predominantly
girls). Even the Father integrates Brown, to some extent, by taking him to the pub.
Brown's problem (and Merrick's in The Elephant Man) is not that he lives in an unfair
social setting, but that 'outsiders' are not nice to them. The problem is, consequently,
solved in My Left Foot not by changing the unfair social structure but by having various
individuals (mainly one's family) being nice to the disabled. Christy's brothers'
consideration for him, by including him in their lives, clearly manifests that the Mother has
succeeded in bringing her children up decently. The perspective is reinforced by the fact
that there are never any significant squabbles between siblings, and in the scene where
Brown has been rejected by a girl he took a fancy to, his brothers are indignant on Brown's
behalf.
A brawl which Brown initiates at his Father's wake would seem to contradict the view of
the Brown family as decent, but the brawl is shown (rather bizarrely) as being part of what
being a 'real' man is. Part of the Father's character, his masculinity, is his ability to drink
and be violent; violence is justified if it is activated in defence of the family; thus making
controlled male violence part of what a 'real' man is. The mother is not upset at the brawl
because, it seems, boys will be boys; equally, drinking is accepted implicitly by its
masculine character and its ability to release aggression in a 'safe' male setting outside the
family. Such a reading conforms to the view that the Father (the man) is allowed his
violence / drink as compensation for being the breadwinner and repository of physical
power and discipline within the family (Segal, 1983; Bemardes, 1985; Atwood, 1997).
Assertions of male aggression as natural produce a tension within the masculine (Hark,
1993) — a problematic tension when it becomes excessive and therefore abnormal - and My
Left Foot tries to resolve this tension by giving examples of Mr Brown as both a good
Father and a bad one. The ambiguity within the film, and its supporting ideology, lies in
its not being crystal clear as to what it advocates and what it abhors, but the result is the
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same as if it had been crystal clear — the mystification of the process of various ideologies
at work.
This apparent contradiction of the Father's being both the good and the bad father figure
does not mean that the film escapes effective ideological closure. On the contrary, it
provides a more effective closure because the film offers two contrasting scenarios in
which the logical results of each scenario (behaviour pattern) are played out to their good
and bad results. By creating the two contrasting and seemingly contradictory patterns of
the good Father and the bad Father, the film facilitates a more effective ideological closure
by answering the question it poses of what constitutes a good or bad father. The issues
raised by the film as a social issue drama with simplistic melodramatic overtones are
provided with a degree of closure which reduce the film to a sentimentalised core that
lacks any real critique of its subject.
One example of this gratuitous sentimentality is found in the scene in which Brown
attempts suicide. It is prefaced with a point-of-view shot of his parents as symbolic of
what he will not be (parents) and as such he (and the film) feels this renders him a nothing.
This feeling he acknowledges himself when in his suicide note he states that: is
nothing, therefore nothing must end'. Brown, just prior to writing his note, looks out of his
upstairs bedroom window and sees his Mother calling his sister in for supper in a medium
long shot from a high angle (a point-of-view shot from where Brown is). The Mother is
standing in the street alone, when the Father cycles up to, and around, her. The Father then
stops in front of his wife, and gently fondles his wife's face. Then there is a cut to a
distraught Christy Brown, a low angle medium close-up; with tears in his eyes Brown then
proceeds to attempt suicide. Christy Brown's view is that off authority and power (above),
which as an artist / writer and intellectual (both to and within the family), it is a position he
holds within the family, if interpreted conventionally. The shots are to be read
conventionally at first, but then inverted to be read as emphasising how intellectualism -
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Brown - is never equal to being a Mother and a Father. Significantly, Brown then decides
he is nothing because, no matter how great a painter or writer or intellectual he becomes he
will not be a father (with the validity of such a view narratively left unchallenged).
Consequently, the film sees being a 'Mother' and a 'Father' (within a family) as the zenith
of human existence. If Brown's decision to attempt suicide had been seen as wrong, or
based upon unsound judgement, such a reading could not be made. The suicide attempt is
not seen as wrong because the primary ideological — disabling - thrust of the film is that
Brown is a second class citizen (as a cripple, and intellectual, who will not have a family)
in the film and in general. The overall narrative thrust of My Left Foot reinforces rather
than undermines my interpretation.
Brown is not the only character represented as pathetic due to the inability for whatever
reason to have a family. Doctor Cole's proposed marriage is shown as liable to be un-
fulfilling as - like Stephanie in Duet For One - the doctor is very 'unwomanly' (not
feminine in the conventional - cinematic - sense) and a career woman rather than 'Mother'
figure. The doctor's appearance and general physical attitude combine to make her a very
unnatural woman and, as such, in the logic of My Left Foot, unfulfilled. As the Doctor is
an older, aggressive career woman with a short haircut (these two-dimensional
characterisations are as simplistic as they sound) one is left to presume she will not have
children; thus, it is the assumption that she will not have a family that characterises her as
unfulfilled. It is implied that Brown cannot have a child rather than that he chooses not to,
represented by the complete lack of physical contact between him and Mary except in the
'care' mode. For example, Brown and Mary do not kiss. That Brown will not have
children is implied as being due to his continued dependence and infantilism and his
eventually marrying his Mother (Mary the nurse being clearly paralleled to, and as, his
Mother). The Doctor, it could be argued, is actually shown as even more 'pitiable' than
Brown because her childlessness is a personal choice, one that goes against the ideology of
motherhood, femininity and the family as inculcated in My Left Foot in its mise en scene
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and narrative logic.
The ambiguous and contradictory aspects of motherhood and the family make it difficult to
differentiate between the duty, the role and the place of a mother. Consequently, ideology
and society tend to merge them all into one another (Rojek et al, 1988), and My Left Foot
is no different — as demonstrated above in my discussion of Mrs Brown and Christy and
their relationship to one another and Mr Brown. Merging the contradictions and
ambiguities into one natural role-model is what (family) ideology does as it hides and
smoothes over the cracks that appear and reveal oppression (Kaplan, 199); equally, My
Left Foot achieves this by reducing complex social relations to simplistic ideals. Thus, in
the last scene in this chapter to be described from My Left Foot, this thesis will show how
all the characters and duties in an ideal family are revealed and collectively shown as an
ideal, good, role model. This is a factor which makes the film undeniably pro-family and
ideologically complicit in, rather than critical of, its affirmation of such an ideology as
natural and good, thus proper for the care and maintenance of disabled people, especially
of those assumed to be congenitally abnormal (an assessment of cerebral palsy which is,
more often than not, inaccurate).
After Brown's suicide attempt he is suffering from depression, refusing to get up from his
bed, when his Mother comes in and sits on the foot of it. It is a deep-focus, medium close-
up shot of the Mother, to the right of the frame, with Brown lying in bed with his back to
us stretching to the left of the frame. It is a continuous shot that lasts for just over fifty
seconds - very long in comparison to most Classic Hollywood Narrative's (Bordwell and
Thompson, 1993) film shot lengths - and serves to emphasise the Mother's anguish. The
Mother, looking off screen left and not at Brown to her right, tells Brown: '[Y]ou're getting
more like your Father every day, all hard on the outside and putty on the inside. It's in here
(clenching a fist to her heart) that battles are won, not in the pub pretending to be a big
fellow in front of the lads. Right! If you're giving up, I haven't'. At which point, she stands
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up. The next shot is of her outside, starting to build Brown an extension. In the fifty-
second shot the Mother is seen as the heart of the family (holding her fist there to
emphasise the point); her role is understood as being to ensure that the struggle of life goes
on in the name of love and the family. For My Left Foot the Mother must encourage her
children and ensure that they are loved, to the extent of standing behind them with words
and deeds. After all, in the film's logic, it is the role and duty of the Mother to ensure that
no one gives up, thus Mrs Brown is encouraging, self-sacrificing, and making sure that
what needs to be done is in fact done. Under no circumstances would the Father have been
able to take part in such an emotionally interactive scene: the Father is the practical one,
the Mother is the emotional 'loving' one.
Once the Mother is outside and digging in the yard, Brown comes down and tells her to
stop it; the Mother is very out of breath and clearly not capable of building an extension for
Brown on her own. She states to Brown: '[Y]ou'll have me heart Christy Brown;
sometimes I think you are my heart. Look if I could give you my legs I'd gladly take
yours. What's wrong with you, Christy?' Brown, rightly castigated, replies: 'I'm sorry,
Ma'. The Mother's speech is the most significant shot in the film, let alone the scene, when
it shows us Mrs Brown as the ideal and saintly Mother. As she speaks of willingly
sacrificing her legs we see her in a medium close-up, from a low angle - her authority and
status re-affirmed. Even more important than the dialogue are the lighting and
background. This is the only obvious use of back-lighting in the film which, combined
with conventional front lighting, clearly defines her against the background with an aura of
sparkle, but this is not all. The background to the shot is a pitch-black wall — unnaturally
so, in comparison with immediately prior shots of her in the garden digging against a fairly
well-lit greyish wall. The effect, when combined with all the other elements of mise en
scene (including the nature of the dialogue), replicates traditional religious iconography
even more clearly than the similar instance already described. The scene again indicates
that this is surely a woman on the way to becoming a saint before our very eyes, saintly in
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motherhood.
If the Mother had simply started the extension and failed, the extent of her effort would be
wasted. However, the Father and his adult children subsequently arrive home and take
over, completing the extension (it appears) in the same afternoon. Thus, the Mother has
acted as the catalyst in bringing the family together in an act of love and co-operation for
the agreed benefit of a needy member of it: Christy Brown. At the end of the scene Mrs
Brown tells Brown that that is the closest Mr Brown will ever come to telling him (Brown)
that he loves him, thus the Father is reinforced as the non-verbal and emotionally repressed
patriarch who 'loves' his family really. The Father dies in the next scene; the narrative
seems to act as a warning to all of us good / bad fathers and sons to make their peace
before it is too late. It is not only the Father but also the brothers who build the extension,
an act which verifies my reading that men (Fathers and brothers) are constructed as
practical and, as such, capable of showing love only in acts of practicality and integration.
In totality we are, unquestioningly, shown the epitome of simplistic familial ideology in
My Left Foot.
The Mother's speech 'I'd gladly give you my legs' points again to the mother as being self-
sacrificial in the name of the family, especially the children, with her saintly appearance
making her not just a good Mother but an ideal one. A similar use of religious
iconography occurs repeatedly in The Elephant Man in the character of Merrick's mother,
who is dead; she is seen and idolised over and over again through the manner and style of
the photographs that Merrick has of her. Concomitantly, in My Left Foot, the Father and
brothers are represented as ideal by their subsequent actions in building the extension,
especially when taking into consideration their inclusion of Brown in their lives outside the
family.
The Mother and the family achieve their reward from Brown (and society) by their
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presence at the 'benefit for the cripples' which surrounds the film (the flashbacks of
Brown's story are from the nurse Mary reading his book, My Left Foot at the benefit).
This is indicated by the fact that when Brown arrives at the benefit, to applause, everybody
applauds and stands except his Mother; she remains seated (not applauding) as if the
applause were for her also. Equally, when Brown is given a bouquet of flowers he presents
them to his Mother, who is then persuaded to join him on stage. The film is thus as much
about Mrs Brown as the ideal Mother (both generally and as the Mother of a cripple) as it
is about Brown as the 'ideal cripple'. The Mother receives further reward from Brown
when he gives her his fee from his first piece of writing, an amount of money that is more
than his Father earned in a year: eight hundred pounds.
The context in which disability and parenthood intertwine is in the model of these parents
as ideals; the film implies that a child with a disability requires ideal parents in order to
fulfil his / her maximum capability. Social Services, or extra financial assistance, or even
social change, are irrelevant in this film. Although the Mother must be prepared to include
medical personnel and expertise, the traditional family is seen as what is best for all,
especially cripples. Elizabeth Wilson, in Women and the Welfare State (1977), shows
how the politics of welfarism are firmly rooted in sexist ideas which, in turn, provide a
state framework to ensure - and positively encourage - that women remain in the home.
For Wilson the selective availability and manipulation of income support and service
provision (especially in relation to disability) combine to perpetuate female incarceration
in the myth of motherhood and its social consequences (i.e., dependence on the male
breadwinner). Mrs Brown is given only nominal help from the medical establishment - the
Father states early on that his son will 'go in coffin' before becoming a burden on the state
— so the family in My Left Foot establishes the familial home (or death) as the ideal place
for the upbringing of a disabled child. By suggesting that the family be the main
responsible agency for an impaired child the film ignores the social responsibility of
society collectively to provide help and assistance as it does for all its able-bodied
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members. Similarly, as the film also colludes with traditional family ideology, it ensures
that it is the Mother who becomes the sole guardian and bearer of a 'burden', a burden from
which capitalism and society, and consequently the film, abdicates all responsibility. As
Voysey has stated: 'the family cannot just be seen as a biological unit because it is
"reinforced" by institutions which are "indubitably" social ones' (cited in Close and
Collins, 1985, p.41).
In My Left Foot the family is constructed within the ideology of the ideal traditional
family (as examined above) and, more significantly, the film seems to embrace the
ideology whole-heartedly as an ideal for all families to replicate in order to be rewarding,
satisfying and biologically natural. It fails to be critical or aware of any familial situation
that is influenced externally — such as by disablement (Oliver, 1990; Oliver, 1996; Oliver
and Barnes, 1998) - instead choosing to see all problems as internal or individual family
problems; problems that only the family, or individuals within them, can resolve through
co-operation and effort. Conversely, bad family members are those who fail to put the
family first; consider the family at all times. If they did so, it would ensure conformity and
a rigid code of behaviour; a normality rooted in the ideals of bourgeois morality. If we
take into account what Bemardes (1985, p.209) states when he argues that 'family ideology
is the main stimuli to ensure "conformity", then My Left Foot can be seen as advocating
(and by extension, revealing) such a rigid code of behaviour (i.e., conformity to the norm).
Equally, the film is advocating familial ideology without asking the simplest of questions
of it. Thus, the abject poverty that was a large part of the Brown's family life is
romanticised out of all proportion by being made irrelevant, as in the examples of the
sudden building of the extension. The extent of the family, if portrayed realistically, could
have been read as a plea for Malthusian control (large families breed poverty and
congenital deformity). However, the simplistic and romanticised filmic representation of
the Brown family manages to appeal to the audience as an example of a living paradigm of
bourgeois family ideals for its time and acts as an example to us all, now. The film's
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makers are naively arguing that in the face of unemployment and family breakdowns
family 'love' will bring you through. My Left Foot is a film that so distorts the realities of
the family (let alone a family with a disabled member) that it invalidates itself (as a bio-pic
or 'realistic' representation of any kind) under a cloud of romanticised family tragedy and
inspiration. Thus, total ideological mystification of familial ideology occurs at the expense
of real understanding, comprehension or revelation in a drama that sentimentalises
(Cherniavsky, 1995) rather than explores or reveals any significant truth about its subjects,
let alone disability or impairment.
The reverse of the same ideological coin propagated by My Left Foot posits the argument
that if the family were not there (or are not an ideal version) the impaired person's life
would, simply put, not be worth living. My Left Foot is not in isolation in doing what it
does; other films do the same, for example: Afraid of the Dark; Almost an Angel;
Antonia's Line (Marleen Gorris, Holland, 1995); Dance Me To My Song; The Eighth
Day; Live Flesh; Mandy; Rain Man (Barry Levinson, US, 1988); and many others
throughout the history of cinema. This alternative perspective permeates The Elephant
Man by having Merrick choose suicide as his best possible course due to his not having a
'real' mother but only a surrogate father, Dr Treves, in her place.
The films now to be discussed use the absence or * dysfunction of the family as a valid
reason to prefer death to life with impairments and without a family. For example, in
Whose Life Is It Anyway? Ken Harrison's desire for suicide is diegetically supported by
the absence of a family. Although almost all other characters have no direct family
mentioned within the film, their presence is implied in other ways: for example, orderlies
are never seen with their families yet they do go 'home', and two of them are having a
romantic liaison - the precursor to 'home' and 'family'. Significantly, there are two scenes
in the film that mention the family in relation to Ken Harrison.
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The first reference is to Ken's inability to have a family, soon after he becomes a
quadriplegic. Ken's girlfriend, Patty, visits him regularly, visits that are beginning
emotionally to torture him once he realises that he will not be able to be what he was in the
past: i.e., normal. Ken tells Patty: 'I know you love me, Patty, but if you don't want to
torture me you'll go, now. Now'. The scene is a series of shot / reverse shots in medium
close-up: Ken is lying in bed whilst Patty is, to reinforce their difference, standing against
a window. The setting is significant in that the window is being lashed by rain as thunder
and lightening rage outside; concurrently, violins increase in volume and intensity upon the
sound track to make the intensity, and validation, of the scene explicit both by the inise en
scene and the non-diegetic manipulations. There is a cut to a close-up of Ken lying on his
side in bed, motionless, tears running down his cheeks (as he is a quadriplegic he can
neither move nor wipe his tears away; a nurse does this for him prior to the end of the
scene). Equally, the bed Ken is in has cot-sides - emphasising his now childlike
dependence which is assumed to be asexual and his imprisonment, by their name and
function - cot-sides which are up. Ken says to Patty: 'I just want you to find a new life.
Find a man, get married and have babies'. At this point Patty leaves and, we are later told,
tries to do just that. The whole scene manages, stylistically and philosophically, to
invalidate Ken's life as a quadriplegic; epitomised by his own (in his own eyes) inability to
be a man - get an erection and ejaculate - and have children. Thus, marriage is, as such,
not an issue.
The above scene invalidates Ken's life by his not being able to have that which he
desperately needs for his sense of self, a family of his own. The second reference to the
family invalidates Ken's life by his not being a member of one. Ken's lawyer will take Ken
on as a client only if a psychiatrist, nominated by the lawyer, determines that Ken is of
sound mind, and it is during the visit of this psychiatrist that the second reference to the
family is made. The psychiatrist asks Ken: 'What about your parents, are they living?' The
psychiatrist is shot in close-up and fairly well lit. Ken replies: No. No, I have no living
130
relatives. Which isn't really bad considering birthdays and Christmas, you know, presents.
After all, how many hats can you wear?' In contrast to the lighting of and the focus on the
psychiatrist, Ken is in medium shot sitting up in the bed, cot-sides up; the lighting
(supposedly from the sunshine outside) is much lower key, with the shadow of the slats of
Venetian blinds crossing Ken's whole body and immediate space. Such a mise en scene,
especially the slat shadows, place Ken further into a dark, imprisoned world. It thereby
validates his desire for real death as a positive choice / option over the apparent 'living
death' that he is inhabiting in this room and scene. Interestingly, Ken's comment is given
as sufficient in itself to justify this interpretation even without the added nuances of mise
en scene. What he actually states is even more damning than it first appears; that Ken
offers the example of 'hats' seems quite bizarre except that he must mean it as a metaphor
(as it is often accepted) for social roles (Goffman, 1991). The implication is that Ken will
now only have one hat, whereas normal people have a multiplicity of them. The hats, in
turn, signify the essence of life in that the hats could also be taken as roles he will never
fulfil. The film soon demonstrates, also, that Ken is so physically incapable that he could
not go shopping and buy the 'presents' he mentions for his family — were there indeed
anyone for whom to buy them. It could be argued that an extra nuance of Ken's negation
as a disabled person is the implication that, although we see him being freely pushed in his
wheelchair around the hospital, the same would not be possible outside it.
The psychiatrist, after a couple of other apparently pointless questions, leaves.
Significantly, Ken is also seen by the hospital psychiatrist, who is ordered to find him
'clinically depressed and commit him', yet it is Ken's lawyer's psychiatrist who appears at
the court hearing. The hearing is held in the hospital — to emphasise further Ken's
dependence on medical assistance - to decide whether to let Ken choose to die.
Significantly, it is this psychiatrist's only other appearance in the film and he states that
Ken is rational and able to make up his own mind; a 'diagnosis' seemingly based on the
single statement from Ken that he has no family. The social issue of providing
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Independent Living facilities for disabled people is avoided (and to some extent crushed)
by individualising Ken's problems whilst providing almost no alternatives for, or to, him.
Whose Life Is It Anyway? places disability as an individual or family problem in order to
excuse society - the state - from providing assistance to the individual in any form
whatsoever. For this film, if disabled people have families their life might be worth living
only within them, and if they have no family, it is society's responsibility to provide them
with the freedom to kill themselves and not provide alternative independent support.
Consequently, if a disabled person wants to live independently whilst they have a family,
they are prevented from doing so by the scant provision that is available from the welfare
sector of society (Barnes, 1990). This is due to welfare provision's being predominantly
directed - via social policy - to those who remain in the family unit (cf. Wilson, 1977;
Barrett, 1980). Thus, the family (i.e., usually wife / mother and also husband) act as cheap
care whilst appearing as right and natural. At the same time capitalism, and society, ensure
that (usually) women stay at home, thus saving the state from having to take a greater
degree of social responsibility or, for example, extend Independent Living schemes (for
further elaboration on these points see Stone, 1984, and Oliver and Barnes, 1998).
Duet For One follows a similar line of representation to that of Whose Life Is It Anyway?
Stephanie sees death as a positive alternative to a miserable life (with MS) predominantly
because she has no 'real' family. She has no children and has concentrated upon her career;
she is, as such, seen as an un-feminine woman and / or incapable of being a Mother.
Various scenes throughout the film lead us to conclude that her marriage, to David, was
one of mutual career self-help. David helped her performance whilst she placed him on the
world stage via the conducting of her concerts; love has had little to do with it, as she is
shown to know that he has affairs. More significantly, when David embarks on an affair
with his secretary, Penny, he tells Stephanie that he has: 'never felt like this before'; clearly
signifying 'love' rather than self-interest. We are left in no doubt about the whole
relationship because just prior to David's affirmation of love for his secretary he and
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Stephanie have just had a heated argument in which they state how each has used the other
as regards their respective careers. The way in which Stephanie is invalidated is in the
development of David's relationship with Penny: Penny gives up everything to help David
compose (which is what he really wanted to do, not conduct) and immediately becomes
pregnant. Somewhat unsurprisingly, Penny and David almost immediately become a
family once David leaves Stephanie to marry Penny — Penny then becomes pregnant.
In one of the first scenes of Duet For One Stephanie visits a psychiatrist, Dr Feldman, in
which she tells him that she and David have not had children: '[W]e never had time'. The
narrative reality and attitude are consequently seen as part of Stephanie's selfish attitude
towards her career and life in general. The inferiority of such an attitude is signified by the
representation of her first meeting with Dr Feldman. The scene is shot in a conventional
shot / reverse shot mise en scene with the Doctor shot from a low angle and Stephanie a
high angle, combined with positive lighting and background for the Doctor and vice versa
for Stephanie. Soon after she has told the Doctor that she has no children, she tells him of
how she lost her first violin in the Blitz. The bomb that destroyed her violin also killed her
mother, Stephanie continues: 'I cried more about the violin than I did about her, can you
believe that?' Before and after this statement Stephanie and the Doctor are shot in medium
close-up (shot / reverse shots) but, as Stephanie tells us about how she loved her violin
more than her mother, we move to a close-up of Stephanie. A change in the camera shots
is set up to emphasise Stephanie's emotional hardness to intensify visually the moment and
the nature of her comments. It is this hardness, familylessness, which the film seems to
give us as the problem Stephanie has to solve for herself; she does this by letting David
leave her for his secretary, thus consequently becoming a 'real' family man. Being a man is
to be a Father for all the films discussed here; not being a father (or mother), by
implication, renders an individual less than human and, as such, abnormal.
Although issues of the familial aspect are dealt with more directly in Duet For One, they
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are more subtly invoked than in the other films studied here. In our first glimpse of
Stephanie's 'home' immediately after she has seen the psychiatrist, in an extreme long shot,
we are shown Stephanie's house and home as a large, almost gothic, foreboding place; dark
in its private grounds, wealth and opulence. On moving into the house we cut to a wall
that is covered with photographs and in a fairly long montage sequence we are given
extreme close-ups of the photographs. Whereas conventionally in a 'home' filled with an
aura of a family we would expect family photographs - graduations, birthdays etc. — in this
montage sequence we are shown career highlights: Stephanie with the Queen; Stravinsky;
Charlton Heston (an American icon of right-wing family morality); Edward VIII and Mrs
Simpson; and in concert. Whilst the camera is on the photographs a particularly moving
Bach violin sonata is playing (soon revealed as Stephanie and her protégé practising). The
whole feel of the montage places Stephanie (and David) in a realm of wandering
musicians, rootless and obsessive in their careers, not a family but a business partnership.
The film's emphasis is initially on success and power outside the context of family. The
film later goes on to show how the family - parenthood and female domesticity — is
validated as the only possible form of female happiness through David's consequent
success (as a composer) and happiness at becoming a father and 'real' husband; all of which
is paralleled with Stephanie's subsequent misery as a familyless 'invalid', a woman who has
not fulfilled society's role for her.
At the very end of the film there is a birthday party for Stephanie, a party to which
Stephanie sends all the others (her psychiatrist, David and the pregnant Penny) whilst she
watches it from outside. Stephanie is seen looking from outside - in a cold, bleak,
autumnal landscape - whilst the others are all happily having fun, enjoying life in a warm
and cosy living room. The party is a virtual parallel to Stephanie's birthday party the year
before, shown at the beginning of the film. The party has the same guests except for the
addition of the psychiatrist. The first party shows Stephanie's friends as her surrogate
family, one filled with tension and deceits - as when almost all refuse to acknowledge
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Stephanie's illness, for example. As a surrogate family and not a 'real' family they are
shown to be inadequate with long-term non-participation and death seen as preferable, a
situation similarly depicted in The Elephant Man in Merrick's relationship to Treves. At
the first party there is between the protégé Constantine and Penny a conversation around
the ability to have an orgasm from playing a double bass. It is a conversation that leads to
tension and anxiety (and an element of distastefulness): emotions not traditionally seen as
elements of a happy family party. At the second (final) party David and Penny are soon to
be parents and Constantine is married. Stephanie's agent (a grandmother-type figure) is
there, as she was at the first. The contrast between the parties is striking; yet all that is
different is that it now consists of two 'real' families in the shape of David and Penny, and
Constantine and his wife. The second party is more like what would be considered (or
hoped of) a family party: there is dancing and singing amongst them all and even the maid
joins in the dancing and singing, in contrast to the first party the year before. Significantly,
Stephanie, at this point, wanders off to sit under a tree far away, alone; her inability to
have, or become part of, a family apparently justifies her separation and isolation. The
psychiatrist fails to notice Stephanie's absence (even he is having fun). It is apparent that
Stephanie has convinced him that her choice to distance herself from her friends and
surrogate family is a rational one. Stephanie's (negative) view of herself (and her life) is
allowed to be seen as right. Her decisions and awareness of MS are seen as correct both
medically and morally, as is her decision as a disabled person to choose death. The
representation of life within the family as happy and leading to success or, outside one, as
miserable and closed is reinforced categorically and quite unambiguously.
However, family life in this film contains an element usually seen as disruptive in society,
and that is male infidelity. Another interesting instance of family life, this time working-
class, is also included in Duet For One with the introduction of 'the totter' - a 'rag and
bone' man - Harry; a man clearly signified as working-class by his thick-set build and
physical as well as his mental attitude, dialect, language, and profession. Here, as John
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Hill (1986) states (of social problem films) class is sketched in so as to be irrelevant,
giving male infidelity as part of the human condition rather than social pressure or
construction. Duet For One does the same as a piece of mainstream entertainment. After
all, both Harry and David (men in general, the film would have us believe) are adulterers,
and they are clearly of different classes. Stephanie soon embarks on an affair with Harry
and during one bedroom scene asks him to stay for supper, to which he replies: 'can't, wife
and kid waiting'. In a close-up of Stephanie expressing sexual pleasure at what Harry is
doing (off screen) to her, Stephanie replies: '[A] real family man'. The irony of this is to
reveal Harry's hypocrisy and the opposite of what a 'real' family man is. The subsequent
scene of Harry and Stephanie, at a Working Men's Club - where Harry has bought
Stephanie to meet his wife - Harry is on stage singing whilst his wife tells Stephanie that
he is a wonderful husband and family man. Harry's wife tells Stephanie that Harry has
'always been good to me, he never even raises his voice. I always tell him that he should
have gone in for one of the medical professions'. She continues to state that Harry has
been good to their daughter (who has a 'hole in the heart'). Stephanie at this point realises
that Harry's wife knows about their affair from her expression, Harry is indeed revealed as
a good family man, with the blame for Harry's apparent hypocrisy being placed on
Stephanie and not Harry. The wife is visibly upset - quivering lip and tear filled eyes - and
when Stephanie asks her if she minds her liaison with Hany, the wife replies: 1 [0]h No, I'm
not that sort', Stephanie feels so guilty about intruding upon this family that she then gives
Harry a £250,000 violin - a very high cost indeed to pay for their 'sins'.
The meeting with Harry's wife undermines the irony of Stephanie's earlier assertion that he
is a 'real family man' since the meeting reveals that Harry truly is a 'real family man'; he is
someone who protects and provides for his wife the best he can by providing her with a
child (however damaged — a la My Left Foot). The ultimate signifier as to Harry's family
commitment is apparent in the song that he is singing during the meeting between his wife
and Stephanie: The Green, Green Grass of Home. It is Stephanie's sexuality that threatens
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Harry's family, not his infidelity. Responsibility for sexual morality in Duet for One is
displaced from the male predator (Harry) and placed onto the aberrant sexual Other of
Stephanie (the impaired). Stephanie's sexuality can be classified as excessive and aberrant
as it is leading nowhere and to nothing further in her relationship with Harry, whilst also
transgressing class boundaries. Consequently, the disabled Stephanie's sexual excess is
seen as much of a threat to other families as disability is. Significantly then, it is disabled
female sexual excess, not that of the normal male, that is deemed Other.
The Raging Moon uses the family in its narrative in a similar manner as does Duet For
One: life without a family is reinforced as a life not worth living and with class used in
such a manner that class becomes irrelevant. The Raging Moon is, on one level,
incoherent in what it thinks of the family: on one level it seems to be pointing out how
insufficient it is, whilst on another it seems to invalidate all forms of existence outside the
family. Bruce is clearly from a working-class family whilst Jill is clearly middle-class.
That Bruce's family live in a block of flats and that the Father watches the television -
football - whilst the Mother prepares pie and chips for the family is a clear indication of
their class. Jill's parents, on the other hand, have an enormous garden - they had intended
to have a swimming pool built - and her Father is a medical doctor. Each set of parents'
clothes, manner of dress, speech and attitude all combine to make the class difference
clear, yet each set of parents / families is unable to cope with their son or daughter's
impairments. Bruce's parents are unable even to communicate with him. They resort to
sending their other son to tell Bruce that they cannot have him home because the parental
home is inaccessible, impractical and that the parents' ages prevent them from physically
caring for him. This situation could have led to some serious questioning of available
housing and care assistance in an Independent Living situation, yet the film's logic is
justified by Jill's parents' equal inability to have her home either. Her parents' (and others /
own) attitudes make it unbearable for her. Money and class have no bearing on
impairment and disability in these two films, yet money and class are the biggest disability
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that most people with impairments face in their everyday lives (Berthoud et al, 1993;
Barnes, 1991).
Jill's parents' home is accessible - by the implication that, when she is at home, she can
reach the bedroom and garden without apparent difficulties - yet she prefers to be in the
Home as: 'they leave you alone [and] let you be what you are'. Our first sight of Jill at
home, being pushed around their garden by her Father, is initially shot as if she is
imprisoned behind high walls: a mise en scene which reinforces her feelings of
imprisonment and that her home and family have become intolerable for her.
Consequently, Jill calls off her engagement to Jeffrey, an ordinary man - because he is
'frightened' of her impairment and all that it entails - and goes back to the Home. The last
shot we see of Jill with her Mother is when the Mother walks in on Jill and her now ex-
fiancé, thinks they were kissing, and tells Jill that she 'looks so pretty'. The shot is a zoom-
in from the three of them in a medium long shot to a close-up of just the Mother's and Jill's
faces. The Mother has a forced smile whilst tears stream down Jill's. The image slowly
fades to a shot of a pond - a reference to Alice, in Wonderland, drowning in her own tears
(Carroll, 1995) - and then Jill back at the Home. The mise en scene of the shot reinforces
the deterioration of Jill's relationship with her parents; especially Jill's position as her
Mother's daughter, a position traditionally perceived as a strong basis for a familial
relationship. The zoom-in, by excluding the fiancé to concentrate on Jill's face (exhibiting
a look of inevitable despair) and her Mother's (forced happiness as it is a daughter whom
she knows to be unmarriageable, and dependent), pushes the point beyond
misinterpretation. The fade provides a suitable metaphor for Jill's relationship with her
parents: Jill leaves home and never returns. The only other time we see Jill's parents is
after she has died. The representation implies that once Jill is not going to marry Jeffrey
she is never going to marry a normal person, and as such, will be dependent upon her
parents or a Home for the rest of her life (a reality which comes to pass).
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Significantly, Bruce never sees his family again once he has moved into the Home, a fact
which reinforces my interpretation of Jill and her family as inadvertently representing
disablist ideology (that disability cannot be coped with within a modern family because of
what it is pathologically). Equally, The Raging Moon reinforces other pertinent issues
such as access, relationships, class and social processes as irrelevant. Although this is
seemingly a contradiction in comparison with the ideological thrust of other disability
films that identify the mother figure as perfectly capable of absorbing disability into the
family (i.e., My Left Foot, as explained earlier), this is in fact not the case. The ideal
mother, or perfect mother, is clearly (even within My Left Foot) atavistic; after all My Left
Foot is clearly a period piece. Combined with this, inconsistencies do abound in
representations of disability, and Otherness overall, a fact which highlights the confusion
of solutions to disability in culture in general. Confusion and inconsistency in
interpretation are indicative of a culture searching for coherence in the face of an ever-
changing world in which what constitutes disability (Otherness), and who are the disabled
(Other), as changing as are its politics. The nature of what disablement is has radically
changed over the past thirty years (Oliver and Barnes, 1998; Drake, 1999), the period in
which the films in this study were made, and still it is in transition (as addressed in the
introduction and literature review, Chapter One). It is equally significant to note that The
Raging Moon does not seem too keen on working-class family culture per se: at Bruce's
brother's wedding members of the working-class (Bruce's family and friends) are ShOW12 to
be lustful, negative, alcoholic, ill-mannered and ill-educated. The writer / director's future
role as writer / director of Conservative Party Political Broadcasts and friend of Margaret
Thatcher (Forbes, 1992) although originally from an East Ham working-class family is in
itself revealing. Significantly, given the film's negative portrayal of working-class life
and attitudes, the wedding party is the place where Bruce acquires his polio-like
impairments. The same attitude to the working-class is characteristic of The Elephant
Man, where Treves's family ideology - considerate, caring and liberal - is clearly
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advocated above all working-class attempts at integration: Mrs Treves, for example, has
Merrick to tea whilst the masses - quite literally the great unwashed in this film - exploit
him at every opportunity. The negativity with which the working-class is represented in
both films clearly points to a one-sided view of which class is better equipped to deal with
the deformed. For example, although the attempt by Jill's family to integrate her fails, it is
seen as preferable, by far, to the seediness of Bruce's working-class family. The implied
immorality of Bruce's brother getting his wife pregnant just to obtain a council house is so
unsubtle that it is more of a polemical judgement than it is narratively relevant. Again, a
social comment on how difficult it is for working-class couples (let alone disabled people)
to obtain housing is turned into an attack on the working-class for its perceived attitudes
and actions. Similarly, earlier on in The Raging Moon, when Bruce was normal and had
told Harold that sex was 'not much without love', sex for a council house takes on a whole
new meaning of negativity. Bruce's condemnation of functional sex (in criticising his
brother's impending fatherhood) is significant because he himself had lived - when normal
- specifically with gratuitous sex as his goal in life. Such a view brings us full circle back
to good sex as being specifically for the creation of 'loving families', a la My Left Foot,
Duet For One, Whose Life Is It Anyway?, 'Joe Egg' and The Elephant Man.
The inability to have sex and thus have children - a family - as apparent in all the films so
far discussed is particularly so in The Raging Moon. In the final scene to be discussed in
depth in this chapter, Jill and Bruce intend to get married and are being philosophical about
it because Jill is, at this point, sitting up in bed ill (she dies the next day). Bruce is talking
to Jill in her (sick) room in the Home when a sequence of scenes occur whilst the dialogue
is, asynchronically, from their conversation in Jill's room, shot and synched as an image
dialogue overlap. Bruce states: '[I]t's terrible to think really, isn't it. It's terrible to think
that you [Jill and Bruce] can never have children. I never really thought about it before. It
hurts really to think about it. Do you like children?' Jill answers: 'never wanted to really
have children until this happened [her engagement to Bruce] and then it suddenly seemed
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terribly important'. Bruce concludes:
[T]hey say people like us can't have children. You know I've been reading it up in
these medical books and it's possible, I'm sure it is. I suppose you were a good
child were you? I was a little bugger, I remember they used to take me to
Blackpool, I used to lift up the skirts of old ladies on the prom. I enjoyed that.
The words alone are proof enough that their intended marriage cannot be deemed or
considered a 'real' family because of a lack of children. When the words are combined
with the fact that Jill dies the next day and that Bruce is already seen to be a dreamer, we
are left with no alternative but to see that Bruce's hopes of being able to have a child are as
deluded as they are pathetic. The reference by Bruce to his childhood (and by implication,
Jill's) also implies that both their families were relatively happy families prior to the
intrusion of impairment, thereby reinforcing the film's message of impairment as their (and
all) families' nemesis.
The concurrent images, dialogue, and violin music on the sound-track, act as further
indicators that Bruce and Jill are deluded and pathetic in their romance, it being a mere
parody of a 'real' family. When Bruce states how 'terrible' it is not to be able to have
children we see Bruce looking out of a high, upstairs room, window. There is a cut to a
point-of-view shot from where he is, a view of numerous children happily playing in the
gardens beneath him. They are distant (in an extreme long shot) and, as such, out of reach
for Bruce; his position places him in lonely isolation from what 'real' family life is: the
ability to have children. The children playing in the grounds of the Home is quite
inexplicable as no one seems to have visitors (who could bring children) and children are
never before or after seen at the Home. A virtual replica of this scene, in mise en scene
and its visual message, is in Bette Davis' 1939 movie Dark Victory (Edmund Golding, US,
1939). In the final scene of Dark Victory Davis realises she is about to die and not have
children, while in the distance (equally bizarrely) are a group of children playing; a mise en
scene constructed to make the image of childlessness sadder for that very fact. The next
scene, of The Raging Moon, still voiced over by Jill and Bruce's conversation, is of Bruce
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in bed. Bruce takes two photographs off his bedside cabinet and puts them under the
covers with him and, as one of the photographs is of Jill as a child, it implies that she will
have to be his child as much as his wife. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that
the marriage will be a sexless (penetrativeless) one - as Bruce himself tells us earlier in the
narrative in his quote from Deuteronomy when he tells us that: "[H]e whose testicles are
crushed or whose male member is cut off shall not enter the assembly of the Lord". That's
me ladies and gentleman [ ]'. The musical accompaniment heightens the emotive
content as the strings tug away at our hearts in a plethora of pitifully pathetic scenes which
combine to invalidate all that Jill and Bruce have together - an unavoidable conclusion
considering that she then dies.
Consequently, we can see that The Raging Moon uses Jill and Bruce to criticise their
families for not being ideal whilst advocating their parents' heterosexual model for life. As
Bruce and Jill's only apparent hope of happiness was to live as a husband and wife (as their
parents do), and that this is ridiculed as impossible (Jill dies) or delusory, this thesis's
reading is fully justified. Bruce and Jill's failure to be a couple is pertinent to the film's
inability to decide coherently what it is attempting to portray, unless it is read as
reinforcing normal marriage / family ideology by the film's mimicry of it. Thus, the film's
closure, i.e., Jill's death, acts to validate normal family life above all others by closing off
the possibility of an alternative way of life. The finale acts to reinforce the standard
ideological view of the family because it is not capable of offering (let alone condoning)
any alternatives. In this film, to be happy one must be heterosexually married, sexually
active and capable of producing children (preferably not disabled one's either). Having the
conclusion that it effects, The Raging Moon erases any potential ambiguity that it might
have implied; the death of Jill is the end of any possible or potential threat to normal and
traditional family ideology.
The male care assistant / wheelchair fixer in The Raging Moon, on being asked if his ideal
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Home for 'cripples' will let people sleep together, clearly states that people of opposite
sexes will be able to. There is no need to stipulate 'opposite sex' in the conversation except
to point out that that will be all that is allowed. The idea of two cripples sleeping together
obviously seemed risque enough; homosexual cripples (in their absence) are totally beyond
the pale (Dyer, 1993, p.16). Equally, homosexual cripples are redundant if one is
specifically reinforcing traditional family ideology through a comparison with heterosexual
norms. One of the few examples of a gay disabled character, made in the same year as The
Raging Moon, was in the purely exploitative and sensationalist film Tell Me That You
Love Me, Junie Moon (Otto Preminger, US, 1970), where homosexuality was just another
element of the underside of American society. The delusory idea of a 'crippled family'
works, in The Raging Moon, as a reinforcement of the able-bodied norm by its failure, and
it is constructed as a failure due to its not being a normal family. The success of the film
for a normal audience is its reinforcement of normality by the failure of cripples who are
trying to be normal. The inclusion of homosexuality would both undermine and cloud, and
raise a degree of ambiguity in, the issue and ideology being confronted and advocated:
normality.
In conclusion, I would argue that the films discussed use disability to validate traditional
family ideology by having their central characters' tears, sadness and tragedy initiated and
determined by either their inability to be a normal member of a family or by their inability
to create their own normal family. Death is seen as preferable for the disabled characters
because of their inability to have, or be in, a family in My Left Foot, The Elephant Man,
Duet For One and Whose Life Is It Anyway? The same narrative construction is true of
impairment in films, not looked at in this thesis, such as The Big Lebowski (Joel Cohen,
US, 1998), Bitter Moon (Roman Polanski, GB, 1992), Breaking the Waves (Lars Von
Tiers, Denmark, 1996), The Eighth Day, Sling Blade (Billy Bob Thornton, US, 1996) and
many others. The bizarre twist to The Raging Moon is to have death as a result of
attempting to create a family - be it a family only of husband and wife. Such a narrative
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sequence is a far more questionable from a Social Model perspective in its ideology in
comparison to the other films discussed because it implies that people with impairments
are doomed before they have even attempted anything usually attributed to normal
individuals. Alongside these points, Mothers are seen as the ideal carers (as in The
Elephant Man and My Left Foot) with Fathers represented as somewhat ineffectual.
Equally, institutional care or death is seen as preferable when the parents - or siblings - are
either non-existent or unable to cope with the disabled person (as in The Raging Moon,
The Elephant Man, Duet For One and, especially, Whose Life Is It Anyway?). By
concentrating on the traditional family model, however ideologically determined, the films
studied reinforce the same ideology by the failure or non-inclusion of any other family
(non-family) models. The disabled are used to prop up normality, as well as the normality
and hegemony of the familial unit, at the expense of their own validity or identity;
disability is thus created out of impairment whilst at the same time making it seem natural
and pathological. Such representations are relatively typical and scenarios of a similar type
about impairment exist in films such as Broken Silence (Caroline Link, Germany, 1996),
The Heart is a Lonely Hunter (Robert Ellis Miller, US, 1968), Hearts of Fire (Jeff
Bleckner, US, 1992), The Horse Whisperer, The Switch, The Walking Stick (Eric Trill,






'Deformed bodies depress me.'
Nicholas Van Ryan (Vincent Price) in Dragonwyck (Joseph L. Mankiewicz, US, 1946)
This chapter will build upon the issues raised in the previous chapters, in order to examine
the ways in which disability is specifically constructed on film as pathological. It will be
discussed below, how representations of impairment place the problems of disability as
being caused by impairment rather than their being socially orientated or constructed. The
key strands of my discussion of the body will revolve around medicalisation (cf Bryan
Turner, 1992; 1995); the body as a metaphor for society (cf Mary Douglas, 1966; 1970);
the camivalesque or grotesque (cf Bakhtin, 1984); and normalisation (cf Foucault, 1977;
1978). As has already been stated in earlier chapters, the Medical Model of disability has
almost total hegemony over the modern Western definition of disability. Thus, it places all
problems of disability within the individual's own body and his / her impairments. For the
Medical Model (of disease as well as deformity) the body is a machine, one with a
physiological norm to which the body either does or does not conform. When a body does
not fit the physiological norm all subsequent problems are seen as arising from its
corporeal deviance and not from how it is perceived or placed socially, making a chapter
on the body essential in any thesis of impairment and disability in whatever form or
medium.
In concentrating on how filmic representations of disability accept the hegemony of the
Medical Model I have applied the theories of Foucault, Bakhtin and Douglas in order to
understand why the Medical Model is so persuasive, and pervasive, in the representation of
disability. When Gilman (1988, p.255) writes: 'it is in the world of representations that we
banish our fear of [the Other ... ] proof that we are still whole' (Gihnan's emphasis), it is
145
possible to see why some representations remain negative even after social or political
change; although some social change has occurred - legal rights, economic advancement et
al - the archetypal and stereotypical persist even though many have been forcefully
challenged — be they of minorities of one kind or another, or the disabled. Douglas,
Bakhtin and Foucault enable us to deconstruct the symbols of the Other (the impaired, in
this case) more effectively. Also, issues of masculinity and femininity as manifest in the
body will be discussed in relation to how 'norms' are used to define both what they
themselves are and how deviation from them is used to reinforce the 'norm' and devalue the
abnormal. The main emphasis of this chapter will be on the film Whose Life Is it
Anyway?, and, as such, the theories of the camivalesque body are not utilised until the
latter part of the chapter, when this thesis will explore the concept of the body in the other
core films of this study.
Whose Life Is It Anyway? is about Ken Harrison, a man who has been involved in a car
accident and sustains irreversible quadriplegia necessitating, in the logic of the film,
lifelong hospitalisation. In the hospital, every possible act of objectification and
surveillance - medicalisation (Armstrong, 1983) - is enacted upon Ken to keep him alive.
It seemed ideal for this thesis: a prime example of how we are dehumanised and
pathologised due to medicalisation. Yet, this interpretation did not seem completely
accurate, and I realised why: the film is a critique of medicalisation; it even advocates de-
medicalisation. The problem is that the means used to criticise modern, technologically-
advanced medicalisation consists of people with impairments. Consequently, they, the
disabled, are dehumanised and pathologised as a burden, out of a desire to demean the
technology that keeps them alive. The basis of the film's argument is that the problem
with modern medicine is that it unnaturally keeps certain people alive and, as such, those
people have to be portrayed as less than human or the Other in order to demean
medicalisation. The way the film ascribes certain characteristics to the body of Ken
Harrison, which are culturally unacceptable or filmically constructed, makes him - and his
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type - inhuman and the Other. Thus, medicalisation is seen as bad because it keeps the
negative, sub-human disabled alive. The film Whose Life Is It Anyway? is far more subtle
than one like A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg in its construction as a political piece of
film-making.
The way in which Whose Life Is It Anyway? de-humanises Ken is by having him
articulate his inhumanness himself (see earlier chapter) in a particularly human way; so
much so that Ken was described, in a review of a revival of the play, as having: 'a
personality which he lets shine to the full' (Sweeney, 1993, p.24). Ken shows his
humanness through his ability to be a thoughtful, rational and intelligent person. Ken's
inhumanness must therefore be made apparent in his body, which is achieved by having
Ken appear as dependent, impotent and 'feminine' (impaired). The film achieves this most
conventionally by having before-the-accident and after-the-accident components in the
chronological narrative and in flashbacks.
Ken is told of his 'Catch 22' situation - his intellectual humanness whilst at the same time
being bodily the Other - by Sandy, the hospital psychiatrist, who tells him that his plea for
death: 'is weakened by his obvious intelligence'. The way the film avoids the 'Catch 22'
situation is by having the negative pathology of the body as more severe than the positive
capacity of his intelligence. Consequently, Ken is multi-impaired, quadriplegic with renal,
muscle, bowel and almost complete body failure in order for his body's negativity to be
greater than his intellectual positivity. The failure of the (Ken's) body is thus shown as
dominant over the success or power of the (his) intellect. Ken and Sandy's 'Catch 22'
conversation continues:
Ken:	 I don't think doctors realise that their patients can and want to
understand what's wrong with them, and they're capable of
making decisions about their own bodies.
Sandy:	 Then what they need is information.
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Ken:	 Well, a doctor doles out that information like a Kosher
butcher doles out pork sausages.
Sandy:	 That's true, but wouldn't you agree that patients need good
medical advice to make good decisions?
Ken:	 Absolutely. I would be grateful for any information so that I
could make the proper decision. It would, however, be my
decision.
This conversation reveals some of the problems the film addresses and how it sets out to
resolve them. Ken is arguing for the control of his own body, a re-appropriation of his
body after its appropriation by medicine, so that he can take the decision to die. In doing
so Ken criticises modern medicalisation. Ken's actions condemn medicalisation's de-
humanisation of the patient and himself for its objectification of Ken achieved through its
exclusion of him from the decision-making process that most nearly concerns him. Thus,
the emphasis lies on the 'my decision' part of his speech, but the reason for his wanting
control is to end his own life (and, by logical corollary, control over his body). In this
simple way Ken is stating that if he cannot have control of his body, nor should anyone
else. The ideal(s) of the Independent Living Movement - with disabled people living and
controlling their own lives (Oliver and Barnes, 1998) - is denied when the implication of
the mise en scene is that of having medicalisation as essential in keeping Ken alive. It
implies that one without the (0)ther is not an option and, as if to support this, Ken is
having his daily dialysis treatment during the entire conversation. Concomitantly, Sandy
and Ken's conversation is not presented in a conventional shot / reverse shot sequence of
dialogue between two characters. Instead, the mise en scene is created by having Ken shot
straight-on in close-up and Sandy in a medium shot straight-on. Tubes (flowing with
blood from the dialysis machine) frame Sandy as he stares at the machine. Sandy avoids
Ken's gaze by looking at the dialysis machine. Consequently, Ken has, in the logic of the
film, become the machine that is keeping him alive and, as such, Sandy's looking at the
dialysis machine is both logical for the film's meaning and for Ken's own view of his life as
it now is. The film's criticism of medicalisation is strengthened by Ken's own
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acknowledgement that medicalisation is essential for his survival but that in keeping him
alive it dehumanises him; this realisation is identified and reinforced when Ken himself
states earlier in the film that he cannot survive outside the hospital - a debatable point in
itself yet one that is offered by the film as being the truth.
Significantly, despite Ken's astute criticisms of the medical profession for their grip on
medical knowledge, he wants for himself this same knowledge in order execute his own
destruction. In Ken's view, and that of the film, his knowledge of his condition is restricted
by the doctors. He feels that he is being exploited by the medical profession for their own
purposes - for the medical team's discussions of Ken's condition rarely include him. Such
purposes are summed up by Bologh (1981, p.194) as: 'professionals use[ing] the patients'
illness for their own ends - research, teaching, income, learning, while depriving the
patient of medical knowledge and control over their own bodies, even causing illness'. The
perspective is seemingly confirmed when in one scene, consisting of Dr Emmerson's doing
his rounds with student doctors, he demonstrates his power, position and status. The film
addresses a public desire of the time (and the present) to question the intrusiveness and
coldness of a profession that has become rich on the privileges it has made for itself
through the objectification of the patient. Fox (1977, p.21) sees a movement - significant
in itself— towards the achievement of the goals of demedicalisation manifest in the success
of many 'right to die' cases of the mid-seventies; the period in which the play and film
originate and upon which philosophy the film is not only based but also supports.
Sandy, during his conversation with Ken, is portrayed as Ken's intellectual inferior: in the
dialogue he feeds Ken the correct lines for the appropriate condemnations of the medical
profession, then agrees with him when these are explained to him. Prior to sitting down
and conversing with Ken-as-the-dialysis-machine, Sandy wanders around the room
exhibiting a 'neatness compulsion', as Ken speculates on the cause of the compulsion to
him; a 'compulsion' involving picking up linen napkins, folding them and placing them
149
across the room in neat piles. One could read this particular nuance as the psychiatrist
being shown to be as 'mad' as his patient (after all, he is sent to commit Ken). All the staff
in this film are obsessed with preserving all life to a degree which is compulsive rather
than caring; 'care' has been replaced by a compulsion to keep bodies neat, tidy and alive, in
hygienic Intensive Care Units (ICUs). Sandy's 'neatness compulsion' also acts more
directly as its ironic comment on Ken's bodily state. Sandy's actions emphasise his
physicality and movement; he is using his hands because he can. Ken cannot use his
hands, so no matter how intellectually superior Ken may be to Sandy (or others), they are
superior beings because they are able to control their hands, legs, kidneys and bowels, and
have an intellect. If Mead's view (cited in Turner, 1992, p.29) that 'hands are vital in the
development of the social being' is acceptable, then we can detect one of the methods the
film uses to degrade Ken: it removes his conventional social / bodily idiom such that Ken
becomes less of a human being. The whole question of what constitutes a human being is
thus defined in Whose Life Is It Anyway? as a person's having the facility to combine
intellectual ability with bodily control. One without the other, in this case mind without
body, is shown as a life not worthy of living.
In an earlier scene, Ken ironically describes himself as a vegetable, a statement that has
further clear implications: the film's criticism of how medicine keeps alive those who
would otherwise naturally die applies to those with learning difficulties as well as himself.
Karpf states (1988, p.75) that 'modern medicine seems to be the full flowering of Cartesian
reductionism' and that the presentation of disability and medicine 'relieves public anxiety
about its potential'. In this light we can see that Whose Life  Is It Anyway? addresses a
public concern about medicalisation in that it seems to have become impersonal, where the
individual is no longer the concern of medicine but only its object of corporeal subjection.
The argument in the film against medicalisation is intentionally revealed in a scene prior to
Ken's dialogue with Sandy, the psychiatrist. Dr Emmerson calls into his office the
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psychiatrist and the young, attractive, female Dr Scott; he explains to Sandy that he wants
Ken committed. He bases this on Ken's desire to have the right to die as the doctors have:
just about [got] a viable human being'. At this point the psychiatrist immediately agrees to
carry out committal proceedings (without having met Ken - further reinforcing the
domination, and power, of doctor over patient as excessive medicalisation), then leaves.
The scene takes place in Dr Emmerson's office, an office lined with live television
monitors of the ICU's patients. As Dr Scott starts her speech she strides to the monitors
and points at them. She argues:
[D]oes he look crazy to you? Look at him lying there. I mean, Christ, he's got no
privacy at all, he's got no sense of dignity. I tell you, if that happened to me I don't
know if I'd have the courage to live either. Would you like to live like that?
Significantly, it is a generalised argument: she is speaking not merely about Ken but about
all ICU patients. The validity of Dr Scott's perspective is clearly established in this scene
and by her prior and subsequent character development. For example, in this scene, Dr
Scott, a stereotypical WASP, walks into the light as she speaks her lines and is touched by
the natural light coming through the office windows. Her adversary (which is what Dr
Emmerson becomes), on the other hand, played by John Cassavetes, both is in the shade
and, significantly, has a much darker ethnic appearance. Since Emmerson has just ordered
a psychiatrist to commit a man established in the film as highly rational and perhaps, even,
illuminated by intellect, the lighting and mise en scene contrast - literally and
metaphorically - with the light in which we see Emmerson. Emmerson is also smoking. It
clouds close-ups of him in his share of the shot / reverse shots of his argument with Dr
Scott, and in this way further degrades him through the negative medical connotation of
smoking; an unavoidable association emphasised by the film's setting. Similarly,
Ernmerson is the only person in the film who smokes tobacco — so Emmerson allows
himself and is allowed by society to self-destruct, yet he is the one to decide whether to
'allow' Ken a similar right.
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The monitor screens in Emmerson's office, and the whole institution itself, appear as a
visual representation of what Foucault called the 'clinical gaze' (cf. Armstrong, 1983), a
gaze that is on the individual at all times and in all places. Dr Scott herself states that
privacy and dignity are non-existent. Armstrong (1983, p.8), adopting Foucault, writes of
the modern hospital (in England) that: 'it is a medical Panopticon writ large'. Emmerson's
hospital signifies the epitome of such a hospital. The tragedy of the film is that it uses
disability as the perspective through which to examine medicalisation; the film practises in
its discourse an extreme form of normalisation by demeaning the successes of medical
advances. Thus, the film, and culture in general, is unable to divorce the technological
benefits of medicine from the excessive potential for dehumanising that it exhibits. The
film's normalisation is a highly prescriptive one in that it sets up a rationale for preserving
a life only if the life has a certain degree of both bodily and intellectual control over itself.
The philosophy of the film seems to follow that which Foucault (cited in Rabinow, 1991,
p.150) credits to the normalising state: 'if man is made in God's image then one needs to
protect that image of God in man's body'.
The name `Emmerson' is an ironic, and comparable, comment on human alienation in
modern society since it conjures up the philosophy of the nineteenth-century
transcendentalist poet Ralph Waldo Emerson and all the natural / nature ideas that he
professed. Ralph Waldo Emerson is a well-known disparager of the impaired in his works
on the ideal American self, whilst at the same time being highly critical of conservatives
afraid to react in defence of the ideal American self (cf. Garland Thomson, 1997, p.41-44).
The film plays with Emerson's philosophy throughout the film and could be the subject of
a thesis in itself In Whose Life Is It Anyway? Emmerson, a compulsive technocrat, is a
comparable subject which reduces his stature and questions his whole philosophy: i.e.,
total medicalisation. Dr Scott, on the other hand, symbolised through her embodiment,
represents the value of the natural and nature and the ideal (re: Emerson rather than
Emmerson).
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At the start of the film Dr Scott is equally against Ken's having the right to die, through her
involvement with Ken - she herself calls it 'love' at one point - she is persuaded also from
his perspective that his life is indeed not worth living (cf her earlier speech). Dr Scott is a
woman stereotypically classified as having 'child-bearing hips' that make the body of Dr
Scott noticeable as more 'earthy' (larger) and 'emotional' and 'feminine'. The point is
emphasised when Ken compliments her on her 'beautiful' breasts twice within the film and
by contrast with the other central female characters, who are more akin to an arbitrary
modern male aesthetic of what constitutes female beauty for its own sake (thin and
virtually asexual).
Thus, Dr Scott's argument with Emmerson is additionally given as overtly physical in a
way that is more emotional than rational (i.e., archetypally 'motherly'). Such a division of
rationality and emotionality are clearly relevant to the questions of what is defined as
masculine and feminine, aspects to be discussed later. However, Scott, by her conversion,
also represents an open-mindedness, the obverse of which is represented by the dogmatic
Emmerson. That she listens to, counsels and eventually 'loves' Ken validates her above all
other characters, a validation that further confirms Ken's view of his impaired embodiment
as abject. She can think, change her mind, and act upon her insights, whereas Ken is
trapped in his inability to act.
Viewed logically, it is somewhat bizarre that all the characters who 'befriend' and 'love'
Ken are those who eventually support his wish to die: Dr Scott; a petite white female
student nurse named Joey; his white male lawyer; and a black Caribbean hospital porter
called John. Although Ken states that to respect someone is to respect their choice, to
respect such a choice to die could be considered to be a bad reflection of the kind of friend
to have. As they all talk, when Ken is not present, about how wrong it is to keep him alive,
it clearly demonstrates the correctness of his choice. John is indicative of the emphasis of
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the film when, whilst trying to get her to go out with him, he asks Joey:
[h]ow much does it cost to keep him alive; thousands of
dollars a week?
Joey:	 That's not the point.
John:	 Well the point is that in Africa people die of the measles, ya
know; little babies even. Only cost a few pennies to keep
'em alive. No, there's got to be something crazy somewhere,
man!
Joey:
	 Well that's wrong too.
Here, then, the cost of medical treatment, as opposed to the ethics of it, seems to be of
equal significance in whether they should keep Ken alive. The power of John and Joey's
viewpoint is reinforced by the choice of camera angle. They are shot from a very low
angle to emphasise the intimacy of their conversation, giving the scene a greater visual
authority; a cinematic boost to their opinion necessitated by their lowly status within the
hospital hierarchy. The perspective is reinforced by the fact that John and Joey are very
friendly to Ken; they 'kidnap' Ken from the ward to take him to the basement to hear John's
reggae punk band. Consequently, as Ken's friends advocate his death on purely economic
grounds, it gives their argument a validity (and an airing) that places it as a central theme
of the film's criticisms against medicalisation and, by implication, marks impairment as
expensive and unproductive. Ken's body is seen as totally unproductive with his inability
to use his hands clearly symbolic of such a viewpoint. As Joey, in the above conversation,
starts by saying: '[T]hat's not the point', and ends: 'that's wrong too', it is quite a volteface.
By agreeing that the treatment of African children is wrong 'too' she agrees that keeping
Ken alive is wrong, thus undermining her initial reluctance to support Ken in his suicidal
wishes. Equally, Joey's support for Ken soon becomes positive support for his wishes to
die. The 'nature' of Ken's impairment does necessitate a high degree of personal assistance,
a fact that places it in the realm of what Turner (1992, p.177) calls: 'chronic degenerative
illness'. Through having such a physically dependent central character, the film indicates
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the financial problems incurred by revealing how modern medicine has moved from curing
infectious diseases to containing and curing chronic degenerative illness. Significantly,
Joey wishes Ken 'good luck' when he goes to court (a makeshift court in the hospital
library) to plead for the right to die.
An ill body, and similarly Other bodies, are consequently seen in Whose Life Is It
Anyway? both as symbolic of and the cause of social ills (somatic ills, or problems such as
excessive tax burdens, health care costs or even recessions). Ken's body is indicative of
the excesses of medicalisation and its alienating consequences. It is also a symbol of the
'sick' society that pursues such medicalisation at all costs, both metaphorically and literally.
One scene in particular sums up the above points and firmly places them in the
embodiment of Ken, and Others, as representative both of social malfunction and of a false
sense of social responsibility. In the scene Ken falls out of bed; interestingly, it is an
incident which he calls an accident when it is clearly nursing negligence. Joey brings Ken
a can of coffee, and he playfully refuses to drink it. On turning his head to look at Joey he
knocks the drink which she is holding to his face. It spills down him. Joey sets about
changing the bed on her own (negligently, as it should be two). In the process of Joey's
changing the bed, Ken falls to one side, hangs out of bed, and is rescued by four other staff
Dr Emmerson is at the time with Dr Scott doing a ward round with some students.
As Joey changes his bed, Ken asks: '[H]ow does a quadriplegic cross the road?',
rhetorically answering: '[H]e was stapled to a chicken'. Ken's dependence is encapsulated
both by his own joke and by the state of his body: unable to drink or to clean itself up, with
Joey lifting and tugging him in a way that is not within the realm of most people's
experience. Ken's complete physical dependence on others, once he has quadriplegia,
characterises Ken's embodiment throughout the entire movie. All the scenes of Ken have
him undergoing some kind of essential life-saving treatment - dialysis - or requiring the
actions of others to compensate for his own total lack of physical movement (i.e., wiping
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away his tears) in order to construct his dependency through mise en scene. The only
scene in which he is having neither of the above is when Dr Emmerson is giving him an
injection of valium that he does not wish to have. This scene has added resonance,
emphasising - and constructing - as it does Ken's powerlessness, through a carefully
constructed mise en scene, over what others do to his body whether or not he needs or
wishes them to perform a medical function.
The film consists predominantly of long takes, some lasting up to nearly two minutes, and
the scene under discussion starts with a fairly static long take of Joey giving Ken his
coffee. The simple visualisation that Ken has to have special canned coffee makes specific
the high cost of keeping him alive; it is not just technology but special people and
nourishment that are required. His needs are time-consuming, too. However, at the
beginning of the scene in which Ken falls, there is an increase in the pace in the choice of
camera positions, angles and music; cuts become increasingly rapid. Between Ken's
starting to fall, falling and being put back in bed into his former position, there are twenty-
seven shots which together last under seventy seconds. They consist of straight-on
medium shots of Joey, who is panicking, long shots of male and female nurses coming to
rescue Joey / Ken and shots of Ken's body slipping down to the floor, from the bed, from
under the bed and from the opposite side of the bed to Ken. Most importantly, though, we
have point-of-view shots from where Ken is; shots which involve the camera panning left,
tilting ninety degrees, rapidly, and shots canted from the floor as Ken's head rests upon it.
The disorientation suggested by the movement of the camera, its pace and rapidity, all
combine to emphasise the helplessness and terror that a lack of body control - in Ken and
the disabled - is constructed as entailing in circumstances where control would be
advantageous. In other situations, Ken is simply helpless. Ken becomes a spectacle for the
camera initially and then for the medical gaze: Emmerson, his students, and Dr Scott walk
in upon Ken hanging from his bed.
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Embarrassment is the emotion that Ken first seems to feel upon falling out of bed, but it
turns to outrage when Emmerson walks in with the student doctors. Ken orders them all
out and Emmerson, realising how Ken feels, leads them out. Ricks' (1974, p.1) assessment
of Keats' art and its use of embarrassment is applicable here to how Ken feels, and what the
art of the film is achieving, when he states that embarrassment is connected with feelings
of: 'defencelessness [ ... and that A]rt uses embarrassment to help [the spectator / reader]
deal with it, not by abolishing or ignoring it, but by recognising, refining and putting it to
good human use'. Ken's embarrassment is rooted in his defencelessness. The art of the
film uses the audience's defencelessness against developing quadriplegia (an impairment)
to make the audience feel as uncomfortable in observing Ken's defencelessness as Ken is in
experiencing it. The embarrassment, which is the embarrassment of witnessing the
deformed, or non-controllable body, is achieved by having it individualised in Ken; closure
is achieved by Ken's deciding for himself that it is all right for this embarrassment to be
removed (by his suicide). Consequently, through such a resolution, an audience's
embarrassment and discomfort are relieved and the ideal world (of entertainment and
normality) is restored. The embarrassment in the scene is not only the audience's point of
view but also the audience's required emotional response, because embarrassment is both
personal and social in this, and all, contexts. It is a reaction to a social situation, whoever
is involved.
Once Ken is revealed to be deeply embarrassed Dr Emmerson takes the student doctors
away. The student doctors had stood motionless, gazing at Ken when they come in to the
room. Significantly, our view of this part of the scene is a point-of-view shot from Ken on
the floor - low angle canted, slightly moving all the time - with Ken seeing only their shoes
and legs the closer the crowd of student doctors come to Ken. His humiliation (and
embarrassment) at the feet of the crowd of student doctors (Ken's positioning as both
constant spectacle and in constant humiliation) is left in no doubt by our being given his
perspective in a point-of-view shot. This key scene sets out the film's view very clearly:
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Ken's life is a life that is not worth living due to its dependence, humiliation and inability
to protect itself. No other single scene in the film more explicitly combines its philosophy
and imagery to greater effect — it is a wonderful piece of film-making. Equally, in having
Ken's body require four people to lift him into bed, with two more nurses present, and two
doctors to check him medically after the event, his financial cost in manpower is shown
and, by implication, condemned.
Mary Douglas (1970, p.160) tells us that: 'the body is a symbol of society', and that: '[W]e
cannot possibly interpret rituals concerning excreta, breast milk, saliva and the rest unless
we are prepared to see in the body a symbol of society, and to see powers and dangers
credited to social structures reproduced in small on the human body' (Douglas, 1966,
p.115). Although Douglas is talking of the typical - normal - body, the anxiety about the
disabled body can be understood only if we see the disabled body as part of a range of
available bodies that may act as potential cultural symbols in general. Ken's body has been
normal and now it is not; its value as a symbol is both metaphorical and as a potentially
lived reality. If we take Douglas's views on the body and apply them to this film, Ken's
body is a body / society paralysed by rationality and intellect, a society whose head thinks
but whose body has become a danger to itself, ready to topple at any moment. Ken needs
such a multiplicity of technology and bureaucratic hierarchies to survive that, if we take
Douglas's point again, it is impossible now to enjoy death or dignity as a natural part of
living. After all, it is death that is the root desire of Ken. In contrast, Emmerson, in an
earlier scene with his student doctors, cites death as 'the enemy'. Death is, more radically,
for Foucault (1977) the last resistance to power. This gives rise to a crux in interpretation:
with the film as seen through a Social Model analysis, death is given as the release from
abnormality, and not as Foucault meant it: a last stand against the tyranny of normality
over us all.
Turner (1992, p.55) summarises Douglas's views when he states: '[F]or Douglas, the body
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is a metaphor of society as a whole with the consequence that disease in the body is, for
example, merely a symbolic reflection of disorders in society. The stability of the body is,
equally, a metaphor for social organisation and social relationships'. Consequently, Ken
acts both as an example of the impaired life and as a metaphor for society. The film's
narrative and overall philosophy uses his body to initiate anxiety about both his own body
and that of society. Ken's body acts as a symbol of the failure of society because it uses
the body language of anxiety about the social state to criticise medicalisation. If we relate
Ken's dependence and inability to protect himself from potential danger to his lack of
freedom of choice (the 'right to die') then Ken is also a metaphor: for a society paralysed by
its construction of people so dependent while nevertheless keeping them alive that they
become 'useless eaters' draining society. Ken represents not only society but also a
particular product of that society; he can be read in both ways. The need of eight to ten
people to put Ken back into bed and check him is surely meant to indicate such an
interpretation.
Once Ken is back in bed, Dr Emmerson tells Ken that he will be a quadriplegic for life and
that it is hoped he will be transferred in the near future to another ward or hospital for
continuing rehabilitation. Ken retorts to this statement: '[Y]ou mean you just grow the
vegetables here, the vegetable store is somewhere else'. Again, Ken's humanity is
contrasted with his own words but, more importantly, whilst this conversation is
continuing, a new 'vegetable' is brought in to an ICU cubicle along from Ken's (it is in
view as all the ICU cubicles are Panopticon-like glass constructions). The medical
production line of 'vegetables', the wholly dependent and very expensive, are shown being
created and damned in the same process of medicalisation as Ken has undergone. The
lighting of the characters in this dialogue shot / reverse shot part of the sequence is of
interest. Emmerson - in medium shot from the side - is again lit in a cinematically sinister
manner with the left side of his face in near darkness which, when combined with his
ethnic (Italian-American) features, gives him an appearance of being obsessed. In itself
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alarming, this is in sharp contrast to Ken, who is well lit in close-up (for extra intensity and
feeling it is shot straight on), with no shadow on his face. Thus, Ken's words are more
pure and possibly vulnerable through their purity (signified by the lighting) than
Emmerson's. The latter's appearance is shown to be a prediction of evil. This reading is
confirmed later at the hearing when Ken classifies Emmerson's wishes as committing him
to 'a life sentence'.
The professional counselling is given to Ken by a woman whose manner seems (and then
Ken confirms this for us) patronising: 'we'll teach you to read on a machine'; further proof
of the delusions, as the film sees it, of any idea(l)s of Independent Living. The
counsellor's insistence that she can 'teach' Ken to do what he calls 'the three R's', by which
he means basic functions, further emphasises the child-like nature of his - the impaired -
body. There is no comprehension of the quadriplegic body as the product of a patronising,
de-personalising discourse. The film's makers are seemingly unaware of this perspective
because the film is, as I have shown, acting as part of the (cultural) discourse that is
describing quadriplegia as dependent, inhuman and child-like. As such, it demonstrates its
lack of awareness of the fact that, as Foucault stated, the body is a product of discourse.
The ideologies of the film, a normalising individualism and disabling medicalism, are
revealed by the absence of disability-specific issues; the film carries its own ideological
theme forward with no regard for alternatives, despite its supposed liberal philosophy of
choice. The film's makers cannot be assumed to have read Foucault - they may have - but
the film does propose itself as a challenge to disempowering situations of (medical)
hegemony. In fact, it challenges only the right to be (medically or socially) different,
despite the film's makers message that they understand all the issues. The view held by
this thesis is that they do not and, as such, they merely reinforce continued
(mis)understandings about the issues upon which the film purports to comment.
As Ken has his bed changed for him and he is then washed and dressed (adequately for his
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environment), the film places him bodily as the equal of an infant. It is important to note
here that social relationships are mediated by our bodies and that Ken's is constructed in
the film as the root of his social exclusion. It is only if we see what Goffman (Burns, 1992,
pp.38;85) calls our 'body idioms' - movement, gestures - and 'body gloss' — the desire to
enact those 'idioms' - as natural rather than constructed that the loss of one's standard
'idiom' or 'gloss' becomes problematic. A loss is indeed a loss; however, it becomes the
reason for living - or dying in Ken's case - only if the loss is seen as the loss of one's
natural state. Whose Life Is It Anyway? inadvertently demonstrates the acceptance of such
norms as natural through the film's attempt to have Ken rationally decide to commit
suicide because of his inability now to have the 'idioms' and 'gloss' that were part of his
existence before the accident. There is nothing essentially negative about being dependent
or needing help in changing, for example; it is only if one constructs the body as the
'showcase of the self which is in turn a 'showcase of a successful life' (Seymour, 1989,
p.13) that it is seen — constructed and interpreted - as negative. In contrast, a temporarily
sick or incapacitated adult expectantly receives care and consideration, as will be discussed
below.
Usually, body idioms do define the difference between what is considered masculine and
feminine. Taking a cue from Creed (1993, p.131), who states that 'the abject body is
identified with the feminine, which is socially denigrated, and the symbolic body with the
masculine, which is socially valorised', it will be demonstrated how Ken's body is
denigrated by being placed in the idioms of the feminine. The negation of Ken's
masculinity is effectively and intentionally, even by its own logic, achieved by having
valorised it as overtly masculine prior to the accident that led to his quadriplegia.
At the beginning of the film Ken is welding, adding the final touches to a giant metal
abstract sculpture that he has been commissioned to make, about fifty feet up in the air and
hanging from a mobile crane. This is a very masculine image indeed; instantly, we are
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assured that we have an energetic, strong and physical man with a grand, and very public,
artistic vision - no weedy little sculptures for this guy. The sculpture in question is
approximately a hundred feet high and appears to be a minimalist iron representation of a
sailing ship. Upon clambering down, Ken's virile sexuality is immediately shown when his
girlfriend Pat (a dancer) instantly embraces, kisses and is carried by him. As such, Ken is a
man's man, a bourgeois artist whose physicality is manifest in his art. His art can be
classifies as bourgeois due to its non-representational, and therefore 'difficult', quality;
'difficult' being what Bourdieu (cited by Vincendeau, 1992, p.35) tells us is: 'a condition
for great (bourgeois) art, as opposed to popular art which delivers its goods
straightforwardly'. To push the emphasis on Ken's masculinity beyond doubt he even
drives a sports car.
The accident occurs immediately following the above opening display. The audience next
sees Ken having his bed changed, his body rubbed (to prevent pressure sores) and being
washed and fed in the Intensive Care Unit. We further see Ken being fed and this seems to
signify the child-like quality of what he has become; more so than his feminisation.
Infantilising is very closely allied to feminising - i.e., the Lolita (Stanley Kubrick, GB,
1962) syndrome that places each within the (0)ther - feminisation occurs in the way that
the camera uses tight close-ups of Ken's body when it is being rubbed, fragmenting him in
a way that children are rarely represented. Ken becomes an object similarly to when
Mulvey (1975, p.19) describes the objectification of the female, as Ken is submitted to a
'to-be-looked-at-ness'. The process can be seen as part of a criticism of medicalisation, as
indeed is intended in this film. The difference lies in the constant 'to-be-looked-at-ness'
which aligns Ken with the feminine, in contrast with his having previously been so
masculine. Ken has moved from a situation where his creations were looked at and into a
situation where he himself is the object that is looked at. Equally, the to-be-looked-at-ness
process is part of the construction that makes Ken an abject creature (or 'vegetable')
through medicalisation as much as feminisation. Feminine to-be-looked-at-ness is
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considered to be pleasurable, as is impairment to-be-looked-at-ness; in the latter case, it is
pleasurable because the normal body's anxiety about its own condition is relieved and
passed on to an[O]ther. It is interesting to note that the term for the condition one step
worse, medically, than Ken's is termed PVS: Persistent Vegetative State. The turn of
phrase shows where the medical 'truth' has taken its cue from popular culture, with each
clearly mediating the other.
Part of Ken's masculinity in normality was his bodily control; his ability to keep his
balance whilst hanging from a crane; his fearlessness; his strength and poise - without our
being shown its (0)ther bodily functions. The above are factors which combine to
encapsulate his masculine attributes. They are of equal importance in Ken's (and
society's) perception of masculinity. Later, in the hospital when Ken falls out of bed (a
scene discussed earlier) the symptoms of his fear are most often associated culturally, with
the aspect of the weaker: the feminine. Control of the body can easily be paralleled with
social control and the control of nature. The disquiet about Ken's lack of control is best
explained by Scott (1970, p.273) when he states that: 'cripples make us feel uneasy; they
threaten our sense of mastery over nature'. Although Ken represents almost total control
over nature — the severity of his accident was such that he should be dead - his presence as
a lack of bodily control threatens the spectator's desire for individual mastery, making the
close of death preferable, in order to restore order. Joey's reaction to Ken is basically the
same as Ken's. Subsequently, we are left in no doubt that Ken is on a par with her, a weak
woman, as it is Joey's lack of physical strength (that which Ken had but now lacks) which
caused Ken to fall in the first place.
Such an interpretation relates back to my earlier comments about not being able to protect
one's self, a state usually ascribed to the female — culturally and cinematically (Brosnan,
1991; and Burchill, 1986) that is. To emphasise this, the film shows a symbolic rape of
Ken by Dr Emmerson, immediately following his fall from his bed. Emmerson decides to
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increase Ken's dosage of Valium, a decision Ken rejects and thus refuses to take orally.
Emmerson then arrives with a double-dosage injection of Valium that Ken asks him not to
give intravenously: 'do not stick that fucking needle in my arm. God damn you, I
specifically refuse you permission to do that'. Ignoring his plea, Enunerson plunges (quite
literally) the needle in to the unflinching Ken. Ken himself raises the idea of rape by
saying 'fucking' in his language (in the original play the symbolic homosexual rape is made
more explicit by having Dr Emmerson turn Ken over and inject the Valium into his
buttocks). Significantly, during this scene, the shot is a medium shot from a high angle
that tracks back to an even higher angle, as if to imply the victim being abandoned in the
place of his assault, which is visually similar to many rape-type mises en scenes. Ken, as
Emmerson leaves the room (apparently walking under the camera to the left), shouts at
Emmerson: 'Pis that all I am to you, wait a minute, is that all I am to you, a lump of clay?'
Ken's feminisation is complete: he is fetishised; he endures a constant voyeuristic gaze; he
is at the mercy of male power; and his pleas for respect are ignored. The completeness of
Ken's feminisation is later confirmed: Ken, having told Dr Emmerson that to him he is only
a lump of clay, is later shown to sculpt his girlfriend Pat out of clay as she dances for him
(a flashback).
Another way that Ken is made abject, and feminine, is by his showing of emotion. If we
consider Tasker's view (1993, p.237) that 'a familiar cinematic definition of masculinity
constructs restraint, a control over the emotions, as providing a protective performance' for
men, one can see Ken being feminised and made monstrous (Baldick, 1995; Brooks, 1995)
throughout the film's narrative. Ken is feminised through the breakdown of a protective
performance, a breakdown which is conversely constructed as feminine (and as such the
Other and abject for men). Consequently, medicalisation is criticised by the equation of
having Ken as monstrous (because he is a feminised man) whilst equally being a metaphor
for society at large, in this case medicalised society; for Whose Life Is It Anyway? society
at large has become monstrous because it creates monstrous beings. This is signified by
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the fact that Ken loses his calm and 'in control' manner from his masculine beginning - his
normal period - and becomes emotional - in his abnormal period. The best example of this
is when Ken is crying after having told his girlfriend Pat to leave him and to go and get
married and have children with someone else. He has himself indicated that he is
impotent. Ken is further emasculated by the feminising implications of the construction of
his condition and, if taken together and in light of his own view that he has 'a piece of
knotted string between his legs', it leaves us in no doubt about the socio-sexually
emasculated state of Ken's body.
John is one of the characters who comes in to Ken's cubicle to wipe his tears away, saying
as he does it: '[I]f a man cannot use his hands he's got to be a real dumb son-of-a-bitch to
cry. I mean, it's just another way of getting your gown wet'. John instantly places the
issue of being 'a man' into the discussion and parallels it with Ken's inability to move his
hands. As John talks of crying as 'another way' of wetting a gown, the lack of bodily
function control is paralleled to crying (feminine / infantile). Consequently, Ken's crying
and uncontrolled excretions also act to place his body parallel to that of a baby's; however,
one grows out of a baby's body, not into one. As babies grow up, they also learn, they are
socialised, to control their emotions.
Having control of one's emotions is, as Tasker states, part of the process of restraint that
signifies masculinity, but it is the idea of it as a 'protective performance' which makes Ken,
via his body, monstrous and an abomination of and against society in the logic of the film.
Masculinity as a performance implies that it is above nature, whilst identifying it as a
performance reveals that it is in fact unnatural. If we combine this perspective with
Creed's (1993) view that the masculine male body is the 'symbolic' and with Kristeva's
view (1982, p.102) that: '[T]he body must bear no trace of its debt to nature: it must be
clean and proper in order to be fully symbolic'; furthermore, that the body that does betray
its debt to 'nature' is perceived to be the female body, then we can see Ken's body as being
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shown as feminine. The female body is seen to betray its debt to nature through
menstruation and its function's ability to determine behavioural patterns; just as Ken's body
does. Ken is unable to control his bodily functions (after kidney failure it has its blood
purged regularly), and they are actions and bodily necessities shown both to affect and to
determine his emotional state. Consequently, Ken's dialysis is both mentioned and shown
in great detail, as in the interview with Sandy the hospital psychiatrist, and paralleled with
menstruation for the viewer explicitly to infer Ken's feminisation.
As it is only women who cry in the film, apart from Ken, crying is part of the method by
which he betrays his new 'femininity'. Ken gets emotionally angry - tossing and banging
his head against his pillow - thereby confirming his character as 'emotional' and, as such,
feminine. In the description of his poise prior to his accident it was commented that Ken
had an energetic and strong body, one showing assurance in his movements and posture;
his head is held high and he has a darkish beard covering a strong chin. Significantly, once
the accident occurs, his posture is given an attitude that reflects the change in the nature of
his personality and ideals: it emanates hopelessness and it is portrayed in a manner that is
not logically, medically speaking, related to his quadriplegia. Once the accident has
happened Ken's chin is always resting on his chest and even the beard has paled,
apparently in order to signify the waning of his masculine health. Yet Ken can hold his
chin up (he is shown having physiotherapy to strengthen his chin / neck) in a way that
would drastically change the way the spectator perceives his posture and, by extension, his
character. His character is inextricably linked with his posture to reinforce the ideology of
the film that his condition is hopeless.
The whole question of posture relates to Go
	 inan's points about body idioms. Murphy
(1991), an anthropologist who himself developed quadriplegia, states about quadriplegia
that:
[T]he quadriplegic body can no longer speak a 'silent language' in the expression of
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emotions or concepts too elusive for ordinary speech - for delicate feedback loops
between thought and movement have been broken. Proximity, gesture and body set
have been muted, the body's ability to articulate thought has been stilted. (p.101)
In Murphy's comments we can see how the body, if muted, can place an obstacle upon
social relationships, but also that we should not take the muted version to be the full
expression of the individual. If we understand muted bodies as mutations only
comprehensible as outsiders to interactive social relations then an acceptance of bodily
difference will become increasingly difficult. Another method the film employs to
advocate the muted body as the equivalent of the dead body is by having others speak
Ken's body language for him. A good example of this is in the scene where Ken is being
fed a chicken leg by Joey: she lets him take a bite, puts the bone down and then she licks
her fingers. Ken makes an envious comment. Such an apparently natural reaction of
licking one's fingers is used against Ken in order to mute his body still further. The same
point occurs when John wipes away Ken's tears and when Ken has to ask another nurse to
get his lawyer's card out of his bedside cabinet and telephone him. The repeated use of
having others carry out bodily reactions and simple tasks either for, or in contrast to, Ken
places him further into the realms of 'the dependent useless eater'; with the 'useless eater',
or useless of body, being equated with the dead body. Any understanding of dialysis
would also lead the spectator to realise that even his bodily functions are being carried out
for him, only this time by a machine.
Perhaps part of the problem for society of the quadriplegic body can be related to
Featherstone's (1991) argument that consumer culture needs a plastic body that will be
stimulated into buying decay-delaying consumables. Ken is unable to consume freely and
repeatedly in the manner that consumerism requires. Ken does consume, but it is of high
cost, low demand, technology; thus, he consumes in a way that is considered to drain
capital from a more rapid product consumerism. Equally, Turner (1992, p.11) states that
old and sick bodies are: 'a brake on growth [due to their being a] burden of dependency [
] a form of hyper-Malthusianism'. Even so, Ken still has a function in consumerism, as
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does the film itself, if we take Featherstone's (Featherstone et al, 1991, p.186) point that
consumer culture 'needs to stimulate the fear of decay and incapacity which accompanies
old age and death by jolting individuals out of complacency and persuade them to consume
body maintenance strategies'. Ken, and the film, facilitate this process by signifying all
that is horrific about not controlling one's own body functions and not having specific
control over one's own body idioms. It is a perspective that extends even to fashion and
body garments in Whose Life Is It Anyway?, where, for example, Ken is almost at all
times seen in his hospital gown - in his wheelchair he has a particularly tasteless dressing-
gown on over it - which ensures that he is never represented as anything other than a sick
person. Equally, the 'sick person' implies loss of bodily control, dignity, privacy and
freedom, but also implies decay and mess due to its chaos of faecal and urinary excreta
(i.e., bodily decay). That the quadriplegic body is unable to fulfil its part of the paradigm
of the 'sick role' also accounts for the desire to see it as useless and worthy of termination
(as defined by Parsons (cited in Murphy, 1991, p.19). The failure to play the 'sick role',
where the individual promises to make the effort to recover in return for the temporary
abdication of responsibility to work, is clearly a part of the overall negation of impairment
as a validated state and seen to be so in Whose Life Is It Anyway?
As clothes are increasingly seen to signify the worth of the individuals within them
(Kaiser, 1985), the degree of success and worth manifest in their apparent cost or
individuality, then Ken's apparel singles him out (and all who are sick) as both a social and
a physical failure (Hoffman, 1979). Goffman (1990) argues that normalisation is the act of
the individual to cover up his abnormality and appear normal (Burns, 1992, p.99), an
aspect of the 'sick role' which Ken is unable to carry out. Ken's inability to cover himself
(his abnormality) acts as an incitement to the spectator to see Ken as abnormal and as not
fulfilling his part of the social contract 'sick role' (cf. Parsons, 1961). Bourdieu (cited in
Featherstone, 1991, p.68) sums up, by his terminology, Ken's social status if his apparel
and bodily state are considered as his 'cultural capital'. It is a 'capital' that is culturally
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worthless with a potential debt to society rather than a profit: socially, financially or
interactively. The value, 'cultural capital', that this film, and society / culture in general,
are to Ken (the disabled) not his potential, or capable value / capital, but his discursively
determined worth as manifest - and reinforced - in Whose Life Is It Anyway?
Consequently, Ken, and all those with quadriplegia, are culturally devalued. This film
merely reinforces such a devaluation through its ideological affiliation and adherence to
the tenets of the Medical Model of disability, identifiable here through the application of
the Social Model.
All the characters in the film are seen in clothes which vary and signify the social
multiplicity of individuals (Kaiser, 1985). For example, the main doctors are seen in their
professional outfits (white coats) and leisure / daily wear. When Dr Scott has an evening
out with Ken's lawyer, and then visits Ken in the hospital in her elegant dress, the scene
serves to show that she has an external (private) life, as well as a professional (public) life,
in direct comparison to Ken; it is, thus, a created comparison which acts further to demean
Ken in his impaired state. If we take Gilman's (1988, p.26) view that 'human identity lies
in the individuality of the body', and that 'the outer-man is a graphic reproduction of the
inner-man' (ibid, p.128), then we can interpret Ken's body as symptomatic of his limited
character and performance capabilities. As such, Ken's character and performance is in
the singular once his body has become quadriplegic. Ken's body has become his sole
character whilst all the other characters signify that to be a social being one has a
multiplicity of uniforms / hats for a multiplicity of bodily or social performances.
Representationally, here and in many other impairment-orientated films, the individual
with quadriplegia becomes his body and, as Gilman states, 'the cultural image can become
the self definition' (ibid. p.10). The limitation of this film is that it does not question how
the 'image becomes the self definition' through social discourse and its processes, yet
merely reinforces it as the logical and natural, essentialist definition generic to
quadriplegia. Significantly, the two other main characters of the film, John and Joey, also
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have an external life - they begin courting - whilst at the same time the film is showing us
Ken's inability to have either a private or a satisfactory public life. Another method by
which Ken is made a hideous liminal man, half-alive, half-dead, half-man, half-animal, is
in the way in which the characters other than Ken are all seen as mobile or physical. One
example is the scene when Ken sees Joey and John's private life in full physical union,
when they 'kidnap' him and take him to the basement to see John's reggae band, a scene
during which John and Joey dance in a particularly sexual manner. Significantly, John's
physicality is apparent from the first time that we see him; it is axiomatically given in a
traditionally racist cinematic manner (Cripps, 1993). John is black, therefore: he is
musical; he dances; and he desires white women with an aggressive sexuality (in fact, his
courting of Joey - a new, innocent, petite, white nurse - borders on harassment).
Consequently, when Ken is taken to see the band, it is a dope-smoking, jiving, black band,
where the male members dance with the female singers groin to groin. To make the point
beyond doubt, in a negative comparison, Joey grabs Ken's hands and does as much of a
dance as is possible with him, hand to hand.
Movement is the subtlest way in which the film disables and objectifies Ken as a body and
as an individual, particularly since it is movement of other people. The mise en scene of
movement to degrade Ken lies both in the characters' direction and in the movement of the
camera, in the lighting and in the editing. The mise en scene is striking in that a large
number of scenes impact a style of movement that gives a flow that permeates the entire
film. It starts to decrease only when Ken gets closer to winning his battle to die (the
ultimate in non-movement). Two segments of the film epitomise this point: firstly, one
with a scene in the operating theatre that dissolves to Ken's girlfriend, Pat, waiting for the
result of the operation immediately after the accident and, secondly, in a scene involving a
view of Ken's sculpture (and then a dissolve to the ICU). These two segments are closely
linked although there is a brief connecting scene between the two to demonstrate the
passing of six months.
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The first segment's initial scene starts with a high angle close-up of the x-ray negatives of
Ken's broken spine, from which the camera pans and tracks back left gradually to become a
higher angle medium shot of Dr Emmerson talking to another surgeon about the impending
operation they are about to carryout on Ken. Immediately they have finished talking, they
walk off screen left with the camera levelling into a tracking shot forward, combined with
a zoom-in, to the right of the operating theatre which is all the time visible behind Dr
Emmerson and his fellow doctor. Thus, we have moved from a close-up of x-rays in the
foreground to a medium shot of Ken lying on the operating table in the background. This
scene, which is continuous and lasts over thirty seconds, then dissolves slowly <it is a &az--
second dissolve) in to a panning left shot of a nurse's legs walking left, with the camera
finally stopping on Pat sitting in a chair in medium shot.
The previous shot had started as a minor left pan immediately as it dissolved into a left pan
to Pat. Once the camera is on Pat she starts to take her thigh length boots off, necessitating
overt physical movement. Pat then squirms in the seat: legs are lifted up and out and,
finally, sitting on her feet by placing them up under her to the left and then the right. This
sequence is a continuous take of twenty seconds. The camera movement, in lesser hands,
could have seemed very jarring, yet here flows majestically. It would conventionally have
been an ideal rapid cut sequence but its intention is specific in providing an alternative to
Ken's predicament. It is worth noting that the film's director, John Badham, was to
become well known for his highly successful rapid cut 'action adventurer' movies War
Games (US, 1983), Short Circuit (US, 1988) and the highly physical dance film Saturday
Night Fever (US, 1977). The long take gives the best opportunity for the camera to move
whilst at the same time giving the actors ample space to show how they can move, or 'act'
with their whole bodies, especially when they are around Ken but also when they are not.
It is the excess of movement of both characters and camera that places Ken's immobility,
his impaired body, at the forefront of the spectators' consciousness, whether or not Ken is
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in the shot or sequence.
The second segment of shots to be discussed reinforce the same points. It starts with a
twenty-second extreme long shot, continuous take, at sunset, of Ken's grand abstract
sculpture. It consists of a rapid tracking shot right, from a low angle, with camera panning
left, of the sculpture, to imply that the sculpture is itself moving - sailing freely - around
the city. The low angle of the camera makes the sculpture look as tall and as wide as the
tallest office block of the city. Concomitant to the visuals the sculpture's majesty, strength,
beauty and size are emphasised by the orchestral violins that non-diegetically accompanies
them. This scene then dissolves to a slow right panning shot of the ICU's control centre's
heart monitors, only now it has changed to being a high angle shot and six months are
supposed to have passed. The musical accompaniment continues as the camera tracks back
panning slightly left as the video monitors of the ICU's patients are lined up next to the
heart monitor; this is a high technology, high cost control centre, we are being informed.
The camera continues tracking back, only now it levels off to take in the nurses who are
picking up notes and bed sheets to take into Ken's room. The camera then pans right,
tracks forward and follows the nurses into Ken's cubicle of the ICU unit. Once in the
cubicle we are at the bottom of Ken's bed watching two female nurses change, rub and
electrically lower the head and shoulders part of the bed. As the nurses entered the room
they took headphones off Ken's head, at which point the music becomes diegetic and, as
such, has fidelity, before being switched off. Once the bed-changing and rubbing has
begun, the camera goes to the opposite side of the bed to the two nurses rubbing Ken's
naked back. We see Ken prostrate across the screen in a medium shot, with the nurses
vertical. This one-take sequence takes one hundred and five seconds, making it a
considerable take indeed.
The success of the camera's movement is astounding, in that it gives every character and
item around Ken a movement that would otherwise seem either irrelevant or minor. That
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the camera follows the nurses from one room, the control centre, right in to Ken's cubicle is
a good example of this. As Ken's sculpture (as a 'real' sequence or as his memory of the
sculpture) is given such a free-flowing, ethereal, quality - it is shot at sunset - the mise en
scene serves to imply that Ken was then in control. Control is indicative of the masculine
rather than the feminine and, as such, Ken as masculine is indicated only when he was
normal (we see him climbing his sculpture early on in the film prior to the accident to
make the point clear). That the scene prior to Ken having his headphones removed
(bringing the ship-like-sculpture scene to a close) is subsequently shown to be an
'imagined' scene further reinforces the idea that Ken had a 'beautiful' past, but also that he
has no future.
Ken has his bed changed, the nurses roll him from side to side to get the sheets under him,
and then he has to have his body massaged in order to prevent bedsores from occurring.
Ken, a body with quadriplegia, is thus seen as someone who has produced his last great
piece of art; the sunset of his life has arrived just as it has for his last work of art. The state
of his body tells us that Ken's masculinity and strength have both literally and
metaphorically vanished; Ken is now dependent and his muscles have withered. As Joey
rubs his calf and buttock muscles he fantasises that he has: 'dreamed of situations like this'.
To which the senior nurse says: '[B]eing injured'. Ken replies: '[N]o, massaged by two
beautiful women'. Thus Ken's de-sexualisation is stated and his lack of muscle, bodily and
penile, his lack of power (masculinity), are emphasised.
Failure of muscle is a sign of fatigue (signified in a later scene when upon seeing the
counsellor Ken becomes breathless and in need of life-saving oxygen), as Rabinbach
(1982) argues when he states that:
fatigue and exhaustion represent the body's resistance to the attempt to push it
beyond its natural limits. They are modes of stubborn defiance against intense
regulations imposed by the machine and the internalised timework discipline of
industrial society. Fatigue is the last revolt of the organic against the inorganic.
(p.58)
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It could be argued that if we interpret Ken's body as symbolising the fight against the
technology that is keeping him alive, then its 'desire' to die a natural death has been
prevented by the machines that now control, purge and feed it. It is argued that the film
does follow this logic of anti-medicalism to show Ken's body as a metaphor for a body
completely controlled and alienated by technology. Rabinbach (ibid, p.46) states: 'fatigue
undermines the optimistic productive potential of the age'; which relates back to my earlier
points about Ken (the disabled) being seen as a burden upon capital (cf. Featherstone,
1991) or a capital with no potential. For example, Ken's body, upon his seeing his
counsellor, is easily fatigued (a factor that the play emphasises in a more explicit manner
and in more scenes than does the film) and as such is constructed as being more dependent
upon total surveillance and expensive technology and labour as a consequence. The lack
of muscle that Ken has when we see his calf and arm musculature is apparent by the soft
and delicate nature that they have, a musculature that is culturally considered to be both
feminine and weak (i.e., easily fatigued and exhausted). Ken's femininity, or Otherness,
and immobility are thus made clear and damned via references depicting his glorious past
and grand monument. The sculpture of an abstract iron sailing ship, with the sculpted
sailing ship being an example of atavistic masculinity, refers quite explicitly to a time
when men sculpted not only art but whole continents for themselves.
Rabinbach writes of the factory machine imposing its regulations on the individual body.
The same can be said for the medical technology that is laid before the camera as the film
explores the ICU. Ken's body is not only regulated by it but is at its mercy. The film tries
to use medical technology to criticise the way technology (and modern life) has taken
choice away from the individual. The film's disablist stance is inadvertently revealed
when, by the posing of Ken's death as a technological alternative, the film implies by its
pathologising Ken's predicament that the only good life is the film's interpretation of what
normality is. The emphasis on the impaired Ken negates the criticism of medical
technology by losing its focus and displacing the emphasis onto the impaired body. Also,
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art, for this film, is seen as the only true meaningful artefact of the modern world,
technology being a retrograde step into seeing man solely as a machine at the mercy of
other machines.
Upon seeing the counsellor, who fatigues him, Ken tells her - in reply to her suggestion
that when he learns to use a computer he could write poetry or literature - that one cannot
change art forms as one does your 'major in college'. He continues: 'trying isn't important.
The work is important, the work, not the credit and not the reward and it is the work
[sculpting] that I will never do again'. From this scene we can see that change for change's
sake is to Ken unacceptable; once one's true and natural talents have been dislodged
nothing is worth anything. For Ken, only his art remains; art which has worth and is
timeless. Ken sees his art as the mind's expression made manifest through his hands - he
states: 'my whole being, my imagination, speaks [ ] spoke [ ] through my fingers' - a
perspective which serves to alienate him even more from his own body; the social
definition is becoming his self-definition both for himself and the film. Consequently, we
can interpret the philosophy of the film as being a break from Cartesian mind / body
dualism to a unification of the two, a unification which, if broken, can be repaired only by
death. The unification of mind and body is that which Rabinbach, and Featherstone
(1991), note as having taken place in the modern industrial society out of the necessity to
have the individual as both a producing and consumerist 'energumen' (Rabinbach, 1982,
p.57).
The immobile body is expertly revealed in Whose Life Is It Anyway? as additionally
abject in a very short scene in which Ken's lawyer, Carter Hill, tries to talk to an
uncooperative Dr Emmerson. Emmerson, trying to dissuade Hill from continuing to
represent Ken's case, is walking very rapidly along a hospital corridor. The two then turn a
comer. The scene is shot from behind the two professionals as they quite literally hop-
skip-and-jump up five steps and immediately turn another corner. Next to the five steps, to
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the left of them and the screen, is a hospital porter slowly pushing another patient in a
wheelchair up a ramp. The design and existence, socially and filmically, of the steps /
ramp juxtaposition enables an instant parallel to be drawn between them. The virtual non-
movement of the wheelchair-user up the ramp in the short period that Emmcrson and Hill
take to climb (jump) the stairs can have been included for no other reason than for it to be
comparative. The comparison is used to clarify the difference - as the film sees it - in
ability and efficiency between the two types of mobility: the normal and the abnormal.
There is little need to have such movement in the whole sequence except to give the
camera another opportunity to move as rapidly as the normal characters, with the whole
Emmerson and Hill conversation in this segment filmed on the move, cinema verite style,
for both camera and actors.
Although Ken fleetingly mentions that all he wants is choice, his liberal demands are lost
in the plethora of 'body fascist' (Shaban, 1997) images that the film puts forward for Mar to
have the right to terminate his ability to have choice at all in the future: the 'right to die'.
There is one further segment of Whose Life Is It Anyway? that should be addressed, and
that consists of the sequences prior to Ken telling his girlfriend, Pat, to leave him so that
she can get married and have children. It is a flashback sequence, in black and white, of
Pat doing a divertissement as Ken draws in charcoal and sculpts in clay her delicate and
graceful body doing a pas de brise. The sequence starts -with a medium cluse-up oi Ken un
his side in the hospital bed, his hands up to his chest and totally immobile (as if sculpted in
clay) due to quadriplegia.
The end of the scene that starts with a one-hundred-and five-second-continuous take ends
with Joey, under detailed instruction from Ken, laying Ken's hand on a pillow with his
fingers and thumb specifically positioned. This attitude of the hand is later revealed as that
of Michaelangelo's God's hand giving Adam life. Hands and fingers, or in this case Ken's
lack of mobile hands, are signified in the film as (Ken states) the tools through which the
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mind's imagination speaks. Thus the lack of hand (bodily) movement is another element in
the film's devaluation of impaired people and the mystification of the cause of disablement.
However much Ken is nevertheless able to articulate his intellect he is not, at least from his
perspective, able to articulate his creativity.
From the view of Ken lying on his side in the hospital bed - with a storm rumbling outside
the hospital - we cut to the first black-and-white flashback sequence of the film in which
Pat is wearing a leotard doing her battement in front of a seated Ken who is rapidly
sketching in charcoal Pat dancing. The sequence lasts just over a minute and on the
soundtrack is suitably evocative orchestral music which accentuates every pirouette,
glissade, entrechat, ciseawc, ecarte, bourree and fouette Pat does; all that is considered
elegant and graceful in body movement. As Dyer (1992, p.43) states about ballet: 'muscle,
stamina and power' are all utilised in the 'service of the opposite feminine ideal'. Once her
dancing is over she sits on Ken's lap and admires his sketches of her. There are repeated
close-ups of Ken's hands sketching the dance action while she is dancing. As a couple Ken
and Pat epitomise the combined talents of mind and body both as individuals and as an
artistic couple trying to achieve artistic perfection in their chosen respective arts, arts
which could hardly have been more dependent bodily on a functioning body. At the end of
the sequence the music becomes discordant and, with a return to colour, we cut back to
Ken as a bolt of thunder and lightning strikes outside his room; Ken is literally and
metaphorically bought back to his newly-impaired self in a flash with a bang. The mise en
scene of this entire section is meant to indicate that Ken's mind is being tortured by his past
normality. The external thunder and lightning of the sequence signify Ken's internal
turmoil, a past and present crashing about in the psyche of man who wishes he'd been left
to die. Consequently, the mise en scene is effective, and well executed, in explicitly
revealing the film's, and Ken's own, perspective of what it is like to have quadriplegia.
Within five seconds of the momentary return to the Metrocolor reality of Ken's
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impairment the film cuts back to another black-and-white sequence. This time the sketch
has become a sculpture of a figure and is being made by Ken as Pat dances in a darkened
studio. The shots of both Ken sculpting and Pat dancing are superimposed upon the screen
— the former to the left and the latter to the right - thereby demonstrating the intrinsically
intertwined physicality of both their life and art. We see Ken with the wire frame of his
clay sculpture layering clay upon it to create a sculpture of a somewhat anorexic body
doing a pirouette: i.e., Pat. As the sculpture frame acquires more and more clay, Pat has
fewer and fewer bodily coverings. The camera cuts to Pat as her chiffon clothing slides off
her body until she is completely naked and lying on the floor, the camera closing in on her
from above, as if it is caressing her buttocks, breasts and pubic body fragments as she does
the splits. As she finishes the completed sculpture slowly replaces her image and the
sculpture begins to turn as if it is doing an independent pirouette - which, in the logic of
the film, means it is 'alive'. Ken's hands and fingers are seen creating his 'living' sculpture
out of nothing as they were in previous dance sequence, which is surely the point of having
both his massive iron sailing ship and the more delicate ballet sculpture appear to be
moving independently. Dyer (ibid, p.41) writes of ballet that its: 'gesture[s] literally
embod[y] grace, poise, elegance and transform[s them in to ... I a dream of living in
harmony with one's body', a feeling that Pat's and Ken's artistic representations are
explicitly meant to imply. Ken's masculinity forbids him to embody those qualities (and,
conversely, qualify Pat to signify them due to her slim, lithe embodiment) yet his
masculine skills allow him to represent them. Ken is allowed to admire and create from
his imagination feminine beauty but not be it. Consequently, Ken's disembodied-
embodiment from his imagination traps him inside his imagination with no hope of letting
it speak. The silence renders the apparently mute body a prison and, as such, abject and
unbearable.
Dyer (ibid, p.44) continues by stating how ballet exemplifies the potential of the body,
shorn of social construction, as an ideal; however, it is an ideal that: 'does not
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accommodate disabled bodies'. Dyer's point is debatable (see the multi-ability dance
troupe CANDOCO, for example) but that ballet is identifiable in Whose Life Is It
Anyway? as proving Dyer's point could not have been clearer; it is the apparent perfection
of Pat's performance (and body), and Ken's representation of it, that makes sure the point is
taken. If, as Dyer states, ballet (and dance in general, for that matter) is the pinnacle of the
ideal and co-operative body then the disabled body is the converse: it is the embodiment of
the abyss of impaired physicality. Furthermore, if, as Irene Castle (cited in Cohan and
Hark, 1993, p.26) states: 'dancing is the language of the body', then Ken's body - the
disabled body - is the enemy of that language through the fact that its mute character strips
the body of such a language and, also, survives by fatiguing others. This supposed
language of the body can only be understood, or brought into being, when it is rigorously
structured and constructed by the imagination and intellect. As such, the language of
dance in Whose Life Is It Anyway? is used - structured and constructed - to negate (0)ther
languages of the body, just as oral language has used its hegemony to negate sign language
(cf. Davis, 1995; Gregory and Hartley, 1991). The conclusion of this segment of the film,
with Ken persuading Pat to leave him for a 'real' man, acts to ensure that the dancing Pat,
and sculpting Ken's potential - capital and social - is seen as a glorious past with no future.
Ken's past, present and future are wholly defined and valued by his past and present
embodiment.
The strength of the film's intention can be comprehended only if Ken's body, at the same
time as being represented as a reality, is a symbolic representation of the danger to society
of medical technology (i.e., it is a metaphor). Ken's body is metaphorical of the danger
posed by disorder to the ordered body or society (as in Douglas's work). The metaphor of
Ken's body as society can be achieved only by using the idea of the symbolic body's
language and anxieties. From a Social Model viewpoint, the film is a very negative and
one-sided view of the causes and needs of the impaired; it fails utterly to consider
Independent Living as an option. The factors that it could be cheaper or a process that will
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enable Ken to have dignity, independence and the right of choice to live as he wishes and
not die are not demonstrated. In Whose Life Is It Anyway? technological medical culture
is damned for its success through its successes: the severely impaired. Thus, the impaired
as symbols of its success have to be, and are, equally damned. As regards the perspective
propagated by the film, this is undeniably achieved by a sophisticated piece of film-making
which has great depth and skill behind it, at all levels of production.
If we continue on from the idea of dancing as representative of an attempt to demonstrate
the ideal body, Duet For One is another film which uses dance to devalue disability by
perceiving it as incapable. In this case dancing is used to devalue disability by having it as
a 'party pooper', both metaphorically and literally, as discussed earlier in the 'family'
chapter. The initial birthday party at Stephanie's rapidly deteriorates into aggressive
squabbles, after the failed attempt to play Bach. It quickly brings the party to an end, with
death becoming the key topic of discussion thus making it a wake rather than a celebration
of birth and life. Once Stephanie's MS is openly acknowledged by her protégé -
Constantine, a Nigel Kennedy parody - Stephanie's husband, David, attempts to encourage
him to leave but it is only Stephanie's order: '[L]et him speak', which enables him to stay
and, as a consequence, depress the party-goers. Constantine states: 'I love this woman [
] and I just saw a part of that die. I watched the end of it'. As a conclusion to a birthday
party it is somewhat anticlimactic, but as Murphy (1991, p.132) tells us, the disabled are
often seen as 'downers' because they lack clarity and they evade rigid classification.
Similarly, Stephanie's condition is unpredictable, with inconsistent remissions and lapses.
From what Constantine tells the party goers - 'a bit of that died' - we can conclude that the
inability to have total control over one's body is inevitably equated with death or at the
very least a lack of body control, as in Whose Life Is It Anyway?
The conclusion of Duet For One, the 'final' birthday party discussed above, reinforces the
point. Stephanie had expressed her self through her violin playing and, having lost that
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ability, feels she can no longer be expressive or, therefore, alive in a social world.
Stephanie's ability to be expressive is based upon a disciplined control of bodily
movement, combined with intellectual ability. When combined, these reinforce the idea
that the uncontrolled (or uncontrollable) body is inferior and not worth living in and is, as
such, preferably segregated. Stephanie is still expressive in her body and intellect, even
though she cannot play the violin, otherwise we would not as spectators be able to see that
she is depressed and angry. Stephanie could dance at the party but chooses not to — though
all the other at the party do - as her body may fail in the middle of a dance, or it will serve
to depress the others by its presence. As if to justify this perspective, Stephanie wanders
off into the wintry landscape unnoticed. The choice to have only one manner of
expressiveness as significant or worthwhile - violin playing in Stephanie's case - is the key
to understanding the process through which disability is devalued in the films under
discussion. The expressive manner chosen to be significant in these films is a normal,
happy expressiveness, with all (0)thers (disabled or depressed expressiveness) devalued in
comparison.
Stephanie's body is central to the film's idea of what MS and disability are, or what it
means to live with it. The reality of having MS is irrelevant. The point being made in the
film is that the incidents, immediate consequences and social consequences that the film
chooses to show all devalue those with MS and impairments and construct them as rightful
social outcasts. The individual is marginalised with no differentiation between the disease,
the impairment and the individual. One of the key methods the film uses to construct MS
as anti-social is by having MS as anti-social due to its bodily unpredictability and liability
to create mess and / or embarrassment. Throughout the film Stephanie progresses from
being able to walk (with and then without a walking stick) to being in a wheelchair. For
example, on the occasion Stephanie demonstrates to her psychiatrist that she can walk she
does so by getting out of the wheelchair and walking around the room carrying a cup of
tea. The fine china is dropped and it smashes as she falls to the floor. It is one instance of
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how embarrassment and mess are created in one impaired movement, whatever its nature.
If we consider Sontag's (1979, p.41) view that: 'fatal illness has always been viewed as a
test of moral character', then Stephanie's character reveals stoicism of the highest order.
She chooses, by walking away at the end, to abdicate all social relations, which confirms
her as taking sole responsibility for the trauma and possible embarrassment that her
condition can, or does, cause. Consequently, MS (the most predominantly feared disease
of the body and the ultimate image of bodily deterioration [Hevey, 1992]) becomes an
individual problem that cannot be alleviated by society in any way. Little else could
realistically be expected from a film, a medium that individualises almost all socially
constructed problems (Hill, 1986), but that does not mean it should not be criticised for
doing so. This thesis would argue that in trying to discuss how disability is devalued it
must constantly be pointed out that one of the predominant methods through which culture
achieves such a devaluation is through the process of individualisation (i.e., it renders the
problem pathological).
At Stephanie's earlier party David is her husband - quite happily, apparently - but by the
second he is having a baby with his secretary. It is a dramatic change from which we can
conclude that for this film, as with the other core film, the disabled body is not one capable
(or should not be allowed to be capable) of having children, let alone relationships. The
disabled, or diseased, body (impairment centred films make little or no differentiation) is
by logical corollary constructed as asexual or de-sexualised as preferable to its
sexualisation. For example (see earlier chapter for more detailed examination), Stephanie
has an affair with a scrap metal merchant. The film offers this to demonstrate that she is
very sexually active, but by having it classified as self mutilation by Stephanie herself, it
becomes deviant; by extrapolation, sexual encounters with the disabled body are labelled
as deviant. It is part of Stephanie's apparently strengthened moral character that she
eventually ends the affair and chooses to withdraw into a life without sex.
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We are left in no doubt about the deviancy of a sexual encounter with a disabled person by
Stephanie's own words on the subject; in a bedroom scene with the scrap metal merchant -
Harry - Stephanie taunts him by saying to him that: Tht turns you on, doesn't it, cripples?
What's your favourite, paraplegics?'. Although Harry rejects the implication, he admits
that if she had not been disabled they would not even have spoken to one another, let alone
'fucked'. To some extent the film even makes cross-class sexual encounters deviant by
having Stephanie (Julie Andrews speaking with her best possible English accent) consider
Tucking' Harry (Liam Neeson is here at his Irish working-class best) because she is
disabled and / or diseased. Duet For One cannot be claimed to show disability as asexual,
since it contains a relatively long sex scene involving Stephanie (and Harry). This scene
occurs just after Stephanie has already had sex with Harry. When he gets out of the
shower, Stephanie taunts him about his preference for cripples. During the conversation
Stephanie stretches her body as she lies upon the bed to reveal her breasts; she rolls off the
bed as Harry lies on it, then she puts her head on his thigh. Harry joins her on the floor and
they 'roll' together into a dark corner where they make love again. Consequently,
Stephanie is very sexually drawn, and desired, in this and other, earlier, scenes, but the
process through which she is de-sexualised is by, as I have said, having this sex or
attraction made deviant through her own definition; that it is described as 'fucking' is a
simple enough example that the relationship is abuse rather than love. It is the devaluation
of sex with Stephanie (and valuation of sex between others) which leaves us in no doubt of
the supposedly unnatural nature of sex with an impaired body.
Prior to David going to America with his secretary Stephanie tells her, Penny, that she has:
'lovely legs [ ] and [ ] sensual knees'. As Stephanie is telling Penny this, Penny stands
up and lifts her skirt to display her 'lovely' knees and legs. In stark contrast, Stephanie sits
in an electric wheelchair (it may be presumed, during a relapse) which she has a great deal
of difficulty steering without hitting furniture. It is worth noting that during the first
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meeting between Stephanie and her psychiatrist she tells him that she has no children
because they (David and Stephanie) had no time yet later in the film, upon their return
from America David and Penny are expecting a baby. The comparison of two vastly
different aspects of the narrative implies that the morality of sex for this film is closely
related to ideas of procreation and love. That Penny and David are in love, and that
Stephanie and David were much more of a partnership, is left in little doubt by a number of
scenes throughout the film, but perhaps the most relevant scene is between David and
Penny when he tells her that he needs her. The maid brings David and Penny tea and
Penny pours the tea and passes a cup to David as he tells Penny that he needs her, to which
she retorts: '[Y]ou're a star. What am I? Your little secretary. Why, in two seconds you
could find a better woman than me and you'd forget that I ever existed'. As Penny passes
the tea to David there is an extreme close-up of this happening. Then, in a close-up, David
gently utters: '[Y]ou don't understand me do you, I need you, Penny'. The word 'need' is
spoken at length and with absolute sincerity. This is 'love', we are supposed to conclude,
and not a relationship of mutual exploitation or abuse.
The close-up of the tea being exchanged further suggests the way in which David sees
Penny as more of a woman than he does Stephanie. Stephanie is a great artist, as David is,
but David does not want 'a better woman' (equal woman). He wants one who will look
after him, i.e., make him tea and tell him he's a 'star'. In the David-and-Stephanie
relationship Stephanie is the star, and that relationship has not worked. In the logic of this
film, a relationship that is successful is one that has - in the long term - children and a
submissive domesticated wife; thus Penny and David close the film expecting a child.
Looked at diegetically, and in the mise en scene, no other reading is possible, and it affects
the relevance of the body The difference is apparent in the embodiment of the two
characters of Penny and Stephanie, their somatic signifiers confirming it: Stephanie is
'fucked' while Penny is 'made love to'; and Stephanie's 'fuck' is considered 'self-mutilation'
whilst Penny's 'love-making' leads to a baby (i.e., it is 'natural love'). The difference
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between Penny and Stephanie is further manifest in their clothes and hairstyles: Penny
wears very 'feminine' type skirts and has long flowing blond hair whilst Stephanie's is
cropped and she wears 'butch' trousers (Dyer, 1990[A]). It is difficult to see Penny and
Stephanie as little other than symbolising the maternal (feminine / natural) and masculine
female respectively; Penny, for example, never swears; she is better at interior design and
thus home-making than Stephanie; she is constructed in the film as more maternal than
Stephanie, and is not homosexually desired as is Stephanie. If, as quoted earlier,
masculinity is made abject through the adoption of stereotypically feminine characteristics,
the opposite also applies. Duet For One masculinises the feminine and, by extension,
makes disability abject in a reversal of the method used in Whose Life Is It Anyway?.
Each film uses the standard ideal of what femininity or masculinity is and then parallels the
disabled character to be (or become) the opposite of those characteristics their gender
would normally signify.
The lesbian aspect of Duet For One is subtle and could almost be (dis)missed, but it is
there; Stephanie and David have a Spanish maid who is in love with Stephanie. Three
scenes imply the maid's desire; the first of which is when Stephanie goes into the kitchen
from the first birthday party to cut some parsley, she fails, and has to sit down due to the
physical strain. At this point the maid, leaning over her says that Stephanie need not be
concerned about her failure to cut parsley as the maid will do it. The act of leaning over
her, both faces in profile, in close proximity, would, if they had been male / female and not
female / female, have been a standard mise en scene for a 'first kiss' scene. However, they
do not kiss and Stephanie goes back to the party. The second occasion is after Harry has
first appeared, to clear the house of junk, and then left. Stephanie is in her bathrobe talking
to the maid, with the robe slightly open; the maid looks her up and down in exactly the
same way that Harry had when he arrived to clear the house. To reinforce this aspect, the
maid is looking while Stephanie is asking her why she has not seen her with any men in the
five years she has worked for her, thereby implying the maid's lesbianism. The final
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occasion is when Stephanie, in a panic one night, asks the maid if she could sleep with her
because she is scared, telling the maid that she loves her, to which the maid replies, 'I love
you, too'. The tone in which the maid tells Stephanie she loves her is the same tone in
which David has told Penny that he needed (loved) her. The lesbian desire for Stephanie
felt by the maid is just another element of the film's mise en scene in which Stephanie is
de-feminised and made abject. If we consider that the maid is hired to do all the tasks that
are generally considered women's work and that Stephanie is the master, then the
characterisation of the lesbian aspect of the film clearly has Stephanie as the masculine
element. Although it cannot be claimed that lesbians cannot be feminine, a masculine
looking woman is a much more prevalent icon of lesbianism and, as such, both in the film
and in society, constructed or perceived as unnatural, abnormal.
As in Whose Life Is It Anyway?, Duet For One sets up a parallel between the normal past
and the abnormal present (and future) of its disabled character. The scene in which
Stephanie is shown as having a glorious normal past is when Stephanie watches a video
recording of one of her great performances at the Royal Albert Hall. At this point,
predictably given the narrative up to this point, she decides to commit suicide to reinforce
the gloriousness of the past (normality) over the tragedy of her present (impairment). The
lighting of each period of her life is representative of their respective meanings; the video-
recording is shot in blazing light, the whole arena visible with Stephanie at centre-stage
basking in the glory of the performance and the audience's appreciation of her. When she
is on stage, on the video recording, the camera is predominantly at a high angle in order to
emphasise how she holds the attention of all. The room in which Stephanie now sits
crying is lit only by the glow of the television. The film's view of Stephanie in the dark
room watching herself is a low angle close-up (as if from inside the television itself); it
adds to her expression of despair and weakness. The angles stress how once she was
looked at, but how now she is unable to do more than look at her former self. The looking
is also representative of envy, an envy to be great, which in Stephanie's case is envy for her
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own glorious - normal - past.
The above scene's repeated zoom-ins and close-ups on Stephanie's hands when she is
playing the violin leaves no room for the spectator to doubt the desperation concomitant
with her physical deterioration. Significantly, each shot of Stephanie's fingers on the
video-recording is immediately followed by a reaction shot of her staring down at her now
incapable hands. Stephanie's distress increases at each glance down. Between the time
when she has had to give up concert performing and before she watches the video of her
glorious past, Stephanie has a dream in which she is giving a recital at the Royal Albert
Hall. In the dream her hands fail her, at which point David comes up behind her with a
wheelchair, forces her into it and straps her arms on to it with leather straps. Once
Stephanie is strapped to the wheelchair she is wheeled off. Her protégé Constantine takes
over her performance and ignores her protests at what is being done to her. Stephanie
awakens in a cold sweat and panic as in the dream when she is wheeled off. It is part of
making MS signify uncertainty and potential embarrassment (Hevey, 1992) however
unreal the circumstances. Such a dream sequence (which we do not know until it is over to
be a dream sequence) ensures that impairment is seen as a condition from which there is no
return. The only escape is death (or an stoical acceptance of its inevitability) both morally
and physically. In having Stephanie strapped forcibly and unwillingly into the wheelchair,
the film ensures that the wheelchair is seen as a prison and a form of torture. Impairment
as torture and as a bodily prison are exactly the same in this film as they are in all the other
films discussed in detail. In reality the wheelchair, if one cannot walk, can be the greatest
liberator of all; the limitations imposed by the struggle to walk are often far outweighed by
the opportunities opened up by the use of a wheelchair.
The body that becomes disabled is easily (and routinely) devalued and degraded by the
creation, intimation or presentation of a glorious past or alternative normality (a degree of
success) seen in parallel with an abject present (a degree of failure). A similar narrative
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process of negation for the impaired character is used, for example, in films such as
Beyond The Stars (David Saperstein, US, 1988), The Boy Who Could Fly (Nick Castle,
US, 1986), Charley (Ralph Nelson, US, 1968), Citizen Kane (Orson Wells, US, 1941),
Hilary and Jackie (Anand Tucker, GB, 1998), Kingpin (P. and B. Farrelly, US, 1996),
Lady Chatterley (Kem Russell, GB, 1993), Lady Chatterley's Lover (Just Jaeckin, GB,
1981), Paulie (Jolui Roberts, US, 1998), Reach for the Sky (Lewis Gilbert, GB, 1956), and
Starship Troopers (Paul Verhoeven, US, 1997). This sample list contains a small number
of the complete list of films, but even here the range, date, diversity of style, genre and
production base are vast. Interestingly, in Duet For One the psychiatrist goes as far as to
plead for immortality for Stephanie's fingers; the psychiatrist rhetorically asks: '[W]hy not
immortality? At least for the best of us; for the genius who takes us where we would never
have gone alone; the artist with his revelations about the world; and your fingers and
hands, the way they once moved'. As the psychiatrist speaks we are given an extreme
close-up of the psychiatrist's hand touching Stephanie's fingers, brightly highlighted
against a sun-filled window. Stephanie's fingers remain lifeless as the psychiatrist wishes
he were God giving life; the scene is intended to be compared to Michaelangelo's painting
of God giving Adam life (see above reference to sculpture of same in Whose Life Is It
Anyway?). The inability of the psychiatrist to be God - to breathe life into Stephanie's now
'dead' hands and fingers - shows Stephanie as dead in the present in both body and mind.
The character of the psychiatrist, as specifically acted by Max Von Sydow, serves further
to validate his position, of talking to death itself (Stephanie), by the film's repeated
allusions to Ingmar Bergman's The Seventh Seal (Sweden, 1957) which has Max Von
Sydow play chess against death. Thus, the disabled body is again represented as a dead
body; a body that traps the living mind and tortures it. Consequently, the casting, in
combination with the allusions, adds potent emphasis to Duet For One.
The last point to be made in reference to Duet For One relates back to Rabinbach's
comments on the fatigued body as symbolic of the undermining of the 'potential of the
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age', and my own comments on the masculinisation of the feminine. It concerns the image
of sweat and its appearance and significance on Stephanie. Sweat is conventionally seen
as very un-feminine - it is harder to get a more culturally negative image of a woman than
a woman lifting her arms to reveal a sodden armpit stain on her clothes - and very un-
masculine: the weak sweat whilst the strong glisten (cf. Barthes). Stephanie's face is
repeatedly covered in sweat pearls after the slightest amount of effort or strain. The failure
to cut parsley brings Stephanie out in a sweat. Another example is when Stephanie is in an
electric wheelchair and commenting upon Penny's 'sensual knees'. Following her
discussion with Penny and David Stephanie leaves the room, hitting the furniture with the
wheelchair; there is a straight-on close-up of Stephanie's face covered in sweat. That the
fatigued body - represented as a sweating body — can undermine potential is clearly
relevant to Stephanie's body, because as soon as David (the overtly roascalitie Aka Bates?
leaves Stephanie he is a huge success in both musical and masculine terms. If we consider
the nineteenth-century saying that 'horses sweat, men perspire and ladies glow' the point is
clear, but more seriously, if we accept what Rabinbach also states (1982, p.72) when he
writes that 'fatigue is a metaphor of decline, inertia, loss of will, or lack of energy', we can
read Stephanie as having brought about her own decline. She has devoted herself to her
own career and not to her husband's; in the logic of Duet For One only men are capable of
sustaining a career without fatigue because it is their natural role. Women who attempt to
break out of traditional family ideology or natural maternal instincts will suffer the
consequences; in this film, they are fatigue, embarrassment and, finally, death. Equally,
not having children is, in Duet For One, seen as part of destroying one's feminine
'potential'. The film sees the process as essential to fulfilling the potential of the past,
present and future of men and women. Consequently, the film sees the disabled body as
destroying not only its own potential but that of others and society in general.
Duet For One and Whose Life Is It Anyway? create a past normal life and present
abnormal one; so does The Raging Moon. The difference between The Raging Moon and
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the other two films is that the characters who become disabled become nicer people for it.
Although Bruce and Jill are better people because they become disabled, their lives are still
represented as tragic due to their bodily conditions; the diegesis of the film offers the
audience the idea(1) that while it is positive that they have learnt humility, it would have
been better if they had learnt it as normal people. The film seems to be saying that we do
not need to be disabled to be better people, and that we should learn our lesson from these
sad, pathetic, and doomed people. The sad, pathetic and doomed nature of these film's
characters' state of being is represented, even captured, in their impaired embodiment.
The Raging Moon uses the same techniques and constructions to make its disabled
characters abject as do the other films discussed above: the disabled are easily fatigued;
totally dependent; socially isolated; asexual; infantilised and impaired. As with the other
films the disabled must be seen within a comparison before they can be shown in such a
way as to devalue them; in The Raging Moon this is provided by the caretaker and
housekeeper of the institution that Bruce and Jill enter: Mr and Mrs Charles. A good
example of how this is done is demonstrated by reviewing the scenes in which the
Charleses arrange to take Jill and Bruce to the coast for the day. One evening in Jill's room
all four are chatting and playing records. The scene is shot almost exclusively in a medium
shot from a low angle so as to emphasise the position and bodily activities of each
character. Jill is sitting on her bed with Mrs Charles sitting on the bottom of the bed with
Mr Charles on a chair to her right (the screen's left) with Bruce is in his wheelchair on Jill's
left (the screen's right). This is a scene that, superficially, appears quite ordinary, yet it
sums up the alienation of the disabled body from what is alternatively given as the pro-
active body of normality: i.e., Mr and Mrs Charles.
The scene sets up a clear binary opposition to which the eye is immediately drawn; Bruce
and Jill are on one side of the screen with the Charleses on the other. As the men are on
either side of the bed where the women are sitting, the film reinforces the two sides of the
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paradigm as comparative and not as a mere simile. Bruce is half-way along one side of the
bed in order to reach the record player. He is also directly beside it, which means that he
cannot look at anyone except without severe strain. As Bruce is in the wheelchair next to
the bed (which is on his right) with the record player on his left (off-screen right) he is
distanced from Jill (whom he loves) and his body is highlighted when he is fully on screen.
Jill, to Bruce's right, is sitting upright on the bed and is also completely highlighted. The
light source for the scene is a bed lamp above Jill's head, a source that consequently
spotlights Jill's impaired legs. As Mrs Charles is turned slightly facing Jill, her side but not
her expression is visible. Mr Charles is also partly hidden, this time by the bed itself. The
camera is at the foot of the bed, to Jill's left. The force of the mise en scene of the shot
ensures that the full bodies of Jill and Bruce are shown, but not those of the Charleses. The
reason for such a difference in each character's positioning is due to what each is doing
with their respective bodies: Jill's and Bruce's are immobile, with the Charleses constantly
in movement.
Jill's legs are flat on the bed, rigid and still. Bruce's are closed tightly together as they rest
on the footplates of the wheelchair. Bruce and Jill's legs do not move, and are not moved
in the entire scene and they use their arms in an often stilted manner that shows their
difficulty of movement. For example, when Bruce puts a record on it is an effort because
of the way he has to strain to look back at Jill and then twist his trunk to face the record
player. Consequently, as each of them is dressed in typical institutional wear - a tasteless
jumper for Bruce and a dress so prim that it covers her entire neck for Jill — the scene
serves further to place them as virtually immobile and inanimate objects of pity. This is
especially so when the garments are compared with those of the Charleses which are, of
course, much more stylishly casual: Mr Charles is wearing a woollen jumper and jacket,
whilst Mrs Charles has on more tasteful yet revealing blouse and skirt. In comparison, the
Charleses physical movement is striking: Mrs Charles is sitting cross-legged, her feet
pointing at the camera, tapping her foot to the beat of the record that is quietly playing.
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Sitting cross-legged is in itself an activity that requires a great deal of bodily control and
the rhythmic tapping of a tune with one's feet merely confirms the control (and its
capability for spontaneous pleasure) that a normal body can possess. Mrs Charles's feet are
closest to the camera; they thus vertically lead the eye to the rest of her. Any movement on
the screen captures the viewer's attention, and it is impossible to ignore the tapping of Mrs
Charles's foot - especially as Jill and Bruce's feet are so passively in view, in stark contrast.
Mr Charles's leg position is equally important in this nexus of normal and abnormal bodily
control. Mr Charles has his legs lifted up and resting, knees bent, to the side of Jill's bed,
directly next to her and sitting on an ordinary chair. It is a chair and place which is where
Bruce, in a conventional cinematic mise en scene, would logically have been placed, as her
lover.
Bruce and Jill are physically passive and separated (despite their love) because of their
bodily conditions; this has been constructed by the mise en scene, as it is not essentially
due to their impairments. The scene is constructing the impaired's body's passivity along
with their physical separation as the Charleses bodily activity - foot tapping and leg raising
- ensures that Jill and Bruce are seen as passive by their active actions and bodily attitudes.
If the same scene had shown Bruce in Mr Charles's position with that chair removed - or
even better, Bruce out of his wheelchair and in a wheelless-chair — yet with the Charleses
more closely positioned to Jill and Bruce, the impact of the scene would have been quite
different. The difference would have lain not only in its mise en scene but also in its
potential interpretation and meanings. The disabled legs of Bruce and Jill would not have
had such a central position, nor would there have been the separation between Jill and
Bruce; as it is, Jill and Bruce seem incapable of life off the bed or out of the wheelchair,
respectively. Bruce is shown so as to instil in the spectator the view that those in
wheelchairs cannot get out of, or live out of, the wheelchair; the wheelchair is thus
constructed therein as the paraplegic's iron lung. The above point regarding how the scene
could, or should, have been is made not to be prescriptive but merely to give a simple
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demonstration of how little need be different to provide a whole new interpretation.
In the scene described above, the Charleses are discussing taking Jill to the coast with
them, when Jill suggests that Bruce should come as well. Mr Charles says that that would
be all right but that 'another bedpan will have to be packed'. Two points need to be made
here about what the scene further represents about the impaired body in both dialogue and
diegesis. Firstly, the whole thrust of Bruce's and Jill's being taken to the coast reinforces
the point that they are bodily not capable of getting from A to B alone, if at all, without the
assistance of professionals. As Bruce is pushed to bed by Mr Charles at the end of the
scene the scene further serves to leave us in no doubt of his physical uselessness. This fact
is further reinforced when considered in combination with the given reality that Jill and
Bruce are shown as not capable of being together as a romantic couple without the
assistance of the Charleses. It is also shown when Jill is pushed to Bruce's room so that he
can kiss her and the Charleses take them both to the local town to buy a ring for their
engagement: a collection of scenes which guarantee that Jill and Bruce are never seen as
anything other than incapable. The second point more directly relates to a reference to the
bodily functions of the disabled characters': i.e., the reference to the need to pack another
'bedpan'. The bedpan reference partly explains why they are given as incapable - they
cannot reach a toilet so this facility must be brought to them by an attendant - but it also
ensures that they are shown as typical (cultural) examples of the impaired / disabled:
uncontrollably incontinent.
Significantly, the next scene takes place on a desolate beach in what seems a fairly wintry
period of the year and, after the establishing extreme long shot of the beach, we cut to Mr
and Mrs Charles playing with a beach ball; they are running and passing the ball as if
playing rugby. Consequently, the Charleses are seen as having physical and emotional fun.
Bruce and Jill are not in the shot of the Charleses playing ball, but there is then a cut to
Bruce and Jill in which a sadder, more pathetic-looking couple could not have been
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imagined. Bruce and Jill are stationed about three feet apart in their wheelchairs - which
are rooted in shingle. The apparent immobility of Jill and Bruce is a factor which leaves us
in no doubt that they did not get there on their own and that the Charleses must have
dragged them there - the appropriateness of the word 'stationed' being self-evident. Again,
Jill and Bruce are physically separated and shown as not capable of overcoming the
physical distance between them. In comparison, the Charleses have standard winter
clothing on - and it is unbuttoned — whilst Bruce and Jill are wrapped up as if they are in
the Arctic. Jill has on the largest overcoat possible, with a scarf wound many times around
her neck; she is wearing gloves and has a blanket around her legs. Bruce wears almost the
same quantity and style of clothing as Jill, although he does take his gloves off to read a
poem to Jill. The poem sums up the futility of their lives: '[Never again will a stone
fascinate [ ] seek a target [ ] wind back the arm and throw, never again': Bruce, the
poem tells us, will never again throw a stone. That Bruce is quite capable of picking up a
stone and skimming it across the water right then and there is a point that escapes both him
and the film. Jill, at the conclusion to the poem states to Bruce: 'I love you'; their tragic
fate is sealed. Bruce and Jill's doom is both sealed and made manifest by the 'nature' of
their bodies; it is partly their dependence and incapacity which shows this because they are
physically unable to move, change or challenge these or any other circumstances, it seems.
In The Raging Moon and Whose Life Is It Anyway? posture is of equal significance in the
negation of the disabled to many other bodily factors. From the very first appearance of
Bruce in hospital he is unable to sit up straight without either falling to one side or slipping
down into a crouched position. Latterly in the film, when Bruce is wheeling around in his
wheelchair, he still slumps down into it as if he is a baby.
In all the films under discussion in this chapter no disabled characters make a meal for
themselves yet other non-disabled people do. As such, impaired people are represented as
individuals incapable of looking after themselves in even the most basic, and necessary,
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way. All the meals that are eaten by disabled characters are prepared for them by other
able-bodied characters, thus equating the disabled body with that of a child; children are
conventionally the only group of people in society whom it is expected will have all their
meals made for them.
The use of the wheelchair is more pronounced in The Raging Moon than in any other film
under discussion and, as such, is the tool by which the most physically capable disabled
bodies of the films are constructed as incapable. Jill and Bruce are the most physically
capable of all the central disabled characters looked at, as established by the fact that all
they cannot do is walk. Ken Harrison and Christy Brown are unable to use their arms or
their legs, whilst Stephanie and John Merrick are disabled in unpredictable and more
physically severe ways, respectively, with impairments that prevent them from doing (in
the diegesis of their films) almost everything. The wheelchair encapsulates Jill's and
Bruce's bodies in such a way as to make them seem bound to them. Through having such a
union between character and aid Jill and Bruce are seen as weaker and more dependent
than the characters in the other core films of the thesis. In one scene we see Bruce getting
out of his bed, into his wheelchair, and delivering a letter under Jill's door. The manner in
which Bruce gets out of bed and into his wheelchair makes the whole operation seem like
exactly that, an operation. The time, energy, concentration and difficulty involved for
Bruce in just getting out of bed is so extreme that all other minor physical activities (such
as defecation) are offered, primarily by extension and in absence but also by example, as
tasks that would seem insurmountable if a lone attempt were made to perform them.
Bruce's and Jill's bodies are clearly signified as weak by the degree of clothing that they
wear (already discussed above) and by their inability to go very far or fast in their
wheelchairs without difficulty. Both Jill and Bruce are frequently pushed in their
wheelchairs, even though they can both propel themselves; the point being made is that
they can move themselves a little, but they are obviously too weak to do too much at any
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given time. Such an interpretation is unavoidable when we consider the repeated images,
especially of Jill, of blankets around the impaired persons legs; a standard image of the
sickly weak invalid. Consequently, the perception of the impaired body as a weak body is
left in no doubt by the conclusion of the film: Jill dies of influenza. Upon seeing the
doctor after Jill has died Bruce is told by the doctor that: 'people in [Jill's] condition catch
these viruses and they can't resist them like [ ... doctor stutters ... ] most people. She didn't
suffer, it was all very quick'. The doctor was about to say normal but stuttering prevents
himself from doing so. Such a speech puts a seal of medical acceptance of the idea of the
disabled body as uniformly weak and sick. The weak and susceptible body, not capable of
defending itself biologically or physically, brings us back full circle to the issues of the
disabled body as easily fatigued and therefore ill (by extension, expensive to support due to
its need for constant medical care and supervision). The weak body is, therefore, equally
childlike due both to its inability to resist minor viruses or to support itself.
As with Stephanie in Duet For One, Jill is given an element of sexual appeal which, just as
is Stephanie's, is seen as deviant: deviant, because immediately after having her only
sexual encounter with Bruce, Jill dies. The sexual encounter is not one of penetrative
intercourse (Bruce has told us earlier that he cannot get erections) but an oral act and, as
such, it confirms the general conception of the disabled as impotent (cf. Whose Life Is it
Anyway?) and dangerous / deviant when sexually active (cf. Duet For One). Sexual
activity involving the disabled actually becomes fatal in The Raging Moon.
The opening credits of The Raging Moon are accompanied by shots of Bruce playing a
Sunday league football match, followed by his then trying to fondle the breasts of a female
spectator on the coach back home from the game. The conclusion of the story has Bruce
returning from a fatal sexual encounter and wetting himself. The contrast between the two
scenes aptly demonstrates how normality and abnormality of body are constructed as
active and passive, in control and without it; with the disabled body constructed as being
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appreciably closer to death - its own and that of others.
My Left Foot is a film that represents the disabled body in a way that is little different from
the three films discussed earlier, except that Christy Brown is characterised as totally
dependent on others for eating, drinking and washing (and, one presumes, defecating).
Significantly, Brown is repeatedly shown wearing a jacket with saliva dribble all down the
front in order that the audience never forget his lack of bodily control. I often point out
that 'this film' has this 'cripple' doing this 'disgusting thing' when in fact the activity is not
disgusting, unnatural, or unrealistic. This thesis does not aim to be prescriptive and say
that such features of incapacity should not be shown; the point is that they are the only
images shown and that they are exaggerated or falsified to categorise the individual
through the functions of his / her body. Consequently, such images are perceived as the
reality of disability when in fact they represent merely a specific construction of disability
as impairment. One scene in particular from My Left Foot demonstrates my point
precisely. It is the scene where, having stolen coal from the coal merchant, Brown and his
brothers come home with coal piled up in a chariot that Mr Brown has built for Christy
Brown. Brown's face is covered in black coal dust from the escapade and he is seen
dribbling white saliva (contrasted with the darkness of the coal dust, giving the saliva a
clarity that it otherwise would not have). As the coal-stealing scene is the only one in
which he actively dribbles (the rest of the time its resulting mark is all that is visible on his
clothes) his lack of basic, spittle and therefore bodily control is emphasised to further
demean him.
An equally significant negation of Brown's existence immediately follows the coal theft
scene. Brown and his Mother argue about the coal stealing incident, resulting in Brown's
sitting in the corner of the main living room still covered in the coal dust. At this juncture
not only does his older brother offer to wash him (a service the upset Mother would
normally perform) but his Father is, significantly, seen playing with a younger brother in a
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very physical manner. The younger brother is on the father's lap as he tickles him and
pretends to fight with him This is of interest in that it is created as an obvious point of
comparison as Christy Brown is never seen being played with in this manner by anyone, let
alone by his Father. One brother's offer to wash Brown and another brother's playing with
his Father act as the equivalent signifiers of Bruce, Stephanie and Ken's past normality
scenes. Simply, the scene puts forward the idea that normal brothers are able to play with
their fathers and wash themselves. As Brown does not have a normal past his brothers are
given as alternatives to a disabled past, present and future. The age (and look) of the child
playing with his father is exactly that which is given for Brown when he lay under the
stairs near the beginning of the film; Brown never comes near his Father, nor plays with
him. The severity of Brown's impairment requires that he receive assistance to eat and
drink - at least in his early life - a fact which, if my argument about excessive use of
cultural negatives is appropriate, would entail that Brown be repeatedly shown being fed
and given drinks. The film obliges, indeed repeatedly showing Christy being fed and given
drinks; it is emphasised further when Brown is given his drink in a glass but drinks it
through a straw. Again, this could be unexceptionable except that when the most positive
influence on Brown's life and work - Dr Cole — offers him his drink (one presumes
correctly, because she is a doctor) and, in doing so, she holds a napkin up to his chin as if
he were a child, with the napkin acting as a bib. The very act of holding a napkin up to his
chin reinforces dribbling as to be avoided rather than an action that is natural to Brown.
Thus, Brown's natural bodily function is seen and constructed as wrong and, if possible, to
be prevented. Ken Harrison in Whose Life Is It Anyway? is similarly fed with a napkin
acting as a bib. Again, an individual unable to control his / her functions is constructed
and assumed to be child-like.
If we accept Canguilhem's (1989, p.77) point that: 'strictly speaking a norm does not exist,
it plays its role. [A role ... ] which is to devalue existence by allowing its correction', then
we can see how Brown's dribbling is devalued by not following the adult human 'norm' of
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not dribbling. Although Canguilhem's point is that all existence is devalued - even those
who can closely fit the norm - my point is that the norm is used specifically to devalue the
disabled body alone. Canguilhem's suggestion that the norm devalues the norm is an
important one in that the norm devalues itself by making an individual's body an object
rather than a subjective, lived experience with the freedom to experiment. The devaluation
of the normal body by the normal body is achieved through its generalisation (as in these
films) and these processes of generalisation of the abnormal body most overtly
demonstrate Canguilhem's view. This thesis would argue that the liberation of the disabled
body from a negative generalisation (medicalisation and normalisation) will, above all else,
free the body of normality from the tyranny of itself. If Brown were allowed to dribble
freely, without stigma, then all others are free of the dread of embarrassment of either
others or themselves, for example, to dribble.
It has already been commented above, in the chapter on the family, upon the idea(l)s of
masculinity being shown to devalue the disabled within My Left Foot. However, it should
be added that Brown is singled out as having a non-working (unemployable) body, a body
that is not capable of any culturally assumed masculine work: Brown's body cannot lift
items or tools; write freehand; nor construct any physical object of social utility - while his
brothers and Father can achieve all of these tasks — and more. The same is true of Ken,
who in Whose Life Is It Anyway? is unable to act usefully; it is also true of Bruce in The
Raging Moon, who is capable only of being a telephonist (conventionally, women's work).
Thus, by having disabled male characters who are incapable of masculine work - and this
relates back to the points about Canguilhem - such images define what is masculine for the
norm as well as the Other. For example, if Bruce is a telephonist and Bruce is the Other,
then all men who are telephonists are by logical extension ideologically suspect as it is,
conventionally, a 'feminine' job. The construction of the Other as either one category or
another has the consequence of restricting the norm from any attempt at experiencing other
styles of life through fear of being labelled or constructed as the Other. Thus, 'disability' is
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a key tool in the maintenance and illusion of social order and control since social and
bodily order are both intrinsic elements of what disability is and is not.
As has been stated above, just as all the other films have comparative normals against
which the abnormal as measured, My Left Foot has Brown's own family performing that
function. The social growth - love, marriage and children, especially - of the other
members of the family, compared to Brown's perceived social failure, ensures that his life
is shown as pathetic by contrast, despite the superior financial position that his literary
success creates for him. As said in an earlier chapter, the striking similarity in body and
dress of Brown's Mother and his wife-to-be leads the viewer to see Brown's marriage to
nurse Mary as asexual because he is marrying his 'Mother' and a nurse. Thus, as in the
earlier films discussed, the disabled body is again given as impotent and probably asexual.
The negation of the spastic body is most acutely achieved by Brown's own desire to
eradicate as much of his spasticity as is possible and Dr Cole acts as Brown's Svengali in
this process by normalising him both bodily and intellectually. For example, in a montage
sequence to emphasise the lapse of time, Brown's head is being exercised by Dr Cole and
she is carrying out breathing exercises on him (she gets him to blow in to a large water
dispenser to see how much water is displaced by air). Although such 'therapy' could,
technically, prolong his life, this is not how it is represented or to be interpreted; Brown is,
as a result, to be seen as child-like and ineffectual. Another example is when Dr Cole gets
Brown to read to her so that his pronunciation is more easily understood and rectified. It
could be argued that Dr Cole's exercises - bodily and intellectual - on Brown reinforce his
abnormality by the apparent need to train him to carry out what most people consider to be
natural tasks (such as breathing and talking etc.).
Dr Cole is normalising Brown in order that he can more easily be integrated into society at
large and it is his willing participation in this (the desire to be seen to be as normal as
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possible) that makes Brown (and the film) appear to be a positive role model. My point is
that the very act of normalisation (embraced by the idea of the 'good cripple', which he
represents) increases the devaluation of disabled people who are unable, or unwilling, to be
ashamed of or hateful towards their own bodies. 'Hateful' may seem an extreme word, but
if we consider that Brown tries to commit suicide (leaving a note in which he calls himself
'nothing') then self-hate is an appropriate term. When Brown attempts suicide by trying to
cut his wrist with a cut-throat razor the scene degenerates into farce because he lacks even
enough bodily control to carry out his own suicide: he cuts his thumb, drops the razor and
falls on the bed. Thus, Brown's body is not only dependent and incapable of defending
itself: it is even incapable of carrying out its own plan of action; as has already been stated,
self-determination is an attribute considered to be a central pillar of what constitutes
masculinity and how it is 'normally' represented. My Left Foot has Brown, just as Ken or
Bruce are, emasculated in his essentially represented embodiment.
Finally, the most obvious demonstration of Brown's dislike of his own body is his panic at
being put into an ambulance with other people with cerebral palsy (CP), and his
subsequent refusal to go again to the clinic with them. The justification for not challenging
or forcing Brown to go again is the fact that the other people with CP are shown as more
severe cases - incapable of any significant degree of normalisation - and, as such, not
worthy of home visits by the good Dr Cole. For example, one shot at the clinic is of a
young boy, shot from a low angle medium close-up so as to make him look sinister; his
body stoops over the tray that is in front of him, motionlessly dribbling in silence. The
effect is that the young boy is seen as having a learning difficulty in addition to CP and, as
such, less valuable to society. Brown's refusal to be at the same place as the boy justifies
wider society's refusal to help or encourage those in a similar position, making the 'good
cripple' someone who wants to be like 'us' rather than one who is not so severely disabled
as to make behaviour modification impossible.
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Brown, as with the other impaired bodies so far discussed, acts not solely as a role model
for disabled people but for normal people: those people who need validation that their
striving for bodily perfection is right, proper and just, and worthwhile at every opportunity.
My Left Foot deviates so little from the standard devaluation, and abjectification, of the
abnormal body that to demonstrate each example would be repetitive, very lengthy and
boring. Christy Brown is a 'good cripple' precisely because he hates his own body and
subsequently tries to normalise it to 'fit in' to rather than 'sit out' of the social game.
The Elephant Man differs very little from the other films discussed in its representation of
the disabled body, with Merrick similarly made Other through the feminisation of his body
where weakness is seen as feminine. Merrick is feminised through his being made pathetic
by his bodily weakness (in addition to his mannerisms) in contrast to other masculine male
characters within the film. Merrick is, as such, constructed as abject by his tragic and
uncontrollable carcass; his body is represented as devalued and hated by himself .; and he
reinforces bodily norms through his own, eventually fatal, attempt to sleep normally.
The most subtle way in which Merrick is feminised is by his soft gentle and innocent
voice, which is so genuinely enthusiastic and surprised at life's smaller pleasures (a trip to
the theatre, the way photographs are arranged upon a mantlepiece, etc.). The close-up of
Merrick's left hand - his good hand - delicately building a cardboard model clearly signifies
it as delicate and soft (an aspect Treves actually commented on in his 'true life' account of
Merrick, calling his normal arm 'lady-like' [cf. Howell and Ford, 1980]). The weakness of
Merrick's body is represented by his inability to climb stairs, walk any distance or carry out
any strenuous work (model-making is his limit) without a lack of breath or gross
exhaustion. For example, when Merrick returns from France on the train and is chased
into the public toilets, his exhaustion is so extreme that he collapses and has to be assisted
in walking into the hospital once the police have rescued him; he is unable to rescue
himself.
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The process through which Merrick's body is made abject in The Elephant Man is by
having him segregated from society at large by the justification that the sight of him causes
'women and nervous persons to fly in terror at the sight of him'. The film shows the first
sight of Merrick through a typical horror genre tactic of delaying the horror figure's first
appearance on screen until a suitably young and innocent woman can come across him; in
this case it is a nurse who stereotypically panics, screams and runs away upon seeing him.
Also, Merrick's appearance (the sight of his body) in public places repeatedly causes either
a riot or disgust, thereby validating his segregation and institutionalisation as necessary, if
only for the sake of public order.
The film's ideological support for normalisation, and therefore for the notion of normality,
is apparent in the manner in which Merrick is saved from being a cause of disgust or riot,
in comparison to his saviour, Frederick Treves. Treves is clearly represented as the
epitome of Victorian bourgeois Christian paternalism and a good person. Significantly, the
difference between the ideology and decency that Treves represents and the mob's
indecency is also represented in their respective bodies. Treves (and the others, like Carr
Gomm, of his class) are all well-groomed individuals in both appearance and body: their
suits are immaculate; their beards are perfectly trimmed; and they are clean (i.e., they have
washed). On the other hand, the working-class are, almost without exception, shown as
dirty, promiscuous, pot-bellied and vicious. Writing of Michael Elphick's working-class
character, who uses Merrick as his own personal freak within the hospital, Samuel (1981,
p.317) states: 'Elphick seems to conflate within a single persona a whole number of
contemporary [modern day] middle-class folk devils - street-corner bovver boys, soccer
hooligans [and] flying pickets'. All the working-class women outside the hospital are street
walkers and ruffians yet if they are in the hospital they are inevitably 'angels' - i.e., nurses;
the closing titles go so far as to label them as merely the 'First Whore', 'Second Whore',
'First Fighting Woman' and 'Second Fighting Woman'. Having Treves's class represented
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as equally morally clean reinforces the moral righteousness of their actions in saving
Merrick from the working-class. Interestingly, there are no old people in the scenes of
working-class life, whereas they predominate in the middle-class hospital society. The
point being made by such an omission, one presumes, is that middle-class life is not only
morally better but also physically superior; consequently John Gielgud plays Carr Gomm
with an appropriate amount of physically aged self-preservation to demonstrate the point.
One scene in particular sums up the whole thesis of the film. In the scene Bytes (Merrick's
'owner' until Treves saved him) manages to get into the hospital and starts to go up the
stairs to the isolation ward where Merrick is living or, more appropriately, is being kept.
Bytes encounters Treves on the stairway. Treves tells him that Merrick is not going back
to being a freak and they start to argue. Bytes's very appearance, and bodily state, in
comparison to Treves's appearance, and bodily condition, reveal the former to be inferior,
distasteful and - what is the worst crime of all in this film - working-class. Bytes is
scruffily dressed in an old jacket with a dirty, unbuttoned shirt beneath it. He also exhibits
the first signs of what the film wants us to believe are the DTs (shaking his head with an
unsteady gait) and when he speaks, he spits. Significantly, the conversation between the
two men takes place on a stairwell and is shot from a side angle in medium close-up with
both men on screen in profile. The shot is filmed in such a way that a comparison between
the two characters is unavoidable. The mise en scene and choice of camera angles ensures
that Bytes's spit is clearly visible as he talks - Treves's retreat from being so close to
Bytes's face shows his horror at the spit and suggests that Bytes also reeks of alcohol or
halitosis. Bytes's character is played wonderfully by Freddie Jones, an actor who seems to
specialise in semi-alcoholic, and possibly perverted, degenerate low lifes. Jones even
reprised this character type in a cameo part in Lynch's later film Wild At Heart (US, 1990).
Treves, on the other hand, is smartly dressed in a morning suit with appropriate neckwear;
whereas Bytes is unshaven, Treves has a full beard that is as smartly tailored as his
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morning suit. Treves speaks clearly and concisely with an air of confidence and he does
not spit as he talks. Although Treves becomes slightly flustered (a hair slips out of place in
order to show this) it is from inexperience rather than fear. The arrival of Carr Gomm in
the scene (at a higher level of the stairwell, and shot from a lower level, so as to increase
the impression of his status of authority) acts to reinforce both Treves's authority and
confidence. With a few precise and articulate words Can Gomm dismisses Bytes,
condemning him in the process. The scene shows the difference in both body and
character between good (Treves) and bad (Bytes), right and wrong, medicalisation and
socialisation, and the 'good body' and the 'bad body'. Treves's body, style, manner and
personality are given as the ideal in comparison to the degraded body of Bytes, thereby
ensuring that Merrick's is also seen as degraded. Merrick's positive characteristic is that he
wants the body of a Treves but is unable to achieve it through no fault of his own. The
idea of fault is clearly meant to imply in the film that the working-class are unresponsive to
help and this must, as such, be forced upon them. The comparative responses of Elphick's
character and the educated actress Mrs Kendal to the 'caring' letter Can Gomm has
published in The Times are indicative of this point. Mrs Kendal (dressed in white and
being particularly sensitive) desires to meet 'this gentleman' (Merrick) whilst Elphick, in
sharp contrast, spots an opportunity to exploit both Merrick and his fellow class
degenerates. If we compare the reactions of Elphick (who calls himself 'your very own
Sunny Jim') and Kendal respectively to their subsequent meetings with Merrick, the point
is even clearer. Elphick abuses and uses Merrick both physically and mentally whilst Mrs
Kendal reads from Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet with him and, concluding that he is
'no "Elephant Man" but Romeo' himself, she then kisses him. Mrs Kendal's role as a
leading woman of 'fashion' acts further to reinforce the film's idea that this is how Merrick
should be treated by all who wish to be considered worthy of the title of human being: a
philosophy which is, in the logic of the film, the epitome of middle-class values housed in
a well-kept body that is also intellectual and has a concomitant Christian liberal
philosophy.
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Having Merrick in a degraded body (to some extent, a working-class body gone haywire)
with a middle-class sensibility is offered as 'the tragedy' of Merrick's life. Merrick is a
tragic figure because he is unable to fulfil his intellectual potential or fully exhibit his
obvious good grace and concern for others due to his being trapped inside a so-called
hideous body. The medically technical talk that Treves gives to the Pathological Society
early on in the film clearly categorises Merrick's body as 'hideous', 'lamentable' and
'degraded' because Treves uses those very words, combined with medical jargon, to
describe Merrick's condition. Merrick's presentation before a society called the
'Pathological' Society merely reinforces the medical principle that all deformities and
their consequences are pathological. At the Pathological Society Merrick is shown to an
audience of medical dignitaries from behind a mobile curtain screen, but the film's
spectator is not shown Merrick except in silhouette against the screen. The talk to the
Pathological Society takes place before the nurse (detailed above) and audience are shown
Merrick, and as such, Merrick is objectified both visually and narratively through his
description in medical terms and by the Pathological Society's horrified reactions to his
appearance, prior to the film audience's even seeing him.
Merrick's objectification is intentionally revealed as part of the process of medicalisation
by Treves's actions, yet the film ultimately validates it (rather than challenges it) as logical
and right solely on the basis of Merrick's own body as being the cause of his own problems
and social disorder. Consequently, it is the notion that Merrick is pathologically liable to
cause social unrest that enables reference to be made to the thoughts of Balthin.
Russo (1988) writes of Balditin's theory of the carnivalesque body that:
[T]he political implications of [carnival] heterogeneity are obvious: it sets carnival
apart from the merely oppositional and reactive; carnival and the carnivalesque
suggest a redeployment or counterproduction of culture, knowledge, and pleasure.
In its multivalent oppositional play, carnival refuses to surrender the critical and
cultural tools of the dominant class, and in this sense, carnival can be seen above all
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as a site of insurgency, and not merely withdrawal. (p.218)
Thus, for this film, society must take control of the 'freak' and place it in a controlled and
supervised environment. The 'freak' in The Elephant Man is the body of excessive life as
manifest in the body of Merrick, a body that cannot stop growing even though its growth
will destroy it. The tumour is after all, just like cancer, an excess of life, where each cell
multiplies unstoppably and irreversibly until it kills the body in which it lives. Although
'carnival' can be seen as a form of safety valve to the repression of the bourgeoisie (and
therefore helpful to it) the large numbers of carnivals (and extreme nature of their
'carnivalesque' exhibits - i.e., the 'Elephant Man') meant that it became imperative, and
inevitable, for the bourgeoisie to act (Bogdan, 1988). Treves acts on their behalf in taking
Merrick into hospital for examination and then 'care'. Equally, when taken in consideration
with the fact that Bytes' show is initially shut down, because Merrick 'is degrading to all
who see (him)' - words spoken by Treves's true life great-grandson, the actor Frederick
Treves, to reinforce their validity - the point is unmistakable. Treves's subsequent rescuing
of Merrick from the clutches of those who put him in the arenas of degradation in the first
place serves further to emphasise the point. Merrick is a threat to the bourgeois hegemony
and authority of normality as signified by those who closed down Bytes's show in the first
place because he represents all that they despise: bodily, and therefore social, chaos. The
film is not intentionally showing this point to criticise it — as it does other elements of
medical hegemony; it is revealed inadvertently rather than by design.
The reference to the normality of Merrick's genitals, in the lecture to the Pathological
Society, is a clear reference to the ability of the abnormal to perpetuate themselves. Such
an inherited threat is revealed as frightening for the bourgeoisie due to its leading to
presumed sexual degeneracy and potential for eternally overpowering moral decency (the
eugenicist's - and Frederick Treves was a eugenicist [Howell and Ford, 1980] - nightmare).
Even if the point of the film is to challenge such a philosophy, as with Whose Life Is It
Anyway?, the focus is lost in the sentimentalisation of Merrick as a figure of personal
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tragedy. The apparent degeneracy of the working-class is shown in The Elephant Man
(and in Duet For One) to reinforce the idea of the need to educate the working-class into
the same bourgeois horror of abnormality. The scenes of the working-class, and their
environments, are dirty, disgusting, loud, violent and exploitative in contrast to the
bourgeois scenes of clean, quiet, sensibility and sensitivity. Such scenes thereby make all
that is good bourgeois, and all that is bad working-class in the final logic of this film. The
role of safeguarding society is placed in the hygienic bourgeois world and not the
apparently unhygienic working-class one. The sexual threat of the abnormal body - both
Merrick's and the degenerate masses' — is clearly indicated when Treves walks past a
pickled foetus, which is similar in look to Merrick's body, at the freak show where Treves
first tries to view Merrick. It could be argued that if we combine the references to
Merrick's genitals and the pickled foetus with the shown promiscuous nature of the masses
in the film, then clearly the film is proposing degeneracy as the cause of Merrick's disease.
Although Merrick's Mother is overtly made out to be a depiction of a heroic mother figure,
the father is never mentioned, and by his absence it could reasonably be concluded he was
not a good sort.
If we consider the carnival or freak show as a celebration of life, as many 'freaks' did (cf.
Bogdan, 1988), then we can begin to understand Bakhtin's analysis of how the
carnivalesque body was transformed into the grotesque body by (post-)modernists: a
process of transformation inadvertently being shown in The Elephant Man. The showing
of such a process is inadvertent as the film succumbs to the ideology of bourgeois morality
(modernist in itself) through its validation of all that is anti-carnivalesque, i.e., Treves's
philosophy rather than that of Elphick, Bytes or the masses. Bakhtin writes that the
carnivalesque body does not fear life or death because it is part of the same thing; life as
part of death as death acts as a fertiliser for future life. Bakhtin (1984. p.49) states: 'the
grotesque body expresses not the fear of death but the fear of life'. Merrick, and the
carnival or freak show, threatens the repressed nature of bourgeois life (which is
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consequently anti-life) and, as such, he is (they are) seen as a threat by the bourgeois
(Treves and others like him). As Merrick is so representative of life (and its death) Treves
has to control, objectify and disarm him by making him sick and pathetic rather than
achieving what the freak show had as its aim: to celebrate him and (0)ther 'freaks' (all that
is different and unique) as special and valuable. Treves achieves his disarming of Merrick
as a manifestation of excessive life by having him categorised as a living symbol of death
and abnormality rather than only different. The aim of Treves, and the film, is to instil into
the degenerate (and to normalise the working-class to a middle-class ideal of physiology
and morality) a fear of death and a fear of the behaviour they deem degenerate. Balchtin
continues to write that the Romantic imagination of modernism turns the grotesque body
'into the Gothic' (ibid). This tendency, if true, would perhaps explain the way the film sees
itself as Romantic in its desire to explain why Merrick is disabled in metaphysical or
supernatural terms; thus, the use of horror genre techniques mixed with pseudo-realism
makes the film seem more original than it actually is.
The view that the disabled are seen as a threat is explicitly stated by Hark (1993, p.152)
when she writes: '[T]he usurpers often display characteristics not marked as signifiers of
masculinity in the codes of male film performance [ T]hey may for example be effete,
overweight, short, foreign accented, or disabled'. Such a list describes, as has already been
stated, all the characteristics of Merrick's body, though Merrick's accent is Other due to his
deformities rather than to any specific national foreignness; Merrick's foreignness is to
normality.
Finally, in The Elephant Man, the way in which Merrick wants to sleep, or wishes he
could sleep, demonstrates my point precisely. Merrick dreads the night because he dreams
and sees himself (making him scream); it is a function that, in isolation, justifies others'
fear of him, but Merrick also hates the fact that he cannot 'sleep like normal people'.
Merrick usually sleeps with his knees bent and his head and arms resting on them due to
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the size of his heavy head: a head which if laid back would kill him by either breaking his
neck or suffocating him. The pose is indicative of a melancholic attitude (cf. Gilman,
1988) amplified by its (Merrick's) further devaluation and abjectification by having
etchings all around Merrick's bedroom of children lying asleep, normally, in a bed, rather
than as is Merrick, who is just on the bed. Such scenes act in two ways: firstly, they ensure
that Merrick is never seen as acceptable; and secondly, they act narratively (and
discursively) to ensure that Merrick tries to be normal. The closure of the film, by having
Merrick die whilst trying to sleep normally - having said: '[I]t's finished' - enables us to
read Merrick's decision to sleep normally as suicide; it is an act of suicide carried out in the
realisation that he can never be normal and as an attempt to die with dignity in the guise of
the attitude of normality. Normality of the body is not the singular tool through which
Merrick is made different, the Other, but it is the instrument through which his life is made
meaningless and ultimately lifeless for himself and others. For Merrick (as with Ken and
Stephanie) death is preferable to a life trapped in an abnormal and abject body.
In conclusion, this thesis would argue that Merrick and all the disabled characters (along
with the working-class in The Elephant Man) are seen as social and bodily usurpers unless
they are prepared to try and be normal or as normal as possible. The 'good cripple' is
represented as the cripple who does his / her utmost to overcome his / her abnormality of
body, in contrast to the 'bad cripple' who is the cripple who is happy to be a cripple. This
point is clear if we consider how any individual who attempts to get society to
accommodate his / her body as equal is treated: she / he is classified and marginalised as
bitter and cynical or as a person with a multitude of chips on their shoulder. It is a
stereotype that Norden (1994) calls the 'bitter crip', as in films such as The Men, Born on
the Fourth of July and, from this selection, The Raging Moon. It is significant that in
four of the six films discussed each has a central disabled character dying either as a result
of their own disgust at not being normal or in the attempt to be so: Ken Harrison prefers
death to disability in Whose Life Is It Anyway?; Stephanie prefers social death to
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participation whilst stoically awaiting the release of real death in Duet For One; Jill dies as
a result of a sexual encounter with another cripple in The Raging Moon; and Merrick
commits suicide in The Elephant Man in his desire to 'sleep like a normal person'. Christy
Brown and Bruce are the only long-term survivors of all the films discussed and they are
determined to be as normal as possible. The situation is clearly indicated by Bruce at the
conclusion of The Raging Moon when he states that 'everything matters', in other words,
he (we) must accept normalisation if he is going to have any life at all. Equally, Brown
achieves an element of normality by getting married to a normal woman (even if it is his
`Mother').
Many, if not most, disability / impairment-oriented films follow the same bodily logic as
the films discussed in this chapter, including, but not detailed due to space, A Day In The
Death Of Joe Egg, from the core films of the thesis. Many other films about impairment /
disability represent the impaired in a similar vein, for example, to name but a few, films
such as La Buena Estrella (Ricardo Franco, Spain, 1997), Crash (Charles Band, US,
1977), Crash (David Cronenberg, Canada, 1996), Dark city (Alex Proyas, US, 1997), Eye
of the Needle (Richard Marquand, GB, 1981), I Don't Want To Be Born (Peter Sasdy,
GB, 1971), In The Company Of Men (Neil LaBute, US, 1997), Just The Way You Are
(Eduardo Molinario, US, 1984), Mute Witness (Anthony Waller, GB, 1995), Salon Kitty
(Tinto Brass, France/Germany, 1978), Santa Sangre (A. Kodorowski, Italy, 1989), Sick:
The Life and Death of Bob Flanagan, Supermasochist (K. Dick, US, 1997), Sitcom
(Francois Ozon, France, 1997) and A Zed and Two Noughts (Peter Greenaway, GB,
1985). A list so diverse in so many ways, including impairment subject, demonstrates that
the nature of disability representation is revealed as astoundingly static, given its regular
and continued use by film-makers as subject matter.
The disabled and abnormal body is represented in these films as the model through which
normality is created, validated, defmed and reinforced as superior with the disabled body
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disqualified and invalidated by its inability to be, as a consequence, normal. They are
representations which are, overall, created in a form, style and content of disability




'I know these maimed guys. Their minds get twisted; they put on hair shirts and act like martyrs. All of them
are do-gooders, freaks, troublemakers.'
Reno Smith (Robert Ryan) in Bad Day at Black Rock
'I do not need a wheelchair [	 wheelchairs are for amputees, for Civil War veterans, old people with one
foot in the grave.'
Mr Lightbody (Matthew Broderick) in The Road to Wellville (Alan Parker, US, 1994)
After six years of feeling despair upon realising the extent of the negativity expressed
about my own social grouping, I am loath to ask whether it will ever end. Am I paranoid?
Does anybody else care? As one pootles along the highway of one's life one tends either to
ignore or to dismiss the seemingly innocent constructions by which we all live our lives
(Berger and Luckmann, 1991) and, until I had started this thesis, I was a fairly happy kind
of guy: ignorance, in this case, really was bliss. Cinematically (Barnes, 1992; Norden,
1994) and socially (Oliver and Barnes, 1998) the hegemony of the Medical Model is well
and truly still in command of disabled people's lives — including my own.
As has been shown, in Chapter Two, disability is represented more than merely
stereotypically. This representation is a complex set of constructions which reveals as
much, possibly more, about the stereotyper than it does about those being depicted (el
Oakes et al, 1994). The literature review prior to Chapter Two, and the identification of
most disability imagery by disabled and non-disabled writers as 'stereotypical', clearly
indicates that the examination of disability imagery has a long way to go. It can, and will,
provide many fresh insights into disability imagery, disability theory and film studies in
general. Conversely, as this thesis has demonstrated, the examination of disability imagery
using the Social Model of disability can be useful in the identification of a number of
ideologies within mainstream cinema that are not often applied to disabled characters in
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films or by film studies specialists. This on its own makes this thesis vital, relevant and
applicable outside its specialist domain.
Chapter Three, the concentration on the role of the family and its role in the creation and
reinforcement of the hegemony of the normal, demonstrates that disability is not the only
ideology at work in any given film text about impairment / disability. Impairment can be,
and often is, utilised in a polymorphous manner with various hegemonic and ideological
implications that are supported by, as well as supportive of, numerous ideological
specificities in any given text. Impairment imagery is often as much about supporting
other core and peripheral social ideologies as it is about being a peripheral ideology in its
own right. The dissection of the family as an ideology and concept, and its use within the
core films studied in Chapter Three, illustrates this point.
The chapter on the body and impairment clarifies the degree to which the Medical Model
of disability is still the dominant form of socio-cultural disability management and that it is
still the dominant model in interpreting and dealing with impairment in mainstream
cultural expression or so-called 'entertainment'. Equally, the role of normalisation is
shown throughout the thesis as an implicit part of the cinematic negation of the disabled
experience. Even though normalisation appears superficially to be a step forward, or
minimally a change from the past in the management of disabled people and their lives, it
is still part of a medicalising hegemony which tends to negate the equality of the disabled
person both on film and in society at large. Chapter Four demonstrated the role and
cinematic processes that the represented impaired body have played in the cinematic
element of the culturally disabling process that has existed for disabled people over the
past thirty years.
It has not been argued that impairment or disability is the sole currency in the economy of
normality or other relevant ideologies, or even that disabling cinematic imagery is a
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fundamental part of disability per se; that would be foolish, as it is not the case. Other
ideologies such as gender, race and sexuality — amongst others — are just as relevant and
legitimate subjects for academic papers about disability. Equally, I have included issues of
class as these were relevant to the films examined. However, as Garland Thomson has
written in the conclusion to her book on disability in literature and freakery (1997), but
which is equally applicable to mine:
[b]y focusing on the intersections of the various systems that order and demarcate
visible physical difference, I do not wish to suggest that identities are
interchangeable — that gender and disability are synonymous constructs, or that
disability is a form of ethnicity. Rather, I propose that gender, ethnicity, sexuality,
and disability are related products of the same social processes and practices that
shape bodies according to ideological structures. What I have tried to uncover here
are some of the complexities of these processes as they simultaneously make and
interpret disability. (pp.135 / 6)
I would simply add the category class to Garland Thompson's statement.
I have tried to demonstrate three objectives, in the thesis: firstly, that the stereotype of
disability in disability imagery is much more complex and revealing (and, as such,
rewarding in analysis) than has previously been presumed. Significantly, the predominant
cinematic construction used to depict the disabled as Other is imagery of impairments
rather than images of disablement — i.e., the processes of disablement. Secondly, it has
been contended that the ideologies and hegemony of disability are multi-functional; they
support other ideologies as much as other ideologies support them. Thirdly, and finally, I
have tried to show that the body is the key in any examination of the ideologies of
disability and the cultural construction of both the disabled as abject and impairment as
disability.
Whilst carrying out my analysis I have applied the Social Model of disability, an ideal
model for such work given its affinity to the method of analysis of film studies used. This
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was done in order to reveal, whilst also trying to achieve all three of the above objectives
(and the aims outlined in the Introduction), that cinema, its practices and its processes are
an essential part of the continuing negation of disability as a social creation. I have tried to
demonstrate that images of disability are part of the political displacement (through
cultural processes) of disability onto impairment and the individual. In addition to the
three main objectives I hope that I have offered a fresh perspective on the way in which
disability can be viewed in films of any kind and that this is a critical analysis as revealing
of the ideologies of mainstream cinema as it is of disability.
Sadly, the films examined are typical, indicative in fact, as most other films with impaired
characters represent disability as impairment and, in the process, pathologise disability as a
form of essentialist abjection. They also portray Otherness as abhorrent in the face of the
universally presumed supremacy and righteousness of normalcy. The films discussed and
analysed for this thesis are typical of their type; my analysis of these specific films can be
applied to most disability / impairment narratives in Western culture to much the same
result. Although there may be variations on a theme, the ideological and thematic thrusts
appear fairly constant even in films made in non-English-speaking Western cultures.
Films as seemingly diverse as Mandy (made by Alexander Mackendrick in England in
1952), Born On The Fourth of July (Oliver Stone, Hollywood, 1989) and The
Wheelchair (Marco Ferreri, Spain, 1959) can be analysed in comparison to the core films
of this study, and one another, and result in virtually the same conclusions' being drawn.
Each film studied uses the tools of classical cinema to come to a classical ideological
standpoint on physical impairment and 'disability': i.e., abnormality as abject with
normality an apparently 'real' and supreme state of being. Indeed, most films about
'disability' elicit conventional and traditional claims to the superiority of familial, sexual,
bodily, linguistic and stereotypical and archetypal forms, which is, for want of a better
term, the illusion of normality.
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The problem for most disabled writers, as covered in the literature review and stereotype
chapters, is the failure to acknowledge the manner in which we (this author is include), as
thriving disabled people, reinforce the structures that marginalise disabled people in
general. Normalised disabled people can reinforce the structures that marginalise disabled
people per se both in successfully existing in the community and by appearing as tokens in
response to calls for positive images of disability to predominate in our culture and
cinemas and on our television screens.
The term 'Disability Correctness', derived from the pejorative used 'politically correct', is
beginning to be used against valid criticisms of impairment imagery from a Social Model
perspective (Shakespeare, 1999). This is a consequence of the inherent weaknesses of a
narrow negative / positive philosophy employed by some disabled critics. Nevertheless,
and it must be recognised, the 'Disability Correctness' lobby — exemplified by the 1 in 8
Group of media lobbyists led by Richard Reiser - has achieved a great deal in obtaining
initial recognition for many of the arguments that highlight oppression and discrimination
against disabled people in disability imagery. We must be wary that 'Disability
Correctness' is not appropriated by the educated middle-classes for their own sanitising
purposes as political correctness has been (cf. Shakespeare, 1999). Whilst the 'vocabulary'
used plays an important part in forming attitudes, it is these attitudes, formed as I have
argued, by wider social processes, which are problematic.
Attemps to cleanse or sanitise what may be considered dirty or distasteful or, for that
matter, a personal distaste for any given representation of impairment, are not a basis for
pseudo-disability theory criticism. In arguing for positive images, which many have
considered Mandy, My Left Foot, The Elephant Man and The Raging Moon to be, we as
disabled critics ignore the reality that aspiring middle-classness is the basis of those
images. To be accepted one still has to be, fundamentally, 'nice', 'presentable' and
'articulate' as a disabled person. These films still embody an ideological bias which is
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supported by the keepers of the hegemonic flame of normality. It should be asked why
else so many of the disability / impairment themed films would parallel and blame
abnormality (or its civilised treatment) on working-class manners and morals. This is
indeed the case, as I have shown, in the textual analysis of the core films examined in this
thesis (cf. A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg, The Raging Moon, The Elephant Man, Duet
for One and My Left Foot).
This thesis is not about arguing all images of disability are inherently negative either
because they only work within a Medical Model of disability or because they fail to
acknowledge the Social Model of disability. Although such an argument is applied, in the
main, to the core films of the thesis and it can further be applied to many, if not most, other
films about impairment and or disability. Certain mainstream Hollywood entertainment
films and European Art House films have contained unexpectedly progressive elements in
relation to impairment and disability. If one examines Mr Holland's Opus (Stephen
Herek, US, 1995), for example, its use of imagery as well as sound to create a montage of
an era and to demonstrate the passing of time was imaginative and original. It also had a
refreshingly progressive attitude towards Deaf culture as forming a valid and distinct
cultural community.
There is a marked difference between a film like Mr Holland's Opus and a film such as
Four Weddings and Funeral (Mike Newell, GB, 1994) and its normalisation and
integrationist use of deafness rather than Deafness as a simple plot device, or the extreme
heroicism of a blind woman in Wait Until Dark (Terence Young, US, 1967). Equally,
some impairment-oriented films have been highly effective in dealing with the emotional
side of marginalisation when this is due to a specific impairment: films such as Junk Mail
(Pal Sletaune, Norway, 1997) and, my personal favourite, The Heart is a Lonely Hunter
(Robert Ellis Miller, US, 1968) exemplify this in their treatment of deafness. Perhaps the
most successful film I have seen, from the perspective of the Social Model of disability,
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and one that actually explores disability as a social issue created out of the hegemony of
the illusion of normality, is Lars Von Trier's brilliant The Idiots (Denmark, 1998) - a film
about which this author would quite simply like to write a whole specific thesis. Its
approach and techniques — form, style and narrative structut e - combine to provide a
stunningly perceptive and thought-provoking piece of film art exploring the social
concepts of abnormality and normality.
Dyer (1990[a], p.263) has written, about gay and lesbian images, that the call to be positive
depends upon: 'prior assumptions whether what is positive about [gayness] is the degree to
which it is like straight life or the degree to which it differs from if; similarly, I would
argue, the prior assumptions with which disability writers have conspired are those of
normality (the idea(l)s of the normal family, sexual activity, body and discourse as
revealed herein). Thus, the call for positive — 'Disability Correctness' - imagery per se can
be retrograde if it reinforces the very basis of our oppression by insisting upon imagery
that is, in effect, an image of pseudo-normality. This can be reassuring for those of us
willing or capable to pass, as such, as normal. However, it skirts the main issue in a
similar way to a member of the mixed race community passing as white in the South
Africa of apartheid.
One of the positive aspects of impairment centred films is that at least their Medical Model
affiliations are identifiable (despite ideological mystification) and, as such, they enable
disability theorists to work from an identifiable basis in order that the latter are able to
criticise their content from the perspective of the Social Model of disability. Once the
disabled themselves start to create images that adhere to 'Disability Correctness', they risk
falling deeper into the abyss of human intolerance. A good example of this is in The
Waterdance, written and directed by the disabled film-maker Neil Jiminez and based on
his own experience of paralysis; The Waterdance is a sophisticated example of a
'Disability Correctness' film. Images of ourselves, images of the disabled, which are little
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more that parodies of normality, validate normal society's every fear of the disabled - who
exist in the margins and who are not educated or socialised in the conventions of society.
What we (disabled and able-bodied critics) must not do in such cases is to criticise
individuals for adopting such a hypocrisy of normality since its rewards are immense and
its punishment for failure to normalise are considerable (poverty, marginalisation and even
death). We should all seek to support a collective effort that creates bonds rather than
divisions. The failure of positive imagery to account for the various realities of our
existence (e.g., The Waterdance) makes such imagery guilty of essentialism on a scale that
is equal to that of the films discussed in detail in this thesis. The Nike advertisement
mentioned in Chapter One, and the more recent inclusion of a black wheelchair-using
dancer in a UK ITV Nintendo Playstation commercial are good examples, for the reasons
already stated, of ultimately harmful images of disability identified as positive. Equally,
all images can, and will be, construed as negative because they concern (or contain)
disabled people. The very fact that 'disability' exists in its current social situation (as a
social construct of the Medical Model from a Social Model interpretation) means that
whatever is depicted will be seen as part of that supposedly essential nature of impairment.
Using another marginalised group as an example: if gayness is considered and constructed
as 'bad' then, no matter how it is represented, to those who consider or construct it as
'bad', it will remain 'bad'. What is essential is to eradicate the sense of 'badness'. If that is
achieved then statistical abnormality of sex acts between people of the same sex, will still
exist but the construction of them as essentially 'bad' will not. The statistically aberrant
should never be considered morally aberrant.
Disability criticism should seek to eradicate the negation of the impaired from the current
cultural hegemony of the Medical Model of disability and, particular to this thesis, the
cultural norm of disabling imagery. Consequently, one must strive to validate as positive
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all that the term, or construction (rooted in the Medical Model) 'disability' implies and
supports. Therefore, eradicating 'disability' per se whilst valuing people with impairments
can be achieved; equally, we must validate the specificities of abnormality over and above
the similarities that we, the disabled, may have to 'normality' or the so-called 'able-bodied
and respectable' communities.
The initial way forward for disability imagery analysis is perhaps revealed by Dyer
(1990[a], p.2'74) in his analysis and critique of 'affirmation' gay movies. Dyer argues that
'affirmative' gay movies indicate 'three, not altogether compatible, things: thereness,
insisting on the fact of our existence; goodness, asserting our worth and that of our life-
styles; and realness, showing what we are in fact like'. He continues: 'thereness and
goodness were at odds with the other positivity, realness - conflict, self-hate and
oppression, to say nothing of the rag-bag of human iniquities that are a part of gay / lesbian
reality (and conflict is not even necessarily a negative one)'. Dyer not only sees the value
of presenting Otherness - gays in Dyer's case, but in this thesis the disabled - in a more
three dimensional and challenging (to normality) manner, but he also identifies a creative
form in which marginalised groups can appropriate and use the archetypes and stereotypes
of Otherness that culture has perpetuated as truth.
The disability theorist, the disabled, as the object of so many popular films, can, through
such films, initially validate the Social Model perspective that disability is a social
construct. The disabled critic can identify that impairment is made negative in any
appropriate narrative and by using those identified, oppressive images of ourselves can
reflect back to the culture the myths that it has perpetuated about us. We can even use
these myths in our own culture to subvert the conventions and traditions which society uses
to legitimate the oppression of disabled people. This technique is used to great effect by
key Disability Arts artists such as Ann Whitehurst, Snoozyland and the Centre Consultants.
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The 'affirmation' manner of representation (despite the fact that disabled people have yet
fully to create any satisfactory degree of affirmation, let alone go beyond it) gives us a key
into a way in which 'successful' disabled people can include the forgotten disabled (those
already dead, the segregated, those trapped in day centres or those unable to advocate on
their own behalf) and, furthermore, in a way that simplistic idea(l)s of positive imagery fail
to accomplish. Also - and this is another way in which the disabled and impaired can
appropriate various images and subvert them - disabled theorists can argue that the images
given as negative are not in fact negative but positive, because they show the impaired's
disabled 'reality' and normal culture's rejection of it. Such negative images similarly show
the disabled, (i.e., the reality of disablement) how society has constructed them.
We, all of us, can validate a wider acceptable central point only by making the outer edges
more acceptable, by which I mean that disability theory analysis (of all kinds) must
validate the severely disabled first (people with learning difficulties, people with severe
mental health problems, etc.) if any degree of equality in difference is to be achieved for all
disabled people. Society must value those people, disabled or not, who are in the margins
of our society, in order to validate fully the mildly abnormal who tend to be the socially
peripheral. Although it may appear that some disabled people are accepted as honorary
normal people, they are not, and therein lies the mystifying essence of the social
construction of disability.
My analysis of the core films has, it is hoped, gone some way towards revealing both the
manner and the nature of the social construction of impairment as disability both within the
films themselves and the culture in which they circulate; also, in the way in which the
films, by implication, give credence and status to those idea(1)s of normality socio-
culturally supported by the Medical Model and numerous other ideological hegemonies (be
they corporeal, or familial, for example).
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Is normality really fragile? Do normal people have such limited self-esteem? Does
normality fear abnormality with such a vigour that it must eliminate it at every
opportunity? All these are questions for future research.
Normality does not exist, but it is a complex social construction that we use to make sense
of the everyday. As such, the Social Model theorists' aim is to show that 'disability' does
not exist as a reality and that it is merely a complex social construction of impairment as
abnormality. Thus, in applying the Social Model, I have shown in action the cinematic part
of that process of construction in action in the films analysed in this thesis. In doing so, I
have achieved the ultimate goals of this thesis.
Many areas of research for the future offer exciting opportunities for new insights into the
analysis of disability imagery; for example, the question of how disabled people from
ethnic minorities are represented is an area of considerable importance but is one that has
hardly been addressed. Equally, I feel that considerable rewards may be gained from
analysing the nuances of specific impairment representations such as epilepsy, visual and
hearing impairments, and spinal injuries; regularly 'represented' impairments which, for
example, vastly out-number the occasions on which congenital impairments are
represented. Why? Significantly, I have yet to see a major representation of Spina Bifida
and / or Hydrocephalous — other than as an abortion scenario in Eastenders (BBC 1, 1998,
on-going plot line) - even though it is a well-known impairment and more prevalent than
many other impairments that are regularly represented in entertainment. I would hope that
future work would examine the specific issue of the representation of congenital
impairments in an era when ante-natal and genetic screening (usually leading to a
termination) is reducing considerably the number of people born with an impairment.
Finally, I would hope that much more theoretical work, both creatively and academically,
is carried out by disabled people on, and in, all forms of media. The wider the range of
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people creating images and writing about them the greater the scope for a recognition of
the diversity within all communities, let alone within the disabled community; leading
eventually, one would hope, to a fully inclusive cultural community that values people for
their differences as much as their similarities.
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Filmography
Core Films: detailed and listed chronologically
A Day In The Death Of Joe Egg Columbia / Domino (David Deutsch)
GB 1970 (Released 1972) 106mins Eastmancolour
writer Peter Nichols (from his own play) director Peter Medal(
photography Ken Hodges music Edward Elgar
cast Alan Bates, Janet Suzman, Peter Bowles, Sheila Gish, Joan Hickson
The Raging Moon EMI
GB 1970 (US title: Long Ago Tomorrow) 111mins Technicolor
writer Bryan Forbes (from a novel by Peter Marshall)
director Bryan Forbes
photography Tony Imi music Stanley Myers
cast Malcolm McDowell, Nanette Newman, Georgia Brown,
Michael Flanders
The Elephant Man EMI / Brooksfilms (Stuart Cornfield)
US 1980 124mins b&w Panavision
writers Christopher de Vore, Eric Bergren and
David Lynch (from various memoirs)
director David Lynch photography Freddie Francis
music John Morris (and Samuel Barber)
cast John Hurt, Anthony Hopkins, Freddie Jones,
John Gielgud, Michael Elphick
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Whose Life Is It Anyway? MGM / Martin Schute and
Ray Cooney / Lawrence Bachmann
US 1981 118mins Metrocolor
writer Brian Clark (from his play) and Reginald Rose
director John Badham photography Mario Tosi
music Arthur Rubenstein
cast Richard Dreyfuss, John Cassavetes, Christine Lahti, Bob Balaban
Duet For One Cannon (Menahem Golan and Yoram Globus)
GB 1987 107mins Rank colour
writers Tom Kempinski (from his play), Jeremy Lipp
and Andrei Konchalovsky
director Andrei Konchalovsky photography Alex Thomson
music Bach (and various others)
cast Julie Andrews, Alan Bates, Max Von Sydow,
Rupert Everett, Liam Neeson
My Left Foot Palace / Femadale Films / Granada TV
International / RTE (Noel Pearson)
GB 1989 103mins Technicolor
writers Shane Connaughton and Jim Sheridan
(from book by Christy Brown)
director Jim Sheridan photography Jack Conroy
music Elmer Bernstein


























































Bad Day at Black Rock
Batman Returns
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Carry On ... (generic)
Cat O'Nine Tails
Charly
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Dir: Joseph L. Mankiewicz





Eye of the Cat
Eye of the Needle
Faster Pussycat Kill Kill!
Forrest Gump






Go Now (aka Love Bites: Go Now)
The Good, The Bad and the Ugly
Gummo
Hana Bi




The Hunchback of Notre Dame
The Hunchback of Notre Dame
The Hunchback of Notre Dame
The Hunchback of Notre Dame
Ich Klage Na
I Don't Want to be Born
The Idiots
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Dir: G. Trousdale and K. Wise
Dir. . Wolfgang Liebeneiner
Dir: Peter Sasdy























US 1950	 Dir: Fred Zinnemann
US 1969	 Dir: John Schlesinger
US 1998	 Dir: Peter Chelsom
US 1931	 Dir: Frank Capra
US 1962	 Dir: Arthue Penn
US 1988	 Dir: George Romero
US 1995	 Dir: Stephen Herek
US 1993	 Dir: Brian Hanson
GB 1995	 Dir: Anthony Waller
US 1947	 Dir: John Cromwell
GB 1962	 Dir: Richard Quine
GB 1958	 Dir: J. Lee Thompson
US 1951	 Dir: Nicholas Ray
US 1992	 Dir: John Sayles
US 1965	 Dir: Guy Green
US 1952	 Dir: Rudolph Mate
US 1998	 Dir: John Roberts
US 1996	 Dir: Milos Forman
US 1996	 Dir: George Hickenlooper
Australia 1993	 Dir: Jane Campion
France 1984	 Dir: Claude Chabrol
US 1988	 Dir: Barry Levinson
GB 1956	 Dir: Lewis Gilbert
US 1994	 Dir: Alan Parker
France/Germany 1978 Dir: Tinto Brass
Italy 1989	 Dir. A. Jodorowski
US 1977	 Dir: John Badham
GB 1951	 Dir: B.D. Hurst
GB 1970	 Dir: Ronald Neame
US 1988	 Dir: Richard Donner
US 1993	 Dir: Agnieszka Holland
Sweden 1957	 Dir: Ingmar Bergman






































No Trees in the Street
On Dangerous Ground
Passion Fish
A Patch of Blue
Paula
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The Story of Esther Costello
The Stratton Story
The Switch
Tell Me That You Love Me,
Junie Moon
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